An Unmitigated Threat: The National Security Case for the Prohibition of TikTok in the United States

David’s Note: This article was substantially revised on October 10, 2025 to incorporate new research and provide a more comprehensive analysis.

With over 170 million users in the United States, TikTok is more than a social media phenomenon; it is a deeply embedded component of American digital life and commerce.¹ This ubiquity, however, masks a critical vulnerability. This report presents a comprehensive analysis of the national security threat posed by the social media application TikTok, operated by its parent company, ByteDance Ltd. It argues that due to ByteDance’s inextricable links to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the application functions as a dual-threat vector for sophisticated data espionage and algorithmic influence operations against the United States.

Executive Summary

This report analyzes the national security threat from TikTok, an application operated by ByteDance Ltd. The company’s deep connections to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) allow the app to function as a tool for data espionage and algorithmic influence against the United States.

This report’s central thesis is that mitigation efforts cannot neutralize this threat. The application’s core architecture, corporate governance, and legal obligations are inextricably linked to the CCP, a designated foreign adversary. Therefore, a complete prohibition on its operation within the United States is the only effective policy solution.

The report deconstructs ByteDance’s opaque corporate structure. It highlights the CCP’s control mechanisms, such as the “golden share” held by a state-backed entity, which make any claims of operational independence untenable. It also details warnings from top U.S. intelligence officials, including the FBI Director and the Director of National Intelligence, who define TikTok as a tool that a foreign adversary can leverage.

Furthermore, the report dismisses mitigation efforts like the $1.5 billion “Project Texas” as flawed security theater. Evidence shows this project failed to sever data flows to Beijing or neutralize the threat of algorithmic manipulation. The core issue of adversarial ownership remained unaddressed.

After refuting key counterarguments—related to the First Amendment, economic impacts, and false equivalencies with U.S. tech firms—the report concludes that partial measures are insufficient. The unique nature of the threat, rooted in ByteDance’s subservience to the CCP, demands a structural solution. The only policy that fully addresses these inherent risks is the swift enforcement of a ban on TikTok and any successor applications, as provided by the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA).

Section 1: The Architecture of Control: Deconstructing the ByteDance-CCP Nexus

To understand the TikTok threat, one must first analyze the corporate structure of its parent company, ByteDance. This is not a typical multinational corporation. It is an architecture engineered to attract Western capital and project independence while ensuring ultimate control remains subject to the CCP’s strategic interests. This control is not speculative; it is codified through legal incorporation, shareholder power, and direct state intervention.

1.1 Beyond a Global Tech Company: An Opaque Structure for Obscuring Control

ByteDance presents itself as a global company. It emphasizes that global institutional investors like Blackrock and General Atlantic own approximately 60% of its equity.³ This ownership statistic, however, is a misleading metric that obscures the true locus of control.

The parent company, ByteDance Ltd., is incorporated in the Cayman Islands, a jurisdiction known for financial secrecy.⁵ This is a common practice for Chinese firms seeking to navigate foreign investment restrictions while shielding their ownership from oversight.⁹

The critical mechanism for control lies in the company’s voting structure, not its equity. Co-founder Zhang Yiming reportedly maintains majority voting control through a dual-class share structure, despite holding only a 20% equity stake.⁵ This arrangement centralizes decision-making power with the leadership in Beijing, regardless of the preferences of its global investors.⁵

ByteDance also operates through a bifurcated system. Global entities like TikTok Ltd. are registered in the Cayman Islands, but the core operational assets are based in China.⁸ This structure allows the company to present a Western-friendly face while its legal obligations remain firmly in Beijing.

1.2 The “Golden Share”: State Power Codified

The most explicit evidence of state control is the “golden share” the Chinese government holds in a critical ByteDance subsidiary. In 2021, WangTouZhongWen (Beijing) Technology acquired a 1% stake in Beijing Douyin Information Services Co., Ltd.⁸ This subsidiary operates Douyin (the Chinese version of TikTok) and holds its operating licenses.

