An Analysis of the October 2025 Chevron El Segundo Refinery Fire: A Confluence of Technical Failure, Regulatory Lapses, and Systemic Risk

I. Executive Summary

A significant explosion and fire occurred at the Chevron Corporation refinery in El Segundo, California, on the evening of October 2, 2025. The incident originated in a critical processing unit. It sent a massive fireball into the night sky, rattled nearby communities, and triggered a large-scale emergency response.

The fire was contained and extinguished without reported fatalities. However, its repercussions extend far beyond the refinery’s fenceline. The event exposed deep vulnerabilities in regional energy infrastructure, regulatory oversight, and corporate safety protocols.

A definitive root cause analysis by investigating agencies is still pending. However, a comprehensive review of the available evidence indicates the catastrophe was not a random accident. Instead, it was the culmination of a series of interconnected failures.

The immediate catalyst appears to be a technical failure within the refinery’s ISOMAX hydrocracking unit. This unit is vital for producing jet fuel and diesel. The failure occurred against a backdrop of documented, pre-existing operational deficiencies.

Regulatory filings reveal a pattern of repeated safety and environmental violations at the facility. These occurred in the years and months leading up to the fire. One recent citation was specifically related to the ISOMAX unit. This pattern suggests a systemic failure to effectively address known risks.

A profound vacuum in federal oversight compounded the incident’s severity. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is the independent federal agency tasked with conducting root-cause analyses of such disasters. Its goal is to prevent future occurrences. However, administrative and budgetary actions have rendered the CSB effectively inactive.

Without the CSB, the investigation has become fragmented. Multiple local and state agencies with narrow, siloed mandates are now involved. This creates a significant risk that the most critical systemic lessons from this event will not be identified, synthesized, and disseminated across the industry.

The fire’s consequences were immediate and multi-faceted. It triggered significant disruptions to the West Coast’s tightly constrained fuel supply, especially for jet fuel. This created economic volatility. The fire also resulted in documented health impacts on local residents and injuries to refinery workers. This led to multiple lawsuits that directly contradict initial corporate and municipal statements.

Furthermore, the incident and the subsequent public communication severely eroded trust between the corporation and its host communities. This event serves as a critical case study. It highlights the cascading risks of aging energy infrastructure operating within a weakened regulatory framework. It offers urgent lessons for regulators, industry operators, and policymakers.

Ultimately, this analysis concludes that preventing future disasters requires a fundamental shift. This includes proactive enforcement, a renewed corporate commitment to safety over production, and the immediate restoration of independent federal oversight.

II. Anatomy of the Incident: The October 2nd Explosion and Fire

A. Chronological Breakdown of the Event

The incident at the Chevron El Segundo Refinery began around 9:30 PM PDT on Thursday, October 2, 2025.¹⁹ Multiple residents across the South Bay region of Los Angeles County reported hearing and feeling a significant explosion. Eyewitnesses described the blast as a powerful concussive event, likening it to a “mini-quake” or a “small earthquake”.⁶

Immediately after the explosion, a massive fireball erupted from the facility. It cast a vivid orange glow that illuminated the night sky and was visible for many miles.⁶⁸

Chevron and the El Segundo Fire Department confirmed the fire originated at a processing unit in the southeast corner of the refinery complex.² This location is strategically important, as it directly borders the residential community of Manhattan Beach, heightening public risk.⁵⁶

Emergency alerts were sent to surrounding communities. Officials issued a shelter-in-place order for parts of Manhattan Beach. It instructed residents to remain indoors and close all windows and doors to prevent exposure to contaminants.³² This measure remained in effect for several hours and was lifted early on October 3rd.⁷

The fire raged through the night as firefighting efforts focused on containment. By the morning of Friday, October 3, 2025, officials announced the blaze was contained to the single affected unit.¹⁹ The fire was declared fully extinguished by 11:00 AM PDT that morning, about 13.5 hours after the initial explosion.²

Table 1: Timeline of the El Segundo Refinery Incident (October 2-3, 2025)

Date & Time (PDT)	Event	Source(s)
Oct. 2, ~9:30 PM	Explosion occurs at the Chevron El Segundo Refinery, felt by residents in surrounding communities.	¹⁹
Oct. 2, 9:32 PM	El Segundo Fire Department (ESFD) is dispatched and responds to the fire. A unified command is established with Chevron’s fire team.	²
Oct. 2, 10:06 PM	First public safety alert is issued, 26 minutes after the initial explosion, advising residents to close doors and windows.	³²
Oct. 2, ~11:30 PM	City of Manhattan Beach issues a shelter-in-place order for affected areas, lasting approximately three hours.	³²
Oct. 2, Late Evening	Chevron issues its first official statement, confirming an “isolated fire” and reporting all personnel accounted for with no injuries.	¹⁵
Oct. 3, Early Morning	The shelter-in-place order is lifted. Officials declare the fire has been contained to a single processing unit.	¹⁹
Oct. 3, 7:30 AM	The fire is reported to be fully extinguished by some sources.	⁵⁶
Oct. 3, 11:00 AM	The fire is officially and widely reported as fully extinguished. All local road closures are lifted.	²

B. The Unified Command Response: Mobilization and Suppression

The emergency response to the fire was swift. It demonstrated a high degree of inter-agency coordination. This protocol was honed through prior planning and drills between the refinery and local municipalities.²

A unified command structure was immediately established. It was co-led by the El Segundo Fire Department (ESFD) and Chevron’s own substantial, on-site industrial fire department.² This integrated command is standard procedure for major industrial incidents. It ensures that specialized facility knowledge is combined with municipal emergency management resources.

