1. Executive Summary: A Strategic Compact of Political Imperative and Commercial Pragmatism
On October 10, 2025, the Trump administration and AstraZeneca PLC announced a landmark agreement.¹ The deal aims to lower prescription drug prices for American consumers.²
This is the second agreement of its kind, following a similar pact with Pfizer Inc. in September 2025.³ It is a direct result of the administration’s aggressive “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) policy. This policy seeks to align U.S. drug prices with the lowest prices that other developed nations pay.⁴
The agreement is not a simple price reduction. It is a complex strategic maneuver, born from a convergence of political needs and commercial pragmatism.
For the Trump administration, the deal represents a tangible, high-profile victory in its war on high drug prices—a key issue for the American electorate.² For AstraZeneca, it is a calculated measure to mitigate significant risk. The company faced a credible threat from the administration of tariffs up to 100% on imported pharmaceuticals.⁵
The deal’s structure is dual-pronged. Each prong is designed to achieve distinct political and policy objectives.
- First, AstraZeneca made a broad, portfolio-wide commitment. The company will offer all of its prescription medications to the U.S. Medicaid program at MFN prices.⁶ This component gives the agreement policy substance. It allows the administration to claim a comprehensive victory that will save taxpayers “hundreds of millions of dollars”.²
- Second, the deal includes a narrower, more publicly visible component. Specific, high-profile drugs will be offered at steep discounts directly to consumers. This will occur through a new government-branded platform, TrumpRx.gov, set to launch in 2026.⁷ This element provides the political optics, translating complex policy into a simple message of direct savings.
The central thesis of this analysis is that the agreement’s direct impact on drug affordability for most Americans will be minimal. This includes those covered by commercial insurance or Medicare. While the deal is a significant political achievement for the Trump administration and a shrewd strategy for AstraZeneca, its tangible benefits are limited.
Multiple independent healthcare economists and policy experts support this conclusion. They note that the deal’s primary financial impact is contained within the Medicaid program. This program already benefits from substantial statutory discounts.⁸
Therefore, the deal’s true significance is not a fundamental reordering of U.S. drug pricing. Instead, it establishes a powerful new coercive framework. In this framework, the administration weaponizes trade policy to achieve healthcare policy objectives. This sets a potent precedent for all future government-industry negotiations.
1.1. Key Takeaways
- A Political Victory Achieved Through Coercion: The agreement is a major political win for the Trump administration. It was secured by leveraging the credible threat of severe tariffs to compel AstraZeneca to adopt “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) pricing for the Medicaid program.⁴
- A Strategic Decision for AstraZeneca: For the pharmaceutical company, the deal is a pragmatic move. It neutralizes the existential risk of tariffs, securing a three-year exemption and market stability in exchange for price concessions in a limited market segment.⁴
- Minimal Impact for Most Insured Americans: The deal’s financial benefits are largely confined to government savings within the Medicaid program.⁹ Cash-paying patients using the new TrumpRx.gov platform will also benefit. The agreement is not expected to lower premiums or out-of-pocket costs for the majority of Americans with commercial insurance or Medicare coverage.¹⁰
- A New Precedent in Policy: The agreement’s true significance lies in its method. It establishes a powerful new playbook where the executive branch uses trade policy as a coercive tool to achieve domestic healthcare objectives. This bypasses traditional legislative and regulatory pathways.
- A Direct Challenge to PBMs: The creation of the TrumpRx.gov direct-to-consumer (DTC) platform represents a clear challenge to the business model of Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs). However, its long-term ability to disrupt the market remains uncertain.¹¹
2. The Road to the Agreement: Tariffs, Threats, and the Most Favored Nation Doctrine
The October 2025 agreement did not materialize in a vacuum. It culminated from a multi-year policy campaign by the Trump administration. This campaign was characterized by escalating pressure, the novel use of executive power, and the strategic blurring of lines between healthcare, trade, and industrial policy. Understanding this context is critical to appreciating the motivations and strategic calculations of both parties.