WangTouZhongWen is owned by three state agencies, including the China Internet Investment Fund (CIIF). The CIIF is controlled by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country’s primary internet regulator.¹³

This is not a passive investment. This “special management share” grants the CCP the right to appoint a government official to the subsidiary’s three-person board.¹¹ The appointed official was Wu Shugang, a CAC member with a background in government propaganda.⁵ This state-appointed director holds extensive powers. According to the subsidiary’s charter, the director has veto power or direct influence over:

• Business strategy and investment plans
• Mergers and profit allocation
• The appointment and compensation of the top three executives ¹¹

Most critically, the golden share grants the CCP direct control over the subsidiary’s content. The government’s appointee can control content on Douyin, appoint the unit’s chief censor, and chair a “content safety committee”.¹¹

TikTok claims this arrangement does not affect its global operations.⁴ This claim is not credible. The subsidiary under direct CCP control operates the company’s “crown jewel” applications, which generate the vast majority of ByteDance’s revenue.⁸ To suggest this has no influence on global operations defies corporate logic. The golden share ensures the company’s most vital assets align with state directives.

1.3 The Internal Party Committee: A Direct Channel for Political Influence

In addition to the golden share, ByteDance must maintain an internal CCP committee within its Chinese operations, as required by China’s Company Law.⁵ This creates a formal, embedded channel for enforcing party directives from within the corporate structure.

The company’s vice president, Zhang Fuping, serves as the CCP Committee Secretary.⁵ He has stated the committee’s purpose is to “transmit the correct political direction, public opinion guidance and value orientation into every business and product line”.⁵ This statement confirms the committee’s function is to infuse the Party’s agenda into the company’s products.

ByteDance also maintains a strategic partnership with China’s Ministry of Public Security for “public relations efforts”.⁸ This combination of opaque incorporation, centralized control, a golden share, and an internal CCP committee reveals a deliberate corporate architecture. The system is designed to project a Western-friendly image while ensuring the company remains beholden to Beijing’s interests.

Section 2: The Dual Threat Vector: Data Espionage and Algorithmic Warfare

The architecture of control enables a direct threat to U.S. national security. TikTok functions as a dual-threat vector. It operates as a mass data collection apparatus for a foreign intelligence service and as a powerful algorithmic engine for influence operations. These two functions are synergistic, creating a feedback loop where espionage informs propaganda.

2.1 The Data Collection Apparatus: An Unprecedented Intelligence Haul

TikTok’s data collection is extensive and invasive. The app captures a “vast swath” of information from its more than 170 million American users.¹ While defenders argue that U.S. tech companies engage in similar practices, this comparison overlooks the critical distinction of adversarial control, which is detailed in Section 4.3.

The data collected by TikTok includes:

• User-provided information like name, age, and email.¹⁸
• Internet and network activity, including IP address.¹⁸
• Precise location data from GPS, SIM card, and IP address.¹⁸
• Browsing and search histories within the app.¹⁷
• The content of private messages.¹⁷
• Biometric data, including “faceprints and voiceprints”.¹⁷
• Keystroke patterns and rhythms.¹⁷

This granular data provides a foreign adversary with raw material for intelligence activities. A 2020 executive order warned this could allow China to “track the locations of Federal employees and contractors, build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage”.¹⁷ The sheer volume of this data represents an intelligence windfall of unprecedented scale.

2.2 A Tool of State Intelligence: The Legal Imperative to Cooperate

The risk of this data being accessed by Beijing is not hypothetical; it is a function of Chinese law. This has been affirmed by the highest levels of the U.S. intelligence community.

“All of these things are in the hands of a government that doesn’t share our values and that has a mission that’s very much at odds with what’s in the best interests of the United States. That should concern us.”

— FBI Director Christopher Wray 21

Then-Director of National Intelligence William Burns agreed, stating, “I do… I think it’s a genuine concern… the Chinese government is able to you know insist upon extracting the private data of a lot of Tik Tok users in this country”.²²

These concerns are grounded in China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law. Article 7 states that “any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in accordance with the law”.⁹ This statute legally compels ByteDance to turn over any data requested by Chinese intelligence services. There is no independent judiciary through which the company could refuse.