The scale of the blaze required a broader regional mobilization. Fire departments from neighboring cities provided mutual aid, including Manhattan Beach, Redondo Beach, and the Los Angeles County Fire Department.² This layered response brought significant manpower and equipment to the scene. It was crucial for preventing the fire from spreading to other volatile processing units.

Fire suppression tactics were primarily defensive. They focused on isolating the incident and mitigating the risk of cascading failures. Crews worked to control the flow of fuel to the burning unit by manipulating valves and other controls.⁹

A simultaneous and critical objective was cooling adjacent structures. Crews used massive volumes of water on tanks and pipelines to prevent them from overheating and suffering a secondary failure.⁹

In addition to direct suppression, Chevron personnel activated the refinery’s safety flare system. This system safely burns off excess hydrocarbon gases from the depressurizing unit.⁵⁶ While a standard safety procedure, these flares produced large, visible columns of flame. This contributed to public alarm as some mistook them for a second fire.⁵⁸

C. Initial Corporate and Municipal Communications

In the hours after the explosion, Chevron and local officials initiated public communications. They aimed to reassure the community and control the narrative.

Chevron’s initial statements consistently emphasized three key points. First, the fire was “isolated” to a single unit. Second, all employees and contractors were accounted for. Third, and critically, no injuries had been reported.¹⁵ The company also sought to allay environmental concerns. It stated that its fenceline air monitoring system had detected no “exceedances” of legally permitted emission levels.¹⁷

Municipal leaders largely mirrored this messaging. El Segundo Mayor Chris Pimentel and Los Angeles County Supervisor Holly Mitchell praised the rapid and effective response. They reiterated the “no injuries” claim and stated there was “no cause for alarm”.¹⁹ The official communications strategy was clearly designed to project control and minimize public panic.

However, a significant discrepancy emerged almost immediately. Media reports soon began to allege that at least one worker had been injured.¹² Multiple lawsuits later substantiated and magnified this discrepancy. Legal actions on behalf of refinery workers detailed severe physical injuries, including orthopedic damage, and significant emotional trauma sustained as they fled the blast zone.¹⁰

This contradictory evidence revealed that the initial, carefully controlled public relations narrative was, at best, incomplete. The decision to disseminate incomplete or inaccurate information about worker safety carries profound ethical implications. It goes beyond immediate legal ramifications. This action undermines the public’s ability to trust official sources during a time of acute vulnerability. The initial downplaying of the human cost of the incident would later become a central factor in the erosion of public trust.

III. The Epicenter of Failure: A Technical Analysis of the ISOMAX Unit

A. Function and Criticality of the Hydrocracking Process

The fire’s epicenter was the ISOMAX unit, a technologically sophisticated and vital piece of infrastructure.⁹ The ISOMAX unit is a hydrocracker. It is a type of catalytic cracking unit that operates under extremely high temperature and pressure. Its primary function is to use a catalyst and hydrogen to break down heavy hydrocarbon molecules into lighter, higher-value products.²¹

At the El Segundo facility, the ISOMAX unit is a key producer of transportation fuels. It is particularly important for jet fuel and high-quality diesel.¹¹

The criticality of this specific unit to the regional economy is immense. The Chevron El Segundo refinery is the largest on the U.S. West Coast. It supplies approximately 20% of Southern California’s motor vehicle fuel and a staggering 40% of its jet fuel.¹⁵

A significant portion of this jet fuel goes directly to the nearby Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), one of the world’s busiest aviation hubs.⁴³

Therefore, a catastrophic failure in the primary jet fuel production unit represents a direct threat to the region’s transportation and economic stability. The incident was not merely a fire at a refinery; it was a disabling blow to a linchpin of the West Coast energy supply chain.

B. Evaluating Potential Failure Scenarios

Chevron has not publicly released a definitive root cause analysis. However, available evidence and expert commentary allow for an informed evaluation of likely technical failure pathways.

