Tag: Risk

  • Honey, JPM Shrunk the Collateral: Betting on Crypto ETFs Like It’s Not 2008 Anew

    Honey, JPM Shrunk the Collateral: Betting on Crypto ETFs Like It’s Not 2008 Anew

    JPMorgan Chase’s recent decision to allow trading and wealth management clients to use crypto Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) as collateral for loans is a concerning development that introduces multiple layers of risk. This move, starting with BlackRock’s iShares Bitcoin Trust, integrates a volatile and complex asset class into traditional lending practices, which will have significant negative consequences.

    Custody and Ownership Concerns: “Not Your Keys, Not Your Crypto”

    A primary concern with crypto ETFs is the nature of ownership and custody.

    Lack of Direct Ownership: When investing in a crypto ETF, individuals do not own the underlying cryptocurrency directly (Investopedia). Instead, they own shares of a fund that holds the crypto. This means investors cannot take custody of their share of the crypto assets; they can only trade the ETF shares.

    Reliance on Custodians: Crypto ETFs depend on custodians to safeguard the underlying digital assets. This reliance introduces significant risks:

    Single Point of Failure: Crypto ETFs rely on custodians, such as Coinbase, which holds a significant percentage of Bitcoin for these ETFs. This concentration is concerning, as any major operational issue, security breach, or insolvency at the custodians will have disastrous consequences for the ETFs and their investors.

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  • A Question of Trust: An Analysis of Ethereum Classic’s Foundational Security and Its Place on Premier Exchanges

    A Question of Trust: An Analysis of Ethereum Classic’s Foundational Security and Its Place on Premier Exchanges

    David’s Note: This article was substantially revised on October 10, 2025 to incorporate new research and provide a more comprehensive analysis.

    Introduction: The Chasm Between Perceived Legitimacy and Proven Fragility

    A “51% attack” occurs when a single entity seizes control of a blockchain’s computational power. This is not a distant, theoretical risk. Between 2019 and 2020 alone, researchers at the MIT Digital Currency Initiative documented over 40 such attacks on various cryptocurrencies.1 These events represent a recurring and tangible danger to the integrity of many networks.

    When a digital asset is listed on a prominent, regulated exchange like Coinbase, Kraken, or Gemini, it sends a powerful signal to the market.2 This listing acts as an implicit endorsement. It suggests the asset has passed a rigorous vetting process and meets a baseline standard for technical soundness.3 This report contends that in the case of Ethereum Classic (ETC), this perception of security is dangerously misaligned with its documented history of catastrophic, fundamental breaches.

    This analysis will demonstrate a critical flaw in ETC’s security narrative. While protocol changes were implemented after these failures, a key defense mechanism was later deliberately rolled back. This action signals a return to a security posture that has already proven inadequate.

    The core of this investigation is not a philosophical debate over blockchain immutability. Instead, it is a critical risk assessment grounded in empirical evidence. The central thesis is this: a profound dissonance exists between the implied security of a premier exchange listing and the proven fragility of the underlying asset. This gap represents a significant, underappreciated risk to market participants.

    The case of Ethereum Classic in August 2020 stands as a glaring example of this vulnerability. The network suffered three successful 51% attacks in a single month.4 This report will proceed in a structured manner to build a comprehensive case:

    • First, it will establish the foundational principles of Proof-of-Work (PoW) security, focusing on the direct relationship between computational power (hash rate) and network integrity.
    • Second, it will present a detailed forensic analysis of the 2020 attacks.
    • Third, it will scrutinize the primary response from exchanges—imposing extreme transaction confirmation times—and argue this is a localized tactic, not a fundamental solution.
    • Fourth, it will systematically deconstruct and refute the common counterarguments defending ETC’s security.
    • Finally, the conclusion will synthesize these findings, offer a forward-looking analysis, and provide specific recommendations for exchanges, regulators, and investors.
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