ByteDance has already demonstrated its willingness to misuse user data. In 2022, the company admitted its employees, including two in China, improperly accessed the TikTok data of U.S. journalists to identify internal leaks.¹⁷ This incident provides concrete proof that the company can and will leverage sensitive user data, invalidating its public assurances about data protection.

2.3 The Algorithm as an Influence Engine: Waging Information Warfare

The second, more insidious threat is the weaponization of TikTok’s recommendation algorithm. FBI Director Wray has warned that the CCP can “control the recommendation algorithm, which allows them to manipulate content, and if they want to, to use it for influence operations”.¹⁷

This is not a theoretical capability. A 2024 peer-reviewed study in Frontiers in Social Psychology found “a disproportionately high ratio of pro-CCP to anti-CCP content on TikTok” and concluded the platform’s algorithm is manipulated to “advance CCP propaganda”.²⁵ Researchers discovered that while users engaged with anti-CCP content nearly four times as much, the algorithm served up almost three times as much pro-CCP content. This discrepancy indicates deliberate manipulation.²⁵

This manipulation has a measurable impact. The same study found that heavy TikTok users “exhibited significantly more positive attitudes toward China’s human rights record”.²⁵ This subtle, long-term perception shaping is a hallmark of modern information warfare.

A clear case study was the flood of anti-Israel content following the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks. One analysis found that in the U.S., videos with pro-Palestinian hashtags received 54 views for every one view of a video with a pro-Israel hashtag.²⁶ While TikTok claims this reflects organic sentiment ²⁷, the scale of the disparity, combined with documented algorithmic bias, strongly suggests a deliberate influence operation designed to sow division and undermine U.S. foreign policy.

Section 3: An Analysis of Failed Mitigation: The Inherent Flaws of Project Texas

In response to security concerns, TikTok initiated a costly effort to reassure U.S. policymakers. This initiative, “Project Texas,” was presented as a technical solution to insulate American user data from ByteDance. However, a close examination reveals Project Texas was elaborate security theater. It failed because it applied a technical solution to a problem of ownership and control by a foreign adversary.

3.1 The Promise of a Technical Firewall: The Architecture of Project Texas

At a cost of $1.5 billion, Project Texas was designed to create a ring-fenced ecosystem for TikTok’s U.S. operations.²⁸ The plan involved migrating all U.S. user data to a domestic cloud infrastructure managed by Oracle.²⁹ TikTok also established a subsidiary, TikTok U.S. Data Security (USDS), staffed by U.S. employees, to manage functions requiring access to protected data.²⁹

This structure was intended to address the two primary threats. To prevent data espionage, USDS and Oracle would control all data leaving the secure environment.³⁰ To prevent influence operations, key content moderation functions would be housed within USDS.³⁰ The plan also included oversight from CFIUS, Oracle, and third-party auditors.³⁰

3.2 A Permeable Defense: “Security Theater” in Practice

Despite the elaborate architecture, evidence quickly emerged that Project Texas was a permeable defense. Former TikTok employees revealed a “stealth chain of command” that bypassed the project’s controls.²⁸ One former data scientist stated that sending spreadsheets of sensitive U.S. user data to ByteDance executives in Beijing remained a regular procedure long after Project Texas began.²⁸

This demonstrates that the physical location of a server is irrelevant when remote access and human-driven data transfers persist. U.S. policymakers quickly dismissed the initiative. Lawmakers who received briefings labeled it a “marketing scheme” and “simply not acceptable,” concluding it was not “technically possible” for TikTok to deliver on its promises.³⁰

Technical analyses also identified structural loopholes. A 2024 RAND Corporation analysis noted that while Project Texas focused on “protected U.S. user data,” the vast corpus of publicly posted videos was not subject to the same restrictions.³¹ This audiovisual data could still be stored on foreign servers, accessible to ByteDance. The RAND report identified this as a grave risk, as this dataset is ideal for training advanced deepfake-generating AI systems for future disinformation campaigns.³¹

3.3 The Fundamental, Unsolvable Problem: Ownership is Control

The ultimate failure of Project Texas lies in its inability to solve a problem that is not technical but geopolitical. No amount of U.S.-based staffing or data localization can alter the reality that ByteDance, an entity subject to China’s National Intelligence Law, remains the ultimate owner of TikTok.²⁸

As long as ByteDance owns the intellectual property and controls the core algorithm, the U.S. government can have no assurance that the platform will not be leveraged for espionage. The trust deficit is insurmountable because it is rooted in ByteDance’s relationship with the CCP.²³ The failure of Project Texas proves that mitigation agreements are insufficient. This precedent supports the conclusion that the only viable solution is a clean structural separation through divestiture or a complete ban.