2.1. The Resurgence of the Most Favored Nation Doctrine
The core policy underpinning the AstraZeneca deal is the Most Favored Nation (MFN) pricing model. President Trump has pursued this concept since his first term.² The principle is straightforward:
The U.S. government should pay no more for a prescription drug than the lowest price paid by any other comparable developed country.¹²
The administration defines “comparable developed nations” as member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These countries must have a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of at least 60% of that of the United States.¹³ The administration has long argued that the U.S. unfairly subsidizes global pharmaceutical innovation by paying the world’s highest prices. This allows other wealthy nations with single-payer systems to “freeride” on American investment.³
An initial attempt to implement an MFN model during Trump’s first term failed. It was limited to Medicare Part B (physician-administered drugs) and was ultimately blocked by federal courts after facing industry legal challenges.¹⁴
Upon returning to office, the administration revived the MFN concept. It did so through a more expansive and aggressive Executive Order on May 12, 2025, titled “Delivering Most-Favored-Nation Prescription Drug Pricing to American Patients”.³ This new order was broader and was not tied to a formal rulemaking process that could be easily challenged in court. Instead, it directed the administration to use all available tools to achieve MFN pricing, setting the stage for a more coercive approach.⁷
On July 31, 2025, the administration formalized this push. It sent letters to 17 major pharmaceutical manufacturers, including AstraZeneca. The letters outlined the steps they were expected to take to voluntarily adopt MFN pricing or face punitive action.³
2.2. Section 232 and the Tariff Gambit
The administration’s primary coercive instrument was the threat of severe trade tariffs. This strategy represented a significant shift, weaponizing trade policy to achieve domestic healthcare objectives. In April 2025, President Trump initiated an investigation into the pharmaceutical supply chain under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.¹⁵ This statute allows for tariffs on national security grounds and laid the legal groundwork for what was to come.
On September 25, 2025, the administration announced its intent to impose tariffs of up to 100% on all “branded or patented” drugs. These tariffs would apply to imports from companies that did not comply with its MFN and onshoring demands, slated to take effect on October 1.⁵ The President later suggested these tariffs could be as high as 200%.⁵
This created an existential threat for multinational pharmaceutical companies like UK-based AstraZeneca, which rely on global supply chains. The administration’s pivot to trade policy was a calculated move. It aimed to circumvent the legal roadblocks that had doomed its first-term MFN rule. By invoking national security and trade law, the administration shifted the battleground from the courtroom to the boardroom. There, the financial risk of 100% tariffs on billions of dollars of product was an untenable proposition.
2.3. The Pfizer Precedent
The tariff threat proved its strategic effectiveness on September 30, 2025. On that day, the administration announced its first MFN agreement with Pfizer.³,⁴ This deal served as the crucial template and proof-of-concept for the subsequent agreement with AstraZeneca. Pfizer agreed to provide its drugs to Medicaid at MFN prices and participate in the forthcoming TrumpRx.gov website in exchange for relief from the threatened tariffs.⁴
The Pfizer agreement fundamentally altered the negotiating landscape. It demonstrated the administration’s resolve and established a clear, public framework for “voluntary” compliance. For the 16 other companies that had received letters, the choice became stark: follow Pfizer’s lead or face the economic consequences.
The Pfizer deal created a domino effect, increasing pressure on other manufacturers to come to the table.¹ As the second major company to sign on, AstraZeneca’s capitulation on October 10 cemented the success of the administration’s coercive strategy. It signaled to the rest of the industry that resistance was likely futile.¹
3. Anatomy of the Trump-AstraZeneca Deal: A Multi-Pronged Analysis
The agreement announced on October 10, 2025, is a multifaceted compact. It has three distinct but interconnected pillars: a comprehensive pricing commitment for Medicaid, participation in a new direct-to-consumer platform, and a reciprocal arrangement involving tariff relief and domestic investment.