Industry analysts note that refinery fires of this nature most commonly begin with a loss of containment. This is a breach in a pipe, vessel, or other equipment. It allows highly flammable, high-temperature hydrocarbons to escape and find an ignition source, which is ubiquitous in a refinery.⁹

Reports indicate the fire may have originated in the convection section of a furnace within the ISOMAX complex.¹⁵

Crucially, the failure of the ISOMAX unit was not an unforeseen event. A key piece of evidence points to pre-existing problems. The South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD) issued a Notice of Violation to Chevron on July 30, 2025, just over two months before the fire. This citation specifically alleged the refinery had failed to properly control the burning of excess gases at equipment directly related to its Isomax unit.¹

Such a violation points directly to a potential problem with process control, pressure management, or mechanical integrity. Regulators had already identified and cited operational deficiencies within the very system that later failed. This fact is a powerful indicator. It shifts the potential cause from a simple equipment malfunction to a more serious systemic issue. This issue involves the facility’s management of known safety risks and its response to regulatory warnings. Given this explicit prior warning, the explosion was not just a random event; it was a predictable failure in a system already showing documented signs of instability.

C. Historical Technical Precedents: Lessons from the 2013 CSB/CalOSHA Report

To fully understand the context of the 2025 fire, it is essential to examine the facility’s technical history. A 2013 technical report from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) and Cal/OSHA provides a stark precedent.⁵

This investigation began after the major 2012 fire at Chevron’s sister refinery in Richmond, California. That fire was caused by the catastrophic failure of a pipe due to sulfidation corrosion. Investigators recognized that the El Segundo refinery had a nearly identical crude unit and processed similar crude oil. They analyzed pipe samples that Chevron had voluntarily replaced at El Segundo as a precaution.⁵

The findings of that 2013 analysis were alarming. The metallurgical evaluation revealed the pipe sample from El Segundo had suffered from the exact same sulfidation corrosion that led to the Richmond disaster. The pipe had experienced a severe loss of material. Its wall thickness was reduced by as much as 60% in some areas.⁵

The report concluded that both refineries were susceptible to this aggressive corrosion. They were processing high-sulfur crude oil through older carbon steel piping with low levels of silicon, a key element for corrosion resistance.⁵

This historical data provides a critical lens through which to view the 2025 incident. It establishes that for more than a decade, Chevron has been formally aware of a specific and dangerous corrosion mechanism at work within its El Segundo facility. This risk is directly linked to its choice of feedstock and its aging infrastructure.

At the time of the 2013 report, the CSB Chairperson, Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso, issued a pointed warning.

” the importance of new actions to eliminate this hazard through requiring inherently safer designs and materials, rather than relying on inspections alone to find developing safety problems.”⁵

The 2025 fire, therefore, serves as a tragic validation of that warning. It raises profound questions about whether those fundamental recommendations for material upgrades were fully implemented. The incident cannot be seen as an isolated failure. It is the potential manifestation of a known, decade-old vulnerability that may not have been fully mitigated.

IV. A Pattern of Precursors: Chevron El Segundo’s Regulatory and Safety Record

The technical failure within the ISOMAX unit did not occur in a vacuum. An examination of the refinery’s regulatory compliance record reveals a clear and disturbing pattern. The years leading up to the fire show recurring safety and environmental issues. This history, documented by oversight agencies, serves as a chronicle of unheeded warnings.

A. Analysis of South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD) Violations (2020-2025)

The Chevron El Segundo facility has been a frequent subject of enforcement actions by the South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD). In the five-year period from 2020 to 2025, the AQMD issued 46 separate notices of violation to the refinery.¹ This volume of citations indicates systemic, rather than isolated, compliance problems.

Furthermore, the data suggests an accelerating rate of infractions immediately preceding the fire. Of the 46 violations issued over five years, 13 were recorded in the last 12 months alone.⁶

The nature of these violations is particularly telling. They frequently involved:

• Chemical leaks
• Malfunctioning or degraded equipment
• Failure to maintain critical instrumentation
• Exceeding permitted emissions limits⁶

These are not minor administrative infractions. They are direct indicators of potential weaknesses in mechanical integrity and process safety management.

This pattern is further illuminated by a request Chevron made to the AQMD in August 2025. The company asked for “leniency” in assessing its compliance while it worked to remove buildup inside its furnace tubes. In its request, Chevron acknowledged that these conditions risked equipment overheating and, potentially, failing.²⁶

B. Review of Cal/OSHA Inspection Findings and Citations

A parallel pattern of safety deficiencies is evident in the records of the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA). Over the past decade, Cal/OSHA initiated at least 18 separate inspections at the El Segundo refinery. These resulted in nearly two dozen violations.¹

Several of these citations are directly relevant to the conditions that can lead to a major fire. In October 2022, OSHA issued a “serious” violation against the refinery. It cited a failure to “develop, implement and maintain safe work practices to prevent or control hazards,” such as leaks and chemical releases.²⁶

In September 2023, just one year before the fire, the agency issued another round of citations. These related to multiple safety issues, including a failure to conduct a “thorough hazard analysis.” This is an essential assessment designed to identify and control risks of fires and explosions.²⁶

The presence of an active investigation adds another layer of concern. At the time of the October 2nd explosion, Cal/OSHA was already scrutinizing the refinery. It had opened its most recent investigation on September 11, 2025, just three weeks prior.¹

Table 2: Summary of Regulatory Violations at Chevron El Segundo (2020-2025)

