U.S. Critical Minerals Supply Chain Analysis

Executive Summary

The U.S. government designates a “critical mineral” as a commodity that meets three key criteria:¹

It is essential to economic or national security.

Its supply chain is vulnerable to disruption.

It serves an essential function in manufacturing a product, and its absence would have significant consequences.

Based on this definition, the United States faces acute supply chain vulnerabilities for numerous essential metals. A new U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) economic risk model reveals a specific cohort of 14 metals, led by rhodium and niobium, poses an immediate and disproportionate threat. A supply disruption in any one of these could inflict a probability-weighted impact on the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from over $1 billion to as much as $64 billion.²˒³

These vulnerabilities are rooted in geopolitical realities. The nation has a strategic dependency on a few countries. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) dominates the processing of rare earth elements (REEs), gallium, and germanium.⁴˒⁵ A precarious duopoly of South Africa and Russia controls platinum group metals (PGMs).⁶˒⁷ This concentration gives strategic competitors significant geoeconomic leverage. These nations have weaponized this leverage through export controls and other coercive trade measures.⁸˒⁹˒¹⁰˒¹¹

Key Takeaways:

Quantifiable Economic Risk: The 2025 USGS methodology shifts risk assessment from static metrics to a dynamic economic impact model. This provides a clear, monetary basis for prioritizing policy interventions.³˒¹²˒¹³
High-Threat Metals: A small group of 14 metals presents the most severe economic threat. This group includes rhodium, niobium, and several REEs, with potential GDP impacts in the billions of dollars.²˒³
Geopolitical Chokepoints: The most significant vulnerability lies not in mining but in midstream processing. China holds a near-monopoly in this area, creating strategic chokepoints.⁴˒¹⁴
Sector-Wide Paralysis: A mineral shortage could paralyze key sectors. These include the defense industrial base (e.g., F-35 fighter jet), the automotive industry, semiconductor manufacturing, and the clean energy transition.²˒¹²˒¹⁵˒¹⁶
Urgent Need for a National Strategy: Mitigating these risks requires a multi-domain strategy. This strategy must focus on onshoring processing, scaling up recycling, fostering material substitution, and strengthening diplomatic partnerships like the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP).

The security of these metallic elements is no longer a niche industrial concern. It is a central pillar of U.S. economic resilience and national security in the 21st century.

A Paradigm Shift in Criticality: The 2025 USGS List and Its Economic Framework

The United States has fundamentally transformed its approach to identifying and managing mineral supply chain risk. The draft 2025 List of Critical Minerals, developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), introduces a sophisticated, economics-driven framework. This new model moves beyond static indicators of dependency to a dynamic model of potential economic damage. Mandated by the Energy Act of 2020, this paradigm shift provides a more nuanced and actionable understanding of the nation’s vulnerabilities. It allows for a data-driven prioritization of resources and policy interventions.¹²˒¹³˒¹⁷

The Evolution from 2022 to 2025

The 2022 list identified 50 critical minerals and was a significant step in codifying national supply chain concerns. Its methodology used a quantitative assessment of four primary factors:¹⁸˒¹⁹

Disruption potential: Evaluating the political and economic stability of producing countries.
Trade exposure: Measuring U.S. import reliance.
Economic vulnerability: Assessing a mineral’s importance to downstream industries.
Domestic single point of failure (SPOF): The risk of relying on a single domestic producer.

This approach successfully identified a broad range of materials with vulnerable supply chains. However, it produced a relatively “flat” list. The framework did not allow for easy comparison of the magnitude of risk between, for example, gallium and manganese.³ While all minerals meeting the criteria were designated as critical, the framework lacked a clear, hierarchical ranking of the threat each posed.

A New Economic Model

The 2025 draft list represents a transformative leap in analytical rigor. The new methodology moves from normalized indicators to a direct economic effects assessment. It employs a sophisticated economic model to simulate the consequences of over 1,200 different one-year trade disruption scenarios. The model analyzes their impact on 402 individual U.S. industries and the economy as a whole.¹²˒¹⁸˒²⁰

Crucially, the model weights the economic impacts, measured in projected GDP losses, by the probability of each disruption scenario occurring.¹²˒¹³ This shift from a static, reliance-based framework to a scenario-based, impact-driven one provides a direct monetary value for the risk associated with each of the 84 mineral commodities analyzed.³˒¹²˒¹⁹

Under this new paradigm, the USGS recommends a mineral for inclusion on the list if a probability-adjusted supply disruption is projected to cause a net U.S. GDP decrease of at least $2 million.³˒¹⁹ The methodology also retains a provision for including minerals that pose a SPOF risk, which was the basis for zirconium’s inclusion.¹²