3.1. The Medicaid Most Favored Nation Commitment
The deal’s foundational policy component is AstraZeneca’s pledge to offer its entire portfolio of prescription medications to every state Medicaid program at MFN prices.³,⁶ This means that for any given AstraZeneca drug, the net price paid by Medicaid will be no higher than the lowest price paid by a comparable developed nation. This commitment is both retroactive for existing products and forward-looking. It guarantees MFN pricing for all new innovative medicines the company launches in the U.S. market.³
The White House has touted this provision as a source of “hundreds of millions of dollars” in annual savings for taxpayers and state governments.³,² While this figure is politically impactful, a precise, independent estimate is difficult to ascertain. It depends on confidential international pricing data, future drug utilization rates, and existing rebate agreements.
The real-world financial impact of this commitment must be carefully contextualized. The U.S. Medicaid program, through a system of legally mandated rebates, already receives the lowest net drug prices in the United States.⁸
Independent experts have expressed skepticism about the magnitude of these savings. Craig Garthwaite, a professor at Northwestern University, noted that the deal is unlikely to result in “a very big discount to Medicaid” given AstraZeneca’s portfolio and existing rebate obligations.⁸ Similarly, Rena Conti, an associate professor at Boston University, argued that the deal is unlikely to “move the needle on U.S. rising health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket drug costs” for most Americans.⁸
The impact is largely confined to the Medicaid budget. While significant at around $80 billion in gross drug spending in 2021, this is dwarfed by Medicare’s $216 billion and the even larger commercial market.¹⁰
3.2. The TrumpRx.gov Initiative
The second pillar of the agreement is AstraZeneca’s participation in the new government-branded website, TrumpRx.gov.² This platform has the greatest public-facing visibility. Scheduled for a full launch in January 2026, it is designed as a direct-to-consumer (DTC) channel for patients paying with cash. It allows them to purchase medications directly from manufacturers without using insurance.⁷
While the Medicaid MFN provision is portfolio-wide, the most dramatic discounts are associated with this DTC platform. The White House specifically highlighted three of AstraZeneca’s respiratory inhalers for deep discounts:³
- Bevespi Aerosphere (for Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, or COPD)
- Breztri Aerosphere (for COPD)
- Airsupra (for asthma)
President Trump used hyperbolic language to describe these discounts, claiming reductions of 96%, 98%, and even an impossible “654%”.⁵ While the precise mechanics are unclear, AstraZeneca has committed to offering some drugs at discounts of up to 80% off their list price through the platform.¹⁶
The TrumpRx.gov initiative is a strategically disruptive play aimed at the pharmaceutical supply chain’s middlemen, particularly Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs). The pharmaceutical industry has long criticized PBMs for inflating list prices and not passing rebates to patients.² By creating a channel that bypasses the insurance and PBM apparatus, the administration can deliver a tangible discount to a key segment of voters—the uninsured and those with high-deductible health plans. This simultaneously applies public pressure on the PBM industry.
For AstraZeneca, this DTC channel provides a controlled environment to offer steep, targeted discounts without disrupting the complex pricing structures that govern the much larger commercially insured market.
3.3. The Quid Pro Quo: Tariff Relief and U.S. Investment
The agreement is explicitly a quid pro quo. In exchange for its pricing concessions, AstraZeneca secured regulatory and financial certainty. CEO Pascal Soriot confirmed at the Oval Office announcement that the company had received a three-year exemption from the threatened Section 232 tariffs.⁴
Soriot stated this exemption was essential to allow the company time “to localize the remainder of our products,” underscoring the direct link between the pricing deal and the administration’s onshoring objectives.¹⁶ The immense pressure from the tariff threat was palpable, with Soriot admitting that President Trump and his team had “really kept me up at night”.⁷
The deal was also announced in concert with AstraZeneca’s major U.S. investment plans. The company reaffirmed a commitment to invest $50 billion in U.S.-based research, development, and manufacturing by 2030.¹⁷ A centerpiece of this investment is a new $4.5 billion drug substance manufacturing facility in Virginia, which broke ground just one day before the White House announcement.¹⁷
This investment pledge, while a sound long-term business strategy for AstraZeneca, was also a critical political deliverable for the administration’s “America First” industrial policy. It allowed the administration to frame the deal as a win for both lower drug prices and American jobs.