Section 4: A Critical Review of Counterarguments

A rigorous analysis requires engaging with the arguments raised by TikTok’s defenders. These counterarguments center on free speech, economic freedom, and perceived hypocrisy. However, they consistently fail to address the unique core of the TikTok threat: its control by a foreign adversary. They mischaracterize a national security problem as a domestic issue, leading to flawed conclusions.

4.1 National Security and the First Amendment

The most prominent counterargument is that a ban infringes on the First Amendment rights of over 170 million Americans.¹ Proponents like the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) argue that banning a communications platform is mass censorship.¹ They contend the government has not proven a “serious, imminent harm to national security”.³³ This reasoning was central to the injunction that blocked Montana’s state-level ban in 2023.³⁵

This argument misinterprets the government’s action. The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA) is not a content-based restriction. It is a content-neutral regulation of conduct—the ownership of a major platform by an entity beholden to a foreign adversary.³⁸ The Supreme Court upheld this view, finding the law met the standard of intermediate scrutiny.¹ Protecting national security from foreign espionage is a compelling government interest.

Furthermore, PAFACA is narrowly tailored. As the failure of Project Texas shows, less restrictive means are ineffective. The only way to neutralize the threat is to sever the ownership link. The law achieves this by providing a path for the platform to continue operating under new, non-adversarial ownership through a “qualified divestiture”.³⁸ It is a divestiture-or-ban requirement, not an outright prohibition.

4.2 Economic Disruption vs. Strategic Imperative

A second counterargument focuses on economic disruption. TikTok has become a vital tool for millions of American small businesses and creators.⁴¹ A 2023 Oxford Economics study found that SMBs generated nearly $15 billion in revenue through the platform, and TikTok’s activity contributed $24.2 billion to U.S. GDP while supporting 224,000 jobs.⁴³ TikTok has claimed a ban would cost U.S. small businesses and creators a combined $1.3 billion in the first month alone.⁴⁴

These figures represent a real economic impact. However, sound policy requires a strategic cost-benefit analysis. These quantifiable, short-term losses must be weighed against the unquantifiable but potentially catastrophic long-term costs of allowing a foreign adversary to conduct mass-scale espionage and influence operations.

Moreover, this argument ignores that the law’s primary goal is divestiture, not a ban.³⁹ A sale of TikTok’s U.S. operations would allow the platform and its economic ecosystem to continue functioning. It would preserve the benefits for creators while surgically removing the national security threat. The economic disruption is a potential consequence of ByteDance’s refusal to relinquish control, not an intended goal of U.S. policy.

4.3 The False Equivalence of Data Privacy (“Whataboutism”)

A third counterargument creates a false equivalence between TikTok and U.S.-based companies like Meta and Google. This argument posits that since American tech giants also collect vast amounts of user data, singling out TikTok is hypocritical.⁴⁶ The proposed solution is comprehensive federal data privacy legislation for all companies.²

This argument conflates a commercial data privacy issue with a state-sponsored national security threat. The critical distinction is not the act of data collection but the legal jurisdiction to which the collecting entity is beholden. The table below illustrates this dispositive difference.

Feature	United States (Accessing Data from U.S. Companies)	People’s Republic of China (Accessing Data from Chinese Companies)
Governing Law	U.S. Constitution (4th Amendment), FISA, SCA	National Intelligence Law of the PRC, Cybersecurity Law
Legal Standard	Requires probable cause and warrants from an independent judiciary.	Broad mandate to “support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work.” No independent judicial oversight.
Scope of Request	Typically narrow and specific to investigations under legal review.	Vague and expansive; can demand any data deemed relevant to “national security.”
Company’s Right to Challenge	Companies have the legal right to challenge government requests in court.	No meaningful legal right to refuse a request from state intelligence.
Transparency	Government requests are subject to some transparency reporting.	The process is entirely opaque. Data requests are state secrets.
Controlling Authority	Independent Judiciary, U.S. Congress, Executive Branch (with checks and balances).	Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Ministry of State Security, CAC.