This new approach fundamentally alters the policy conversation by monetizing national security risk. It translates the abstract concept of “supply chain vulnerability” into a concrete economic metric. Policymakers can now directly weigh this metric against the costs of mitigation strategies, enabling rigorous cost-benefit analyses. This framework facilitates a more rational and defensible allocation of federal resources by prioritizing investments that address the largest quantifiable economic threats.³˒¹²

Expansion and Rationale for New Additions

This new methodology resulted in a proposed expansion of the list to 54 commodities.³˒¹²˒²¹ The most significant change is the inclusion of several high-volume industrial metals. This signals a broader understanding of economic vulnerability that extends beyond niche inputs to the foundational materials of the modern economy.

Copper: The addition of copper is a landmark decision, reflecting its indispensable role as the “metal of electrification”.²² Surging demand from the clean energy transition is creating unprecedented supply pressures. Electric vehicles, grid expansion, renewable energy generation, and data centers all require massive amounts of copper, creating projections of structural global supply deficits.²²˒²³ The USGS model calculated a significant potential GDP loss from a supply disruption, thus meeting the threshold for criticality.¹²˒¹³˒¹⁹˒²⁴
Silver: Silver’s inclusion marks a strategic re-evaluation, reframing it from a precious metal to a strategic industrial asset.²⁵ This change is driven by its irreplaceable role in technologies like photovoltaic cells for solar energy and a vast range of electronics.²⁵˒²⁶ With demand surging and the U.S. heavily reliant on imports, the new assessment identified a significant economic risk.¹²˒¹³
Lead, Rhenium, and Silicon: These materials were also added after the new economic assessment determined that potential supply disruptions would meet the GDP loss threshold.¹³˒¹⁹˒²⁰˒²⁷ Rhenium’s re-inclusion underscores the dynamism of the new risk model.²⁸˒²⁹ Silicon’s addition reflects its foundational role in the entire semiconductor industry.¹⁷
Removals: The recommendation to remove arsenic and tellurium indicates that the probability-weighted GDP impact of a supply disruption for these commodities fell below the $2 million criticality threshold.¹²˒¹³

The updated list provides a much clearer hierarchy of risk. The underlying data reveals a distinct spectrum of vulnerability, suggesting that a tiered policy approach would be more effective than a one-size-fits-all strategy.³ Furthermore, the inclusion of copper and silver acknowledges that the technologies central to the U.S. clean energy transition are themselves creating new, large-scale strategic vulnerabilities.²²˒²⁵

Geopolitical Chokepoints: Mapping the Global Concentration of Production and Processing

The economic risks identified by the USGS are a direct consequence of a global production and processing landscape with extreme geographic concentration. A small number of countries, some of which are strategic competitors, hold disproportionate control over the supply of critical metals. This control is most acute not at the mining stage but in midstream processing and refining, creating formidable geopolitical chokepoints.

China’s Systemic Dominance

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has established systemic dominance across a wide range of critical mineral supply chains. This results from decades of strategic industrial policy, state-backed investment, and a high tolerance for the environmental costs of mineral processing, which often leads to severe habitat loss, water and soil contamination, and radioactive waste.³⁰˒³¹˒³²

Rare Earth Elements (REEs): The PRC’s control over the REE supply chain is comprehensive. While it accounts for 60-70% of global REE mining, its true leverage lies in its near-monopoly over midstream processing. China controls approximately 90% of the world’s capacity for separating and refining rare earth oxides into high-purity metals and alloys.⁴˒¹⁴˒³³ This creates a dependency loop: the only active U.S. rare earth mine has historically been compelled to ship its raw concentrate to China for processing.⁴˒⁹
Gallium and Germanium: China’s dominance is even more stark for these metalloids, which are critical for the semiconductor and defense industries. The PRC accounts for an estimated 98-99% of global primary low-purity gallium production and over 60% of germanium production.¹¹˒³⁴˒³⁵ The supply of both is highly inelastic, as they are recovered as byproducts of bauxite, zinc, and coal processing.²¹˒³⁵˒³⁶
Antimony, Tungsten, and Aluminum: China’s influence extends to other key materials. It is the top producer of antimony (roughly 60% of global supply), dominates the tungsten market (over 80% of supply), and accounts for over 58% of global primary aluminum production.⁵˒³³˒³⁷

Weaponization of Dominance: Beijing has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use this market control as a tool of geoeconomic coercion. China has imposed escalating export controls, licensing requirements, and outright bans on REEs, gallium, and germanium, explicitly targeting military end-users to disrupt Western defense and technology supply chains.³˒⁸˒⁹˒¹⁰˒¹¹˒¹⁶˒³⁸˒³⁹

The Platinum Group Metals (PGMs) Duopoly

The global supply of PGMs—platinum, palladium, rhodium, iridium, and ruthenium—is dangerously concentrated in just two countries.

