Doomscroll News

Tag: media

  • Reuters’ South Africa Lies: Predictable Deceit from an Outlet Accused of Embedding with October 7th

    Reuters’ South Africa Lies: Predictable Deceit from an Outlet Accused of Embedding with October 7th

    Those who unquestioningly accept Reuters’ take on critical global situations, like today’s alert on South Africa as an “Editor’s Picks”, should be aware of the outlet’s problematic history. Reuters has faced serious credibility issues, including publishing manipulated images during wartime and maintaining controversial policies on defining terrorism, which distort public understanding.

    1. Photographer’s Images from 2006 Lebanon War: In August 2006, Reuters had to remove all photographs by a freelance photographer, Adnan Hajj, from its database. This occurred after it was discovered that at least two of his photos from the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict had been digitally manipulated. One image showed smoke billowing over Beirut, which had been altered to appear darker and more dramatic. Another showed an Israeli F-16 firing missiles, with the photographer adding an extra flare to make it appear more threatening. Reuters severed ties with Hajj following these revelations.
    2. Embedded with Assailants? Serious Allegations of Reuters’ Foreknowledge in October 7th Attack Coverage: Following the October 7th attacks by Hamas on Israel, Reuters, along with other news organizations, faced scrutiny about how some freelance photojournalists, whose images were used by Reuters and others, were able to be at the scene of the attacks so early. These journalists may have had advance knowledge of the attacks. Reuters denied having any prior relationship with the freelance photographers in question and stated the published photos were taken hours after the initial attacks began and well after Israel had confirmed gunmen crossed the border. Bipartisan U.S. lawmakers sent a letter to Reuters requesting an explanation.
    3. Policy on Not Using the Word “Terrorist”: Reuters has a long-standing policy which includes generally not using the word “terrorist” or “terrorism” to describe specific events or individuals, instead opting terms like “bombers,” “gunmen,” or “militants.” This obscures the nature of such acts and the motivations behind them. Reuters’ editorial policy states they “may refer without attribution to terrorism and counterterrorism in general, but do not refer to specific events as terrorism.”
    Sent by the Reuters app at approximately 6pm on May 21, 2025.

  • An Unmitigated Threat: The National Security Case for the Prohibition of TikTok in the United States

    An Unmitigated Threat: The National Security Case for the Prohibition of TikTok in the United States

    David’s Note: This article was substantially revised on October 10, 2025 to incorporate new research and provide a more comprehensive analysis.

    With over 170 million users in the United States, TikTok is more than a social media phenomenon; it is a deeply embedded component of American digital life and commerce.1 This ubiquity, however, masks a critical vulnerability. This report presents a comprehensive analysis of the national security threat posed by the social media application TikTok, operated by its parent company, ByteDance Ltd. It argues that due to ByteDance’s inextricable links to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the application functions as a dual-threat vector for sophisticated data espionage and algorithmic influence operations against the United States.

    Executive Summary

    This report analyzes the national security threat from TikTok, an application operated by ByteDance Ltd. The company’s deep connections to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) allow the app to function as a tool for data espionage and algorithmic influence against the United States.

    This report’s central thesis is that mitigation efforts cannot neutralize this threat. The application’s core architecture, corporate governance, and legal obligations are inextricably linked to the CCP, a designated foreign adversary. Therefore, a complete prohibition on its operation within the United States is the only effective policy solution.

    The report deconstructs ByteDance’s opaque corporate structure. It highlights the CCP’s control mechanisms, such as the “golden share” held by a state-backed entity, which make any claims of operational independence untenable. It also details warnings from top U.S. intelligence officials, including the FBI Director and the Director of National Intelligence, who define TikTok as a tool that a foreign adversary can leverage.

    Furthermore, the report dismisses mitigation efforts like the $1.5 billion “Project Texas” as flawed security theater. Evidence shows this project failed to sever data flows to Beijing or neutralize the threat of algorithmic manipulation. The core issue of adversarial ownership remained unaddressed.

    After refuting key counterarguments—related to the First Amendment, economic impacts, and false equivalencies with U.S. tech firms—the report concludes that partial measures are insufficient. The unique nature of the threat, rooted in ByteDance’s subservience to the CCP, demands a structural solution. The only policy that fully addresses these inherent risks is the swift enforcement of a ban on TikTok and any successor applications, as provided by the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA).

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