4. Affected Therapeutics: A Comprehensive Portfolio Analysis and Usage-Based Ranking
The MFN pricing commitment applies comprehensively to all of AstraZeneca’s prescription medications sold to the U.S. Medicaid program.⁶ This includes the company’s entire portfolio, from blockbuster oncology therapies to widely used primary care drugs, as well as all future medicines.
However, a practical analysis requires focusing on products with the greatest market significance and those highlighted for DTC discounts. The following table ranks key AstraZeneca drugs based on their market importance, determined by U.S. prescription volume and global sales revenue.
| Rank | Drug Name (Generic) | Primary U.S. Indication(s) | Estimated Annual U.S. Prescriptions (2023) | Estimated Annual Global Sales | Relevance to Agreement |
| 1 | Crestor (rosuvastatin) | High Cholesterol, Cardiovascular Risk Reduction | 42,103,429 (generic)¹⁸ | N/A* | Portfolio-Wide Application (Medicaid MFN Pricing) |
| 2 | Symbicort(budesonide/formoterol) | Asthma, COPD | 9,346,242¹⁹ | $1.288B (1H 2023)¹⁹ | Portfolio-Wide Application (Medicaid MFN Pricing) |
| 3 | Farxiga (dapagliflozin) | Type 2 Diabetes, Heart Failure, Chronic Kidney Disease | N/A** | ~$6.0B (2023)²⁰ | Portfolio-Wide (Medicaid MFN); Included in AstraZeneca Direct DTC Program²¹ |
| 4 | Nexium (esomeprazole) | GERD, Acid Reflux, Ulcers | 3,828,168 (generic)²² | N/A* | Portfolio-Wide Application (Medicaid MFN Pricing) |
| 5 | Tagrisso (osimertinib) | Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer (EGFR-mutated) | N/A** | ~$5.8B (2023)²³ | Portfolio-Wide Application (Medicaid MFN Pricing) |
| 6 | Imfinzi (durvalumab) | Lung Cancer, Bladder Cancer | N/A** | ~$3.5B (Q1-Q3 2025)²⁴ | Portfolio-Wide Application (Medicaid MFN Pricing) |
| 7 | Lynparza (olaparib) | Ovarian, Breast, Prostate, Pancreatic Cancer | N/A** | ~$2.8B (2023)²⁵ | Portfolio-Wide Application (Medicaid MFN Pricing) |
| 8 | Breztri Aerosphere(budesonide/glycopyrrolate/ formoterol fumarate) | COPD | N/A** | N/A** | Specifically Designated for TrumpRx.gov DTC Discounts³ |
| 9 | Airsupra(albuterol/budesonide) | Asthma | N/A** | N/A** | Specifically Designated for TrumpRx.gov DTC Discounts³; Included in AstraZeneca Direct DTC Program²¹ |
| 10 | Bevespi Aerosphere(glycopyrrolate/formoterol fumarate) | COPD | N/A** | N/A** | Specifically Designated for TrumpRx.gov DTC Discounts³ |
*Global sales figures are less relevant for mature products like Crestor and Nexium, which are now widely available as lower-cost generics.
**N/A for prescription data typically indicates that figures are not publicly available for brand-specific drugs, especially for newer products or those primarily administered in a hospital setting, as this data is often aggregated or proprietary.
4.1. Analysis of Portfolio Tiers
The drugs in the table can be analyzed in three distinct tiers. Each tier reveals a different aspect of the deal’s strategic intent and potential impact.
4.1.1. Tier 1: High-Revenue, High-Volume Blockbusters
This tier analyzes AstraZeneca’s most commercially significant products.