South Africa: The Bushveld Igneous Complex in South Africa is the world’s single largest source of PGMs. The country is the dominant producer of platinum (approx. 70% of global supply) and rhodium (80-85%).⁶˒⁷˒⁴⁰˒⁴¹˒⁴² This supply chain is vulnerable to internal risks, including labor unrest, political instability, and a chronic national electricity crisis.⁷˒⁴³
Russia: As the world’s largest producer of palladium (approx. 40% of global supply) and a major producer of platinum and rhodium, Russia represents the other half of this fragile duopoly.⁶˒⁴⁰˒⁴⁴ The ongoing war in Ukraine and subsequent international sanctions have severely compromised the reliability of this supply, and the threat of Moscow restricting PGM exports as leverage remains significant.⁷˒⁴⁵

Other Critical Single-Source Dependencies

Several other critical metals are characterized by an extreme concentration of supply in a single country.

Niobium (Brazil): Brazil exercises a near-monopoly over the global niobium market, accounting for approximately 85-90% of production.⁴⁶˒⁴⁷˒⁴⁸ A Chinese firm, CMOC, owns one of Brazil’s largest niobium mines, adding another layer of geopolitical risk.⁴⁶˒⁴⁹
Cobalt (Democratic Republic of Congo): The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the source of over 70% of the world’s mined cobalt.⁵⁰˒⁵¹ The supply chain is fraught with challenges, including political instability, inadequate infrastructure, and severe environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns, particularly related to artisanal mining practices involving child labor and unsafe conditions.⁵²˒⁵³˒⁵⁴˒⁵⁵ Critically, China controls the majority of the refining and processing capacity for cobalt extracted from the DRC.⁵⁰˒⁵⁶

This analysis reveals that the most acute U.S. vulnerability lies in the control over midstream processing and refining. Any effective national strategy must prioritize breaking this processing monopoly.

The following table provides a summary of key geopolitical chokepoints in critical mineral supply chains.

Country	Mineral	Role in Supply Chain	Estimated Global Share	Key Vulnerabilities
China	Rare Earth Elements	Mining	~70%	Geopolitical leverage; export controls; environmental concerns ¹
		Processing & Refining	~90%	Strategic chokepoint; dependency of U.S. and allied mines ¹
	Gallium	Primary Production	~98%	Near-monopoly; byproduct of aluminum/zinc; export weaponization ³
	Germanium	Primary Production	~60-67%	Dominant producer; byproduct of zinc/coal; export weaponization ⁵
	Antimony	Mining & Refining	~60%	Dominant producer; used in flame retardants and defense applications ⁷
	Tungsten	Mining & Refining	>80%	Dominant producer; critical for defense and industrial tools ⁸
	Aluminum	Primary Production	>58%	Massive scale; energy-intensive production often coal-powered ⁹
South Africa	Rhodium	Mining	~80-85%	Internal political instability; labor strikes; electricity shortages ¹⁰
	Platinum	Mining	~70%	Internal political instability; labor strikes; electricity shortages ¹²
	Iridium, Ruthenium	Mining	Dominant	Byproduct of platinum mining; subject to same internal risks ¹³
Russia	Palladium	Mining	~40%	Geopolitical risk (Ukraine war); international sanctions; potential for retaliation ¹⁵
	Platinum, Rhodium	Mining	2nd Largest	Geopolitical risk; sanctions; state-influenced production ¹¹
Brazil	Niobium	Mining	~85-90%	Near-monopoly from two mines; one mine owned by a Chinese firm ¹⁷
DR Congo	Cobalt	Mining	>70%	Extreme political instability; ethical/ESG concerns; infrastructure deficits ¹⁹

The High-Threat Portfolio: A Deep Dive on Metals with Multibillion-Dollar Disruption Risk

The USGS’s 2025 economic risk assessment provides a clear hierarchy of threats. This allows for a focused analysis of the 14 metallic commodities that pose the most significant danger to the U.S. economy. Each is capable of inflicting a probability-weighted GDP loss exceeding $1 billion from a one-year supply disruption.