Issuing Agency	Time Period	Number of Violations	Key Violation Types / Descriptions	Source(s)
AQMD	2020-2025 (5 years)	46	Chemical leaks, malfunctioning equipment, exceeding permitted emissions limits.	¹
AQMD	2024-2025 (1 year)	13	An accelerating rate of infractions in the year immediately preceding the fire.	⁶
AQMD	July 30, 2025	1	Failure to properly control excess gases at equipment related to the ISOMAX unit, the eventual epicenter of the fire.	¹
Cal/OSHA	2015-2025 (Decade)	~24	Deficient hazard analyses, failure to maintain safe work practices for preventing leaks/releases, ladderway and guardrail issues, heat-illness prevention failures.	¹
Cal/OSHA	October 2022	1 (Serious)	Failure to maintain safe work practices to prevent/control hazardous chemical releases.	²⁶
Cal/OSHA	September 2023	Multiple	Included a failure to conduct a thorough hazard analysis.	²⁶
Cal/OSHA	Sept. 11, 2025	N/A	An active investigation was opened at the facility just three weeks before the explosion.	¹

C. Synthesizing a Narrative of Deferred Risk

The extensive records from both the AQMD and Cal/OSHA do not depict a well-run facility that suffered an unforeseeable accident. When viewed in aggregate, they paint a compelling picture of a facility with persistent, documented, and unresolved problems in industrial safety.

The regulatory system was clearly functioning on one level. It successfully identified and documented numerous deficiencies. The citations acted as explicit warnings of growing risk. This includes the July 30th notice flagging the ISOMAX unit and the prior Cal/OSHA finding of an inadequate hazard analysis.¹

However, the catastrophic fire suggests a profound failure on a more critical level: the enforcement and corporate response loop. The sheer volume and recurring nature of the violations indicate that existing penalties were insufficient to compel lasting, systemic corrective actions from Chevron.

The pattern of behavior suggests a specific corporate mindset. Chevron may have treated these regulatory citations as a recurring cost of doing business. They were seen as manageable fines and procedural responses, not as urgent alerts signaling an escalating danger. This approach externalizes the true cost of deferred maintenance onto the public. The public ultimately bears the burden of health impacts, economic disruption, and environmental damage.

The fire can thus be interpreted not just as a technical breakdown. It was the predictable outcome of a corporate and regulatory culture that allowed identified risks to be deferred until they manifested in the most destructive way possible.

V. The Oversight Vacuum: The Role of a Weakened Federal and Siloed State Response

The investigation into the El Segundo refinery fire is proceeding within a dangerously compromised and fragmented regulatory landscape. A critical component of the national infrastructure for industrial safety is missing. This creates a significant risk that the full lessons of this disaster will never be learned.

A. The Diminished Role of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB)

A refinery explosion of this magnitude would normally trigger a comprehensive federal investigation. This was the second such explosion in California in 2025 alone. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) would have immediately launched a probe.¹

The CSB is a small, independent, non-regulatory federal agency. Its sole mission is to investigate the root causes of major chemical accidents and issue safety recommendations to prevent their recurrence. Its work is widely considered the “gold standard” for impartial, science-based industrial accident investigation.¹

However, at the time of the El Segundo fire, the CSB was effectively non-operational. The agency has been a target of the Trump administration. The administration has repeatedly proposed to eliminate its budget and shutter the board.¹ This political pressure, combined with a federal government shutdown, left the nation’s premier chemical accident investigation body sidelined.⁶

As Congressman Mark DeSaulnier stated, the Trump administration has put the CSB “on the chopping block,” leaving communities vulnerable.⁵²

The absence of the CSB is not a minor bureaucratic detail. It represents a fundamental failure of the national safety apparatus. The board’s unique mandate is to look beyond immediate blame or financial penalties. It identifies the complex interplay of technical, managerial, and regulatory failures that lead to disaster. Without its involvement, the investigation lacks a crucial element of independent, expert, and holistic analysis. This increases the likelihood that similar, preventable incidents will occur elsewhere.

B. The Fragmented Investigative Landscape

In the CSB’s absence, a collection of state, local, and corporate entities is now responsible for investigating the fire. Each entity operates with a narrow and limited mandate. This has resulted in what critics describe as a “siloed” and “toothless” process.⁵² Instead of a single, coordinated investigation, there are multiple parallel inquiries with distinct objectives.¹

The California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) is not leading a broad inquiry. Instead, it stated it is merely “ready to support” the El Segundo Fire Department, which is leading a safety review focused on the emergency response.¹

The other ongoing investigations include:

• Chevron’s Internal Investigation: The company is leading this probe. It is focused on determining the immediate cause for operational purposes and to prepare for litigation. It inherently lacks the independence required for full public trust.²
• Cal/OSHA: This agency’s investigation is strictly limited to issues of worker safety and potential violations of workplace safety regulations.¹
• South Coast AQMD: The air district’s investigation is focused on identifying violations of air quality permits and levying fines for pollution.¹
• California Energy Commission: This body is monitoring the situation. Its primary concern is the impact on the state’s fuel supply and market stability, not the root cause of the accident.¹

No single, independent authority is tasked with synthesizing the findings from these disparate investigations. A comprehensive public report is needed to explain not just what happened, but why it happened, and what must be done to prevent it from happening again.