- Farxiga (dapagliflozin): As AstraZeneca’s top-selling drug in 2023, Farxiga is a critical asset with global sales of approximately $6 billion.²⁰ Its exclusion from the high-profile TrumpRx.gov discount list suggests a strategic effort to protect its pricing in the larger commercial market. Its inclusion in AstraZeneca’s own DTC platform, AstraZeneca Direct, indicates the company’s desire to control the channel for its premier product.²¹
- Tagrisso (osimertinib), Imfinzi (durvalumab), and Lynparza (olaparib): These oncology therapies represent the pinnacle of AstraZeneca’s innovative portfolio, generating well over $10 billion in annual sales.²³,²⁴,²⁵ Their inclusion under the Medicaid MFN umbrella is a significant concession on paper. However, the number of Medicaid patients receiving these advanced therapies is relatively small. Keeping them off the public TrumpRx discount list avoids setting a low price anchor for future commercial negotiations.
4.1.2. Tier 2: Widely Prescribed Primary Care and Mature Products
This tier consists of drugs that reach an enormous number of patients, primarily through generic formulations.
- Crestor (rosuvastatin): The molecule rosuvastatin remains one of the most prescribed drugs in the United States, with over 42,103,429 prescriptions in 2023.¹⁸
- Symbicort (budesonide/formoterol): A leading inhaler for asthma and COPD, Symbicort was prescribed over 9,346,242 times in the U.S. in 2023.¹⁹
- Nexium (esomeprazole): The generic esomeprazole still accounted for nearly 3,828,168 U.S. prescriptions in 2023 for conditions like Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease (GERD).²²
For these products, the MFN pricing for Medicaid represents the core of the agreement’s policy substance. It contributes to the “hundreds of millions” in projected government savings.
4.1.3. Tier 3: The TrumpRx Spotlight Drugs
The selection of three respiratory inhalers for highly publicized discounts on TrumpRx.gov—Breztri Aerosphere, Bevespi Aerosphere, and Airsupra—is highly strategic.³ They are newer, branded products for common chronic conditions. Their revenue streams are less established, making them lower-risk candidates for deep public discounts. The image of an affordable inhaler is politically potent. By spotlighting these products, the administration and AstraZeneca created a powerful public relations narrative without disrupting the pricing of more lucrative drugs in the commercial market.
5. Strategic Implications and Market Outlook
The Trump-AstraZeneca agreement sends powerful ripples across the entire U.S. healthcare landscape. Its implications extend beyond pricing to the very nature of government-industry relations, market structure, and patient access.
5.1. For AstraZeneca: A Calculated Trade-off
For AstraZeneca, the deal represents a clear strategic victory. The company faced an untenable choice: accede to the administration’s demands or risk catastrophic tariffs. By agreeing to the deal, AstraZeneca neutralized this threat and secured a three-year period of regulatory certainty.⁴ The financial cost of the MFN commitment, largely contained within the Medicaid channel, is a manageable price to pay for this stability.
Furthermore, by publicly aligning with the administration’s goals, AstraZeneca has generated significant political goodwill. It has positioned itself as a cooperative partner rather than an antagonist. CEO Pascal Soriot’s public statements reflect a tone of pragmatic partnership, a stark contrast to the industry’s typically combative stance.⁴
5.2. For the U.S. Government and Payers
The agreement is an unequivocal political victory for President Trump. It allows him to deliver on a core campaign promise to take on “Big Pharma” and lower drug prices.² The deal with a major European company also bolsters his “America First” narrative. It demonstrates his ability to force foreign entities to adopt favorable pricing and invest in American manufacturing.³
For government payers, the deal will likely result in modest, but real, savings for Medicaid budgets. More importantly, the Pfizer and AstraZeneca agreements establish a powerful coercive precedent. The administration can now leverage this precedent in negotiations with the remaining 15 targeted pharmaceutical companies.¹
5.3. For Patients: A Segmented and Uneven Impact
The deal’s impact on American patients will be highly uneven and segmented by insurance status.