The table below outlines these high-threat metals, ranked by their potential economic impact.

Rank	Metal	Est. GDP Loss ($M)	Primary Applications	Top Producers (% Global Supply)	U.S. Import Reliance (%)
1	Rhodium	$64,340	Automotive Catalytic Converters, Chemical Catalysts	South Africa (~80%), Russia (~12%)	~90% (PGMs)
2	Niobium	$10,441	High-Strength Steels, Superalloys (Aerospace)	Brazil (~88%), Canada (~10%)	100%
3	Samarium	$4,498	Permanent Magnets (Defense), Nuclear Reactors	China (~100%)	~80% (REEs)
4	Potash	$2,541	Fertilizer, Chemicals	Canada, Russia, Belarus	High
5	Lutetium	$2,059	Petroleum Catalysts, Medical Imaging (PET)	China (Dominant)	~80% (REEs)
6	Terbium	$1,809	High-Performance Magnets (EVs), Green Phosphors	China (Dominant)	~80% (REEs)
7	Dysprosium	$1,624	High-Temperature Magnets (EVs, Wind Turbines)	China (Dominant)	~80% (REEs)
8	Gallium	$1,418	Semiconductors (GaAs, GaN), LEDs, Solar Cells	China (~98%)	100%
9	Germanium	$1,249+	Fiber Optics, Infrared Optics (Night Vision)	China (~67%), Russia	>50%
10	Gadolinium	$1,000+	MRI Agents, Magnets	China (Dominant)	~80% (REEs)
11	Ruthenium	$1,000+	Electronics (Chip Resistors), Catalysts	South Africa, Russia	High (PGMs)
12	Iridium	$1,000+	Catalysts (Hydrogen), Spark Plugs, Electronics	South Africa, Russia	High (PGMs)
13	Platinum	$1,000+	Automotive Catalytic Converters, Jewelry, Catalysts	South Africa (~70%), Russia	High (PGMs)
14	Palladium	$1,000+	Automotive Catalytic Converters, Electronics	Russia (~40%), South Africa	High (PGMs)
Note: GDP loss figures are based on USGS and external analysis.²˒³ Ranks and figures for some metals below the top tier are estimated based on qualitative risk classifications. Potash, a non-metal, is included for context as it ranks high in the overall USGS list.

Rhodium (Potential GDP Loss: ~$64.3 Billion)

Rhodium stands alone as the single greatest metallic threat to the U.S. economy. Its potential disruption impact is more than six times that of the next-ranked metal.²˒³ The U.S. has a near-total import reliance of approximately 90% for the entire PGM group.⁶⁰ Production is overwhelmingly concentrated in South Africa (around 80%) and Russia (around 12%), placing the supply chain at the mercy of two geopolitically fraught nations.⁶˒⁷˒⁶¹

Its primary economic importance lies in its use in automotive catalytic converters to neutralize harmful nitrogen oxides (). There are no viable substitutes for this application.⁶²˒⁶³ A supply disruption would therefore directly threaten the U.S. automotive industry’s ability to manufacture compliant vehicles.

Niobium (Potential GDP Loss: ~$10.4 Billion)

Niobium presents the second-highest economic risk. The United States has been 100% net import reliant for this metal since 1959.⁴⁶˒⁶⁴˒⁶⁵ The global supply is a near-monopoly, controlled by Brazil (85-90%) and Canada (10-15%).⁴⁶˒⁴⁷˒⁶⁵ Niobium is essential for producing high-strength, low-alloy (HSLA) steels and superalloys. These materials are indispensable for critical infrastructure and high-performance aerospace and defense applications.²˒⁴⁸˒⁶⁶

The “Magnet Metals”: Samarium, Lutetium, Terbium, and Dysprosium

This group of rare earth elements ranks third, fifth, sixth, and seventh in GDP risk, respectively. They represent a core vulnerability for the U.S. defense and technology sectors.²˒¹²˒²⁰ The U.S. is critically dependent on China for all REEs, with the PRC accounting for 70% of total U.S. imports and nearly 100% of the processing for heavy REEs like dysprosium and terbium.⁴˒⁶⁷˒⁶⁸˒⁶⁹ China’s monopoly on samarium is absolute.⁷⁰˒⁷¹

The strategic importance of these metals is tied to their use in high-performance permanent magnets:

Samarium: A key component of samarium-cobalt (SmCo) magnets, used almost exclusively in military applications like the guidance systems of the F-35 fighter jet.²˒⁹˒¹⁶˒⁷²
Dysprosium and Terbium: Added to neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets to enhance performance at high temperatures, making them essential for high-performance EV motors and wind turbine generators.²˒⁷²˒⁷³
Lutetium: Used in critical applications such as petroleum cracking catalysts and medical imaging scintillators for PET scanners.²˒⁷⁴ Its production is dominated by China as a scarce byproduct of other REE processing.⁷⁴˒⁷⁵

The “Semiconductor Metals”: Gallium and Germanium

Ranking eighth and ninth in GDP risk, gallium and germanium represent a direct threat to the U.S. semiconductor industry.¹²˒²⁰ The U.S. is 100% import reliant for primary gallium and over 50% reliant for germanium.⁵⁷˒⁷⁶˒⁷⁷ China’s production dominance is overwhelming, at approximately 98% for gallium and 67% for germanium.¹¹˒³⁴˒³⁵ These metals are critical for high-performance compound semiconductors like Gallium arsenide (GaAs) and gallium nitride (GaN), which are essential for 5G telecommunications, advanced military radar, and high-efficiency solar cells.²˒⁷⁶˒⁷⁸

Other High-Risk Platinum Group Metals

Ruthenium, iridium, platinum, and palladium complete the high-threat portfolio. Their supply chains mirror the extreme concentration of rhodium, with a heavy dependence on South Africa and Russia.⁴⁰˒⁴⁴˒⁵⁸˒⁵⁹˒⁷⁹ While platinum and palladium are primarily used in catalytic converters, iridium and ruthenium are increasingly important for the production of green hydrogen, linking their supply security to the future of the hydrogen economy.¹⁷˒⁵⁸˒⁷⁹˒⁸⁰˒⁸¹

The Electrification Imperative: Assessing Supply Risks for Foundational Industrial Metals

The 2025 draft list marks a significant strategic evolution by including high-volume industrial metals like copper and aluminum. This expansion acknowledges a new reality. The immense material demands of the global energy transition are transforming the supply chain risks for even the most foundational commodities.

Copper (New Addition)

The inclusion of copper on the critical minerals list recognizes its indispensable role in the 21st-century economy. The U.S. relies on imports for approximately 30-45% of its refined copper consumption, primarily from Chile, Canada, and Mexico.⁸²˒⁸³ Although the U.S. is a major copper producer, its domestic refining capacity is insufficient to meet national demand.⁸⁴˒⁸⁵

The primary risk factor for copper is a looming structural global deficit. This deficit is driven by an unprecedented surge in demand from the energy transition and the rapid growth of artificial intelligence data centers.²²˒²³˒⁸⁶˒⁸⁷ Multiple analyses project a global supply deficit of 20-30% by 2035.²³˒⁸⁷˒⁸⁸ This shortfall is structural, as the lead times for developing new large-scale copper mines often exceed 15-17 years.²³˒⁸⁷

Aluminum

The U.S. position in the aluminum supply chain has become increasingly precarious. The nation relies on imports for around 50% of its consumption.⁸⁹˒⁹⁰ Domestic primary aluminum production has collapsed over the past four decades, with only four smelters remaining operational.⁹¹˒⁹² While Canada is the primary source of U.S. imports, this cannot insulate the U.S. from global market dynamics dominated by China, which produces over 58% of the world’s primary aluminum.³⁷˒⁹⁰˒⁹³

Aluminum’s economic importance is ubiquitous. It is essential for transportation, construction, and packaging. The production process is extremely energy-intensive, making its cost highly sensitive to global energy prices.⁹¹˒⁹⁴

Battery Metals (Lithium, Cobalt, Nickel)

The viability of the U.S. electric vehicle industry depends on a secure supply of lithium, cobalt, and nickel. All three metals face the prospect of long-term supply shortfalls when measured against projected exponential demand growth.

Lithium: The market is currently experiencing oversupply, but this masks a more challenging long-term outlook.⁹⁵˒⁹⁶ As EV adoption accelerates, forecasts predict the market will shift back into a structural deficit by the late 2020s.⁹⁵˒⁹⁷˒⁹⁸
Cobalt: Cobalt faces dual risks of a projected supply deficit and extreme geopolitical concentration.⁵⁰˒⁵¹˒⁵⁶ With over 70% of mining concentrated in the unstable Democratic Republic of Congo and the majority of refining capacity located in China, the cobalt supply chain is one of the most fragile among all critical minerals.⁵⁰˒⁵⁶
Nickel: The nickel market is currently in surplus, largely due to a massive expansion of production in Indonesia.⁹⁹˒¹⁰⁰˒¹⁰¹ However, this surplus is predominantly in lower-grade, Class 2 nickel used for stainless steel.¹⁰² The supply of high-purity, Class 1 nickel, required for advanced EV battery cathodes, remains significantly tighter.⁹⁹˒¹⁰³

Long-Term Outlook: Beyond 2035

While near-term risks are pressing, a long-term perspective reveals that challenges facing critical mineral supply chains are structural and poised to intensify. The global energy transition is a multi-decade transformation that will continue to drive exponential demand growth for key metals.