Table 3: Key Investigating Agencies and Their Mandates

Agency / Entity	Lead Role / Mandate	Key Limitations
U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB)	[Inactive] Independent federal root-cause analysis for public learning and prevention.	Defunded and sidelined by executive branch actions; inactive at the time of the incident.
Chevron Corporation	Internal investigation to determine cause, manage liability, and plan for restart.	Inherent conflict of interest; findings are not guaranteed to be fully transparent or publicly accessible.
El Segundo Fire Department	Lead safety review of the incident.	Focus is primarily on the effectiveness of the emergency response, not on the refinery’s process safety management failures.
Cal/OSHA	Investigate for worker hazards and violations of workplace safety standards.	Narrow mandate focused on employee safety; does not address broader community risk or environmental impact.
South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD)	Investigate for air pollution and violations of emissions permits.	Focus is on quantifying and penalizing illegal emissions, not on the underlying mechanical or management failures.
California Energy Commission	Investigate for impact on the state’s fuel supply.	Mandate is limited to energy market stability and does not include accident investigation.

C. Implications of Lacking a Central, Independent Federal Investigation

The absence of the CSB creates a critical accountability gap. This has profound long-term consequences for public and industrial safety. The fragmented nature of the current investigations means each agency will produce a report tailored to its specific jurisdiction. Cal/OSHA will focus on worker safety rules. The AQMD will focus on emissions. The fire department will focus on response tactics.

While each of these is a valuable piece of the puzzle, no entity is responsible for putting the pieces together to see the whole picture.

This lack of a holistic, root-cause analysis means that crucial systemic lessons are likely to be missed. A CSB investigation would examine the “confluence of human, organizational, and technological factors.” This includes Chevron’s corporate safety culture, the adequacy of industry standards, and the effectiveness of state regulatory oversight.⁹ Without such a comprehensive review, the final conclusions are likely to be superficial. They might point to a single failed component without asking the deeper questions about why that component was allowed to fail.

The ultimate and most dangerous consequence of this oversight vacuum is the failure to learn. The primary purpose of a CSB investigation is to prevent future disasters. It does this by sharing its findings and recommendations with the entire industry, regulators, and the public. By effectively dismantling the nation’s only independent chemical accident investigation body, the administration has ensured the El Segundo fire will be treated as an isolated, local event. This transforms a preventable disaster into a squandered opportunity, making it more likely that similar catastrophes will occur in the future.

VI. Ripple Effects: Assessing the Economic and Supply Chain Disruptions

The fire at the Chevron El Segundo refinery sent immediate and significant shockwaves through the U.S. West Coast’s energy market. The economic impact stemmed from two sources: the incident itself and California’s unique market structure. The event’s consequences were felt by consumers and industries across the region. It highlighted the profound vulnerability of a system with little operational redundancy.

A. Impact on California’s “Fuel Island” and Regional Price Volatility

Energy economists often describe California’s fuel market as a “fuel island”.³⁸ It is geographically isolated from the major refining centers on the U.S. Gulf Coast. It has very limited pipeline capacity to bring in refined products from other states.⁵⁵

Compounding this isolation, California mandates its own unique, cleaner-burning gasoline blend. This specialized fuel is produced by only a handful of refineries, most located within the state.³⁸ Consequently, when a major in-state refinery experiences an unplanned outage, the supply cannot be quickly replaced. Importing compliant fuel from overseas requires weeks of transit time by sea.³⁸

The partial shutdown of the El Segundo refinery immediately threatened this fragile supply-demand balance. The refinery alone supplies approximately 20% of Southern California’s gasoline.¹⁵ In response, market analysts projected a spike in retail gasoline prices.

• Initial estimates varied.
• A consensus formed around a likely increase of 5 to 15 cents per gallon in the short term.¹³
• Some models predicted increases as high as 25 cents per gallon.³⁸
• One USC professor projected a more sustained impact, estimating prices could rise by 13 cents for every week production remained curtailed.⁶¹

This price volatility is a direct consequence of the market’s structural inability to absorb supply shocks.

B. Jet Fuel Supply Constraints and a Vulnerable Aviation Sector

While the impact on gasoline prices was a major concern, the effect on the jet fuel market was even more acute. The fire’s epicenter was the ISOMAX hydrocracking unit, the refinery’s primary system for producing jet fuel.³⁹ The El Segundo facility supplies an estimated 40% of all jet fuel consumed in Southern California. This specific outage created a severe logistical challenge for the region’s aviation sector.¹⁵

The primary entity at risk was Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). LAX is a critical national and international hub located just a few miles from the refinery. Experts warned that a prolonged disruption could force airlines to reroute flights, cancel services, or arrange for costly alternative fueling logistics.⁶¹ As a result, analysts expected the spot price for jet fuel to jump more significantly than the price for gasoline.³⁰

C. Long-Term Market Implications Amidst Declining West Coast Refining Capacity

The El Segundo fire did not happen at a time of market stability. It struck a system already under significant strain. The incident occurred in the context of a broader, ongoing contraction of refining capacity on the West Coast.