- Medicaid Beneficiaries: This group of over 70 million low-income Americans is the focus of the MFN pricing provision.⁸ While the deal may lower costs for state governments, the direct impact on these patients will be negligible, as their out-of-pocket costs are typically minimal or zero.
- Uninsured and High-Deductible Patients: This demographic is most likely to see a direct benefit from the TrumpRx.gov platform. For a patient paying cash for a designated discounted drug like Airsupra, the savings could be substantial. However, the benefit is limited to the narrow list of drugs included on the platform.
- Commercially Insured and Medicare Patients: This group, the vast majority of Americans, is unlikely to experience any direct financial benefit. The deal explicitly carves out the commercial and Medicare Part D markets, where most U.S. drug spending occurs.² Analysts have repeatedly stated the agreement will not affect private insurance negotiations, lower premiums, or reduce out-of-pocket costs for most insured individuals.¹⁰ This structural limitation is by design. It allows the manufacturer to concede to government pressure in one channel while protecting its primary revenue streams in others.
For example, a patient with a commercial insurance plan will find their co-pay is determined by their plan’s formulary and the price negotiated between their insurer/PBM and AstraZeneca. These negotiations are separate from the MFN deal. This means the lower price point established for Medicaid cannot be leveraged by commercial payers to demand similar discounts.²⁶
5.4. The Rise of DTC Platforms and the PBM Response
The deal’s emphasis on TrumpRx.gov and the parallel launch of platforms like AstraZeneca Direct signal a broader strategic shift toward DTC channels. AstraZeneca launched its own platform, AstraZeneca Direct, on September 26, 2025.²¹ It provides eligible patients a way to purchase certain medications at a transparent cash price with home delivery. The platform initially launched with Airsupra and the company’s top-selling drug, Farxiga, at discounts of up to 70% off the list price.²¹
For pharmaceutical companies, running their own DTC platforms offers numerous advantages.
- It allows them to maintain control over branding, the patient experience, and valuable data on patient behavior.²⁷
- It provides valuable data on patient behavior.²⁸
- It allows companies to offer a wider range of products, build brand loyalty, and test pricing strategies without the intermediation of government branding or PBMs.²⁸
This dual-platform approach serves as both a compliance measure and a long-term business strategy.
This move directly challenges the role of PBMs, the traditional intermediaries in the drug supply chain.¹¹ The long-term response from PBMs is likely to be multifaceted. They may seek to discredit government-led platforms by highlighting their limited formularies.²⁹ PBMs could also adapt by launching their own transparent, cash-pay options to compete directly. Another potential reaction involves increasing administrative pressure on retail pharmacies, which may face stricter audits and compliance checks as they navigate patient requests to price-match with DTC platforms.²⁹
Ultimately, PBMs will likely intensify lobbying efforts to underscore their value in controlling overall drug spending. They will argue that a fragmented DTC landscape is less effective than their established model of negotiating rebates and managing formularies.³⁰
5.5. For the Broader Pharmaceutical Industry
The back-to-back deals with Pfizer and AstraZeneca have fundamentally altered the dynamic of government-industry relations in the U.S. They establish a new and formidable playbook for the executive branch. The choice for other major manufacturers is now clear and unenviable: either “voluntarily” agree to a similar MFN/DTC framework or face the dual threat of crippling tariffs and intense political condemnation.
This model of negotiation-by-coercion bypasses the legislative process and judicial review. It concentrates immense power within the executive branch. The industry must now grapple with a new reality where trade policy is a primary lever for healthcare regulation. This may lead to the emergence of a two-tiered market structure in the U.S.—a heavily managed and discounted government/DTC market operating in parallel with a separate, premium-priced commercial market. This fragmentation could increase complexity and create new strategic challenges for manufacturers.