Copper: Demand could grow from 25 million metric tons (MMt) today to 53 MMt by 2050. A significant supply-demand gap is expected to persist through 2050.¹⁰⁴ The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts a potential 30% supply shortfall by 2035 alone.⁶⁷˒¹⁰⁵
Lithium: The IEA projects that lithium demand for clean energy will increase fivefold by 2040.⁶⁸ The market could shift to a structural deficit by 2029, with a potential supply gap as large as 40% by 2035.⁹⁷˒⁶⁸
Cobalt and Nickel: Demand for both cobalt and nickel is projected to grow by 60-70% by 2040.¹⁰⁶ The current market surplus for both is expected to shift to a deficit in the mid-to-late 2020s as EV adoption accelerates.¹⁰⁷˒¹⁰⁸ For nickel, long-term demand from the EV sector is forecast to grow at a compound annual rate of 12.8%, adding 1.4 million tonnes of annual consumption by 2035.¹⁰⁹
Rare Earth Elements: Demand for REEs used in permanent magnets is also set for strong growth, driven by EVs and wind turbines.⁶⁸

This long-term outlook underscores the urgency of the issue. The supply challenges are structural, rooted in the mismatch between the pace of the energy transition and the long timelines required to develop new mineral resources.

Cascading Impacts: Sectoral Analysis of Critical Mineral Shortages

A disruption in the availability of a single critical metal can trigger cascading failures across entire sectors of the U.S. economy. The interconnectedness of modern manufacturing means a shortage of a low-volume, high-impact material can paralyze the production of high-value systems.

Aerospace & Defense Industrial Base

The U.S. aerospace and defense sector is uniquely vulnerable due to its stringent material requirements and long qualification timelines. This sector often has zero tolerance for material substitution.

Rare Earth Elements (REEs): Neodymium, samarium, and dysprosium are indispensable for the high-performance permanent magnets in many advanced defense systems, including precision-guided munitions and aircraft actuators.³³˒⁷² The F-35 Lightning II fighter jet, for example, requires approximately 418 kilograms of REEs per aircraft.²˒³³
Superalloys and Specialty Metals: Niobium, titanium, beryllium, and rhenium are vital components of superalloys used in jet engines and airframes, allowing them to withstand extreme operating conditions.¹⁶˒¹¹⁰˒¹¹¹ Cobalt is another essential element in these superalloys.⁷²˒¹¹¹
Advanced Electronics: Gallium and germanium are fundamental to the advanced semiconductors used in next-generation radar, electronic warfare suites, and secure satellite communications systems.⁷²˒¹¹¹˒¹¹²

The following table highlights the reliance of key U.S. defense platforms on critical mineral inputs.

Defense Platform	Key Critical Mineral Inputs	Application within the System	Quantity per Unit (if available)
F-35 Fighter Jet	REEs (Nd, Pr, Sm, Dy, Tb), Cobalt, Niobium, Titanium	Permanent magnets for actuators, guidance; Superalloys for engine components; Airframe alloys	~418 kg REEs
Virginia-Class Submarine	REEs (Nd, Sm, Gd), Cobalt, Niobium	Magnets for drive motors, sonar systems; High-strength steel alloys for hull; Nuclear shielding (Gd)	~4,170 kg REEs
Arleigh Burke DDG-51 Destroyer	REEs (Nd, Y, Gd), Gallium	Advanced radar systems (GaN); Missile guidance; Sonar transducers	~2,360 kg REEs
Tomahawk Missile	REEs (Sm, Nd, Dy), Tungsten, Tantalum	Magnets for guidance and control fins; High-density penetrators (W); Capacitors (Ta)	Not Publicly Available

Automotive Sector

The automotive industry faces two distinct sets of mineral vulnerabilities.

Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) Vehicles: The production of traditional vehicles remains highly dependent on platinum group metals—platinum, palladium, and rhodium—for use in catalytic converters.¹⁷˒⁴³˒⁶²
Electric Vehicles (EVs): The transition to electric mobility shifts dependency to a broader basket of materials. The entire EV ecosystem is built upon lithium, cobalt, nickel, and graphite for batteries; REEs for motors; and immense quantities of copper for wiring and infrastructure.¹¹³˒¹¹⁴˒¹¹⁵

Semiconductor and Electronics Manufacturing

The CHIPS and Science Act aims to revitalize U.S. semiconductor manufacturing, but this ambition is threatened by fragile mineral supply chains.

Silicon: As the foundational material for semiconductors, silicon’s inclusion on the 2025 critical minerals list highlights a base-level vulnerability.¹⁷
Gallium and Germanium: These metalloids are essential for next-generation compound semiconductors (GaAs and GaN), which are critical for 5G communications and advanced radar.¹⁷˒⁷⁸˒¹¹⁶
Other Critical Inputs: A host of other minerals are vital for electronic components, including tantalum for capacitors and ruthenium for chip resistors.⁵⁸

Clean Energy Transition

The global transition to a low-carbon energy system is predicated on the availability of vast quantities of critical minerals.

Wind and Solar Power: Wind turbines rely on REE-based magnets, while solar panels are manufactured using high-purity silicon and silver.¹⁷˒²²˒²⁵˒²⁸˒¹¹⁷
Grid Modernization: The expansion of the national electrical grid will require immense quantities of copper and aluminum.²²˒⁸⁶
Energy Storage: Grid-scale battery systems rely on the same lithium, cobalt, and nickel supply chains as the EV industry, creating direct competition.¹¹⁷

This convergence of demand creates a significant risk of inter-sectoral competition that could exacerbate shortages during a crisis.

A National Strategy for Mineral Resilience: Policy and Investment Recommendations

Mitigating the threat from critical mineral vulnerabilities requires a coherent, multi-domain national strategy. This strategy must integrate domestic production incentives, technological innovation, robust diplomacy, and strategic stockpiling into a unified effort involving government, private industry, and research institutions.¹¹⁸˒¹¹⁹˒¹²⁰

Onshoring and “Friend-Shoring” the Full Value Chain

The primary vulnerability lies in midstream processing and refining, not just mining. U.S. policy must prioritize onshoring and “friend-shoring” these crucial value-added steps.

Recommendation: Shift U.S. policy from a singular emphasis on mining to a holistic, mine-to-magnet approach. Prioritize federal incentives for the construction and scaling of domestic and allied midstream processing facilities.¹⁷˒¹²¹˒¹²²˒¹²³

Implementation:

Provide direct support for strategic projects that can break foreign monopolies, such as NioCorp’s niobium facility in Nebraska⁶⁶ and the Ambler mining district in Alaska.¹²⁴
Accelerate the build-out of a complete domestic REE supply chain, with a goal of meeting all U.S. defense needs by 2027.³³˒¹²⁵˒¹²⁶˒¹²⁷
Expedite the federal permitting process for designated strategic projects to reduce timelines from over ten years to approximately two years.¹¹²˒¹²⁸˒¹²⁹

Unlocking Alternative and Secondary Resources

A significant, underexploited domestic resource exists in the nation’s waste streams. A national effort to scale up recycling (“urban mining”) can augment primary supply.

Recommendation: Launch a national initiative to aggressively scale up the recovery, recycling, and reprocessing of critical minerals from end-of-life products and industrial waste.

Implementation:

Expand funding for research and demonstration of advanced recycling technologies, such as “cathode-to-cathode” recycling for lithium-ion batteries.¹²²˒¹²³
Target the recovery of minerals from unconventional sources, like REEs from coal ash and germanium from mine tailings.¹³⁰˒¹³¹
Create demand-side incentives, such as tax credits for manufacturers who use recycled content or a “strategic recycling reserve.”

Fostering Innovation in Substitution and Demand Reduction

The most secure mineral is one that is not needed. A long-term strategy must include innovating away from dependency through substitute materials and more efficient designs. This requires collaboration between government, private industry, and research institutions.¹²³˒¹²⁰˒¹³²

Recommendation: Establish and fund a national material science initiative focused on the “grand challenges” of critical mineral substitution.

Implementation: Expand existing programs like the DOE’s Critical Material Innovation, Efficiency, and Alternatives Program.¹³³ Set ambitious goals, such as designing high-performance magnets with reduced heavy REE content or developing new battery chemistries that eliminate cobalt. This requires sustained investment in fundamental research at National Laboratories and partner universities.¹³⁴˒¹³⁵

Leveraging Diplomatic and Financial Tools

The United States cannot achieve mineral security in isolation. A robust diplomatic and international economic strategy is essential.