In a stark coincidence, the Phillips 66 refinery in Wilmington was permanently ceasing its crude oil processing operations in the very same month.¹⁵ Other refinery closures are also planned, further reducing the state’s ability to produce its own fuel.²²

This trend of diminishing local production capacity has systematically stripped the system of its resilience. The “buffer” that once existed to absorb the impact of an unplanned outage has been eroded. Consequently, each remaining refinery has become more critical to market stability. Any incident now carries an outsized economic weight.

The fire at El Segundo served as a dramatic and costly stress test. It vividly demonstrated the economic vulnerability California has accepted. The state has become increasingly reliant on a smaller number of aging, high-risk industrial facilities. As one industry watchdog warned prior to the fire, the state’s tightening supply means that “even minor disruptions can trigger substantial volatility”.¹³ The fire was far from a minor disruption, and it exposed the precariousness of the entire regional energy supply chain.

VII. The Human Toll: Community Health, Worker Safety, and Public Trust

The El Segundo refinery fire exacted a significant human toll. This went beyond the technical failures and economic consequences. It affected the surrounding communities and the workers within the facility. The incident created immediate health risks, exposed a troubling discrepancy in reporting on worker safety, and caused a severe breakdown in public trust.

A. Documented Health Impacts and the Basis for Resident Litigation

Chevron’s initial statements claimed its fenceline monitors detected no “exceedances.” However, more detailed and independent monitoring told a different story. The South Coast AQMD confirmed its monitors detected elevated levels of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) during the night of the fire.¹⁴

This official data corroborates the direct experience of residents. In the days following the fire, people in nearby communities reported a range of symptoms. These included sulfurous odors, nausea, persistent headaches, and irritation of the eyes and throat.¹²

These documented health impacts have formed the basis for legal action. At least one class-action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of residents living within a five-mile radius of the refinery.⁸⁰ The lawsuit alleges that the smoke, fumes, and pollutants caused direct physical harm. It cites the case of a plaintiff who suffered a severe asthma flare-up immediately following the explosion. The litigation seeks to hold Chevron accountable for the health consequences and economic damages suffered by the community.⁸⁰

Given the known long-term health risks associated with many of the chemicals released, the incident also raises the need for long-term health monitoring for residents in the most heavily affected communities.³⁶

B. Contradictory Narratives on Worker Injuries

One of the most significant failures in the aftermath was the dissemination of misleading information regarding worker safety. The official narrative from Chevron and municipal leaders in the first 24 hours was that there were “no injuries”.¹⁵ This claim was unequivocal and widely reported.

This narrative, however, was false. Lawsuits filed by firms representing injured refinery workers directly contradicted it. One lawsuit described in detail the experience of a worker near the explosion. The complaint states the plaintiff “struggled to breathe, fell to the ground, and ran to escape the explosion,” resulting in “severe physical injuries” and significant emotional trauma.¹⁰ Another report cited a separate lawsuit on behalf of four workers who sustained orthopedic injuries and trauma while fleeing the blast.⁹

An attorney for the injured workers stated that under-reporting injuries is a common tactic after industrial accidents. Companies attempt to control the public narrative and minimize perceived liability.¹⁰ This stark contradiction between the company’s public assurances and the documented reality of its injured employees represents a profound breach of transparency and public trust.

C. The Breakdown in Emergency Communication and Its Aftermath

A breakdown in the official emergency communication system significantly exacerbated the community’s fear and uncertainty. Residents of Manhattan Beach reported a “terrifying” 26-minute gap between the explosion and the first official public alert.³

During this period of intense anxiety, residents saw the sky turn orange and felt their homes shake, but had no official information about the threat.³

Fire officials later explained this delay was procedural. They argued that a unified command must be established and facts confirmed before sending “actionable information” to the public. This is to avoid causing unnecessary panic.³ While this may be standard protocol, the community’s experience demonstrated the protocol was inadequate for an event of this magnitude.

The public outcry over this communication failure was significant. It prompted a direct response from Chevron. At a subsequent community meeting, the refinery’s director, Bryon Stock, offered a public apology. He also pledged that Chevron would fully fund a new, enhanced community alert and warning system to ensure residents receive more timely information in future emergencies.³

This combination of failures created a severe deficit of public trust. It included delayed alerts, conflicting air quality reports, and the false narrative about worker injuries. Chevron’s commitment to fund a new alert system was a direct admission that existing systems were insufficient. It was a necessary and costly step to begin rebuilding that shattered trust.