6. Conclusion: A Landmark Deal in Principle, A Modest Revolution in Practice
The October 2025 agreement between the Trump administration and AstraZeneca is a landmark event in U.S. healthcare policy. Its significance, however, lies more in the political and strategic realms than in a fundamental reordering of drug economics for the average American patient. It is a masterclass in political stagecraft, achieving the appearance of a sweeping revolution while confining the most significant financial impacts to a small segment of the market.
For the Trump administration, the deal is an unmitigated success. It delivers a clear political win and a powerful precedent for future action. For AstraZeneca, it is the pragmatic resolution of a high-stakes confrontation, trading manageable price concessions for invaluable market stability and political capital. For most American patients, however, the direct effects will be imperceptible. The structural drivers of high drug costs in the commercial and Medicare markets remain untouched.
The true and lasting legacy of this agreement is the successful weaponization of trade policy to achieve domestic policy goals. The administration demonstrated that the credible threat of punitive tariffs is a more potent tool for extracting concessions than years of legislative debate or regulatory rulemaking. This establishes a powerful and coercive new playbook for the executive branch.
The deal leaves several critical questions unanswered. Will the remaining targeted companies fall in line? Can TrumpRx.gov evolve into a genuinely disruptive force that challenges the dominance of PBMs? And most importantly, will this model of “voluntary” compliance, backed by the threat of overwhelming economic force, become the new normal in U.S. drug pricing policy? The answers will determine whether this agreement was a singular event or the dawn of a new, more confrontational era in American healthcare.
Works Cited
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- Weissert, Will. “AstraZeneca agrees to lower drug prices for Medicaid under Trump administration deal.” The Washington Post. October 10, 2025.
- The White House. “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Announces Second Deal to Bring Most-Favored-Nation Pricing to American Patients.” October 10, 2025.
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- Schaeffer Center for Health Policy & Economics. “Most-Favored Nation Drug Pricing Has Three Significant Problems.”
- Milliman. “Most Favored Nation EO: Considerations for Life Science Companies.”
- AJMC. “White House to Announce Second Drug Pricing Deal as AstraZeneca Joins TrumpRx.” October 10, 2025.
- Mintz. “A Pivotal Week for Pharmaceutical Policy: Trump Administration.” October 7, 2025.
- “Lower drug prices for Americans: Trump seals deal with AstraZeneca, some medicines at discounts of up to 80%.” The Times of India. October 11, 2025.
- “AstraZeneca agrees to lower drug prices for Medicaid under Trump administration deal.” Las Vegas Sun. October 10, 2025.
- ClinCalc. “Rosuvastatin Drug Usage Statistics, United States, 2014 – 2023.”
- ClinCalc. “Budesonide; Formoterol Drug Usage Statistics, United States, 2014 – 2023.”
- Xtalks. “Top 30 Drugs to Watch in 2024: Insights from 2023 Sales Data.”
- AstraZeneca. “AstraZeneca launches direct-to-consumer platform to expand access to medications for US patients, including those living with chronic conditions.” September 26, 2025.
- ClinCalc. “Esomeprazole Drug Usage Statistics, United States, 2014 – 2023.”
- instagraham. “Tagrisso earned $5.8bn in sales in 2023…” Hacker News. February 19, 2024.
- “AstraZeneca scores FDA nod for Imfinzi as first immunotherapy in limited-stage SCLC.” Fierce Pharma.
- GlobalData. “The Global Drug sales of Lynparza (2020 – 2026, USD Millions).” November 2024.
- BIPC. “TrumpRx: What Pharmacies and Plan Sponsors Need to Know.”
- Debevoise & Plimpton. “Pharm-to-Table: The Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Sales Platforms.” September 2025.
- Radesich, Gianluca. “Embracing Direct-to-Consumer Strategies: Revolutionizing Pharmaceutical Sales.” Medium.
- Bell, Allison. “‘TrumpRx.gov’ could cripple pharmacies, disrupt employer plan management.” BenefitsPRO. October 10, 2025.
- NCPA. “Our Response to President Trump’s Drug Pricing News.” October 1, 2025.
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