As the table shows, U.S. companies operate within a legal framework constrained by constitutional protections. Government access to their data requires due process.¹⁷ In contrast, ByteDance operates under the direct authority of the CCP. China’s National Intelligence Law legally compels the company to serve as an arm of the state’s intelligence apparatus.¹⁷ This jurisdictional difference is absolute. Comprehensive privacy legislation is a worthy goal, but it is an irrelevant solution to the problem of data being weaponized by an adversarial state.

Section 5: The Policy Imperative: From Ineffective Half-Measures to a Definitive Solution

The U.S. policy approach to TikTok has evolved from reactive investigation to decisive legislative action. The history of prolonged negotiations and failed strategies demonstrates the inadequacy of pre-existing policy tools. The passage of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA) is the logical culmination of this process. The only rational policy moving forward is the full enforcement of this law.

5.1 A History of Insufficient Action: The Failure of Negotiation

The U.S. government’s formal engagement with the TikTok threat began in 2019. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) launched a retroactive review of ByteDance’s 2017 acquisition of Musical.ly.⁴⁹ This investigation dragged on for years, highlighting the limitations of using a body designed for financial transactions to address a dynamic data threat.⁵⁰

In 2020, the Trump administration attempted to force a resolution through executive orders.² However, federal courts successfully enjoined these orders. Judges ruled that the administration had likely exceeded its authority and infringed on First Amendment protections.⁶ This judicial pushback underscored the need for a more specific legislative authority from Congress.

5.2 The Logic of PAFACA: A Necessary and Proper Legislative Tool

Congress passed PAFACA with overwhelming bipartisan support, and it was signed into law in April 2024 as a direct response to these past failures.⁴⁵ The law is a precisely crafted tool designed to address the unique threat posed by applications controlled by foreign adversaries.

The law’s logic is built on several key features:

• Clear Definitions: It defines “foreign adversary” countries as those listed in an existing U.S. statute (10 U.S.C. § 4872(d)(2)): China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.⁵⁵ This anchors the law in established national security policy.
• Focus on Control: Its primary focus is on the structure of control, not the content of speech. This targets the root of the national security risk.³⁸
• Divestiture Off-Ramp: It provides a clear and viable off-ramp through a “qualified divestiture.” This would allow the application to continue operating in the U.S. if it is no longer controlled by a foreign adversary.³⁹

The passage of PAFACA represents a significant evolution in U.S. policy. It moves the country from a reactive approach to a proactive, framework-based model. The law creates a durable legal mechanism that can be applied not only to TikTok but to any future application that meets the same criteria.⁵⁷

5.3 Conclusion and Recommendation: The Imperative of a Full Prohibition

The evidence presented in this report leads to an inescapable conclusion. ByteDance’s corporate structure is engineered for subservience to the CCP. This enables a dual threat of data espionage and algorithmic influence. All attempts at mitigation, such as Project Texas, have proven ineffective because they fail to address the fundamental problem of adversarial ownership.

The policy debate should no longer be about if a threat exists or how it can be managed with ByteDance in control. The threat is real, present, and unmitigable under the current ownership.

The final recommendation is unequivocal. ByteDance and the CCP have refused to pursue a qualified divestiture as stipulated by U.S. law. Therefore, the United States government must proceed with a swift, complete, and permanent prohibition on the operation of TikTok. This prohibition must extend to “any successor application or service…developed or provided by ByteDance Ltd.,” a provision designed to prevent the company from simply relaunching the app under a different name.⁴⁵

This is the only responsible policy choice that neutralizes a clear and present danger to U.S. national security. Enforcing this ban is not merely about a single application. It is about establishing a critical precedent in the ongoing strategic competition with China. It will send a clear signal that the United States will not permit its digital domain to be compromised by platforms that function as intelligence and influence arms of an adversarial state.

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