VIII. Analysis and Synthesis: Connecting Systemic Failures to the Catastrophe

The explosion and fire at the Chevron El Segundo refinery was not a singular, isolated event. A holistic analysis of the available evidence reveals a clear conclusion. The catastrophe was the predictable and preventable outcome of interconnected failures. These failures spanned technical, corporate, and regulatory domains. The fire in the ISOMAX unit was merely the final, violent expression of risks that were known, documented, and allowed to fester.

A. Drawing a Causal Chain from Regulatory Lapses to Technical Failure

A clear causal line can be drawn from the pattern of regulatory non-compliance to the technical failure. The extensive history of violations documented by both the AQMD and Cal/OSHA was a diagnostic record of a facility struggling with process safety.¹ The citations for equipment malfunctions, chemical leaks, and an inadequate hazard analysis were clear indicators of systemic weakness.²⁶

The regulatory system identified these red flags. The July 30, 2025, AQMD violation notice for the ISOMAX unit was a specific and timely warning.¹ However, the fire demonstrates that the regulatory framework lacked the teeth to compel effective corrective action. The pattern suggests an environment where a major corporation could absorb dozens of violations as a manageable operating expense.

The lack of forceful, preventative enforcement created the operational space for a known risk to escalate into an uncontrolled failure. The technical breakdown in the ISOMAX unit was not a surprise. It was the manifestation of a risk that the regulatory system had seen but had failed to stop.

B. Assessing Corporate Culture and its Influence on Process Safety Management

The evidence points toward a corporate culture that may have prioritized production over a proactive commitment to safety. Several key data points support this assessment.

First, the 2013 CSB/Cal/OSHA report on sulfidation corrosion put Chevron on notice over a decade ago. It warned about a specific degradation mechanism at El Segundo and recommended a move toward “inherently safer” materials.⁵ The 2025 fire raises serious questions about whether that capital-intensive advice was heeded.

Second, the request for “leniency” from the AQMD in August 2025 suggests a mindset focused on maintaining operations despite elevated risk.²⁶ Third, the immediate and incorrect public declaration of “no injuries” indicates the initial corporate reflex was to control the public relations narrative.¹⁵

Taken together, these actions paint a picture of a management system where the relentless pressure to maintain production may have created blind spots or a higher tolerance for deviance from best safety practices.

C. The El Segundo Fire as a Case Study in Modern Industrial Risk

Framed in a broader context, the El Segundo fire serves as a quintessential case study of modern industrial risks. The incident represents a convergence of three critical and dangerous trends:

1. Aging Critical Infrastructure: The refinery, first built in 1911, is an example of legacy industrial infrastructure. It is essential to the economy but is subject to the inevitable degradation of materials over time.¹⁹
2. Documented Lapses in Corporate Oversight: The incident was preceded by a clear pattern of safety and environmental violations. This indicates the operator was either unable or unwilling to maintain the facility to the highest standards.⁶
3. A Weakened and Fragmented Regulatory Apparatus: The absence of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board created a critical oversight vacuum. This left the investigation to a patchwork of state and local agencies with limited mandates.¹

The fire at Chevron El Segundo was therefore more than a local industrial accident. It was a systemic failure. It demonstrated what can happen when aging, high-hazard infrastructure is operated under a regime of questionable corporate priorities and insufficient regulatory supervision. Addressing these interconnected failures is not merely a matter of local concern but a national imperative to prevent the next, potentially more tragic, disaster.

IX. Recommendations and Strategic Outlook

The analysis of the October 2, 2025, fire provides a clear imperative for decisive action. Regulators, industry operators, and policymakers must act. The incident was not an anomaly but a symptom of deeper systemic risks. The following recommendations are designed to address the root causes of this failure and prevent similar catastrophes.

A. For Regulators (Cal/OSHA, AQMD)

The existing regulatory model proved insufficient. While it successfully identified violations, it failed to prevent a major disaster. A fundamental shift in enforcement philosophy is required.

1. Implement a Proactive, Preventative Enforcement Model: Regulators must move beyond a reactive, penalty-based system. A pattern of repeated violations related to process safety or mechanical integrity should trigger escalating, non-discretionary enforcement actions. This could include mandated third-party safety audits, reductions in operating capacity, or facility shutdowns until deficiencies are corrected.
2. Increase Scrutiny of Hazard Analyses: Regulators should mandate that all major hazard analyses for California refineries be submitted for regulatory review and approval. This would provide a critical check on a facility’s internal risk assessment processes.
3. Establish Integrated Agency Task Forces: The “siloed” nature of the current regulatory structure is a critical weakness. A permanent inter-agency task force (Cal/OSHA, AQMD, California Energy Commission) should be established. It would conduct integrated inspections and share data on high-risk facilities.

B. For Industry Operators (Chevron and Peers)

The incident underscores a critical need. Industry operators must renew their commitment to safety. Safety must be a pre-condition for operation, not a competing priority.