Recommendation: Deepen and expand the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) into a concrete mechanism for joint financing, technical assistance, and offtake agreements.

Implementation: The MSP, which includes key allies like Australia, Canada, and the European Union, is the primary diplomatic vehicle for this effort.¹³⁶˒¹³⁷˒¹³⁸ The MSP Finance Network must be used to pool financial resources to de-risk and fund strategic projects in partner nations, providing an alternative to financing from strategic competitors and ensuring high ESG standards.¹²⁹˒¹³⁹

Modernizing the National Defense Stockpile

The National Defense Stockpile (NDS) is a critical buffer against short-term supply shocks, but its current composition may be inadequate.

Recommendation: Fully recapitalize the NDS and modernize its acquisition strategy to reflect the new economic risk methodology and 21st-century technological warfare.

Implementation: Provide full and consistent funding for the NDS Transaction Fund.¹¹² Align acquisition priorities with the USGS’s ranking of minerals by potential GDP risk. Evolve the stockpile’s strategy beyond holding raw ores to include processed materials and key intermediate components, such as permanent magnets, to buffer against processing bottlenecks.¹⁴⁰

Integrating Environmental and Social Governance (ESG) into the National Strategy

A resilient supply chain must also be sustainable and ethical. The environmental and social impacts of mining—from habitat destruction to human rights abuses—cannot be ignored.³⁰˒⁵⁴˒¹⁴¹

Recommendation: Mandate and incentivize the adoption of the highest international ESG standards for all federally supported mineral projects.

Implementation: Require projects receiving U.S. government support to adhere to leading frameworks like the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA).¹¹⁷ This includes ensuring transparent engagement with local and Indigenous communities, implementing state-of-the-art waste management, and minimizing carbon footprint.¹⁴² The U.S. should also champion these standards globally to create a market preference for responsibly sourced minerals.¹¹⁷˒¹⁴³

Glossary of Terms

Critical Mineral: A mineral commodity essential to economic or national security with a supply chain vulnerable to disruption.
DFC: U.S. International Development Finance Corporation.
DPA: Defense Production Act.
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo.
ESG: Environmental, Social, and Governance; a set of standards for a company’s operations.
EV: Electric Vehicle.
GaAs: Gallium Arsenide, a compound semiconductor.
GaN: Gallium Nitride, a compound semiconductor.
GDP: Gross Domestic Product.
HSLA: High-Strength, Low-Alloy steel.
LPO: Loan Programs Office (U.S. Department of Energy).
MSP: Minerals Security Partnership.
NdFeB: Neodymium-Iron-Boron, a type of strong permanent magnet.
PEM Electrolyzer: Proton-Exchange Membrane Electrolyzer, a device used to produce green hydrogen.
PGMs: Platinum Group Metals (platinum, palladium, rhodium, iridium, ruthenium, osmium).
REEs: Rare Earth Elements, a set of 17 metallic elements.
SmCo: Samarium-Cobalt, a type of high-temperature permanent magnet.
SPOF: Single Point of Failure.
USGS: United States Geological Survey.

Immediate Priorities: A Call to Action

To translate this analysis into immediate results, policymakers should prioritize the following actions:

Fast-Track Midstream Processing: Immediately leverage DPA and LPO authorities to fund and expedite permitting for at least two domestic or North American processing facilities for the highest-risk REEs and semiconductor metals.
Launch a National Recycling Initiative: Establish a federally coordinated program with ambitious, time-bound targets for recycling critical minerals from e-waste and EV batteries, supported by tax incentives.
Expand and Empower the Minerals Security Partnership: Evolve the MSP into a formal financing body capable of making joint, binding financial commitments to accelerate strategic projects in allied nations within the next 24 months.
Modernize the National Defense Stockpile: Direct the Defense Logistics Agency to immediately begin acquiring not just raw ores but processed high-purity metals and permanent magnets for the highest-threat minerals.

Conclusion

The United States stands at a critical juncture. The era of assuming stable, market-driven access to essential minerals is over. It has been replaced by a new geoeconomic reality where supply chains are tools of statecraft. The vulnerabilities are no longer theoretical; they are quantifiable risks to the nation’s GDP and foundational to its military and industrial strength.

The challenge is immense. Dependencies are deeply entrenched, and solutions require long-term, strategic investment. However, inaction is not an option. A failure to build resilient and secure critical mineral supply chains is a failure to prepare for the economic and national security landscape of the 21st century. The urgency is clear. A comprehensive, whole-of-government strategy is the only path forward to ensure American prosperity and security.

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