1. Reinvest in “Inherently Safer” Designs and Materials: Operators of aging refineries must prioritize capital investment in replacing outdated components with modern, more corrosion-resistant materials.⁵ A strategy based on inspection and repair alone has been proven insufficient.
2. Foster a Transparent and Empowered Safety Culture: Corporate leadership must cultivate a safety culture that encourages employees to report issues without fear of reprisal. It must also ensure transparent communication of all incidents, including worker injuries, to the public and regulatory bodies.
3. Proactively Fund and Co-develop Community Safety Systems: Operators of high-hazard facilities should partner with local municipalities. They must fund, develop, and regularly test state-of-the-art public alert and communication systems.

C. For Policymakers (State and Federal)

The El Segundo fire is a stark demonstration of a critical failure in the nation’s industrial safety framework. The most urgent and impactful action is clear.

1. Fully Fund and Restore the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB): The U.S. Congress and the Executive Branch must immediately take all necessary steps to restore the full budget, staffing, and independent authority of the CSB. The El Segundo fire serves as Exhibit A for why this agency is indispensable. Without a credible, independent federal body to conduct root-cause investigations, the nation is destined to repeat its most costly industrial failures. The absence of the CSB represents a profound and unacceptable risk to public safety. Its restoration should be a top national priority.

This incident was not an act of fate but a failure of foresight and responsibility. The path from regulatory warnings to a catastrophic fire was paved by a tolerance for deferred risk and a lack of meaningful accountability. Without a fundamental recalibration of corporate priorities and a strengthening of the independent oversight bodies designed to protect the public, the question is not if a similar disaster will happen again, but when and where.

---

Works Cited

1. Lazo, Alejandro/CalMatters. “Weakening of US Chemical Safety Board makes it unclear who’s investigating California refinery fires.” SFGate. October 9, 2025. https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/weakening-of-us-chemical-safety-board-makes-it-21093031.php
2. City of El Segundo. “Chevron Refinery Fire Update.” elsegundo.org. October 3, 2025. https://www.elsegundo.org/Home/Components/News/News/3933/268327
3. MB News Staff. “Chevron and Manhattan Beach officials pledge fixes to emergency communication.” The Manhattan Beach News. October 8, 2025. https://www.thembnews.com/2025/10/08/549593/chevron-and-manhattan-beach-officials-pledge-fixes-to-emergency-communication
4. MB News Staff. “Chevron and Manhattan Beach Officials Pledge Fixes to Emergency.” The Manhattan Beach News. October 8, 2025. https://www.thembnews.com/2025/10/08/549593/chevron-and-manhattan-beach-officials-pledge-fixes-to-emergency-communication
5. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. “In Cooperation with Cal OSHA, CSB Releases Technical Report on Corrosion Found in Chevron El Segundo Refinery Crude Unit Piping.” CSB.gov. April 18, 2013. https://www.csb.gov/in-cooperation-with-cal-osha-csb-releases-technical-report-on-corrosion-found-in-chevron-el-segundo-refinery-crude-unit-piping/
6. Wells, Marc and Luis Marquez. “The fire at Chevron’s El Segundo refinery: a social crime, not an accident.” World Socialist Web Site. October 5, 2025. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/10/06/txlv-o06.html
7. Wells, Marc and Luis Marquez. “Explosion at Chevron’s El Segundo refinery rocks Los Angeles.” World Socialist Web Site. October 3, 2025. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/10/04/segu-o04.html
8. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service. “Control Technology Assessment of Petroleum Refinery Operations, Chevron U.S.A., El Segundo, California.” ntrl.ntis.gov. May 1982. https://ntrl.ntis.gov/NTRL/dashboard/searchResults/titleDetail/PB84146927.xhtml
9. CTIF. “Chevron El Segundo crude oil fire sparks multi-agency investigation into jet fuel unit explosion.” ctif.org. October 2025. https://ctif.org/news/chevron-el-segundo-crude-oil-fire-sparks-multi-agency-investigation-jet-fuel-unit-explosion
10. Arnold & Itkin LLP. “Arnold & Itkin Files Lawsuit for Injured Worker in Chevron El Segundo Explosion.” PR Newswire via Webull. October 7, 2025. https://www.webull.com/news/13642427344094208
11. Briscoe, Tony and Connor Sheets. “Los Angeles Times: ‘Chevron’s El Segundo refinery has a history of safety and environmental violations’.” Communities for a Better Environment. October 4, 2025. https://www.cbecal.org/news/post/los-angeles-times-chevrons-el-segundo-refinery-has-a-history-of-safety-and-environmental-violations/
12. Wells, Marc and Luis Marquez. “Explosion at Chevron’s El Segundo refinery rocks Los Angeles.” World Socialist Web Site. October 3, 2025. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/10/06/txlv-o06.html
13. False Solutions. “One Fire, Many Costs: How the El Segundo Blaze Exposes a National Refinery Problem.” falsesolutions.org. October 2025. https://falsesolutions.org/one-fire-many-costs-how-the-el-segundo-blaze-exposes-a-national-refinery-problem/
14. Associated Press. “Flames visible for miles after a fire erupts at a Chevron refinery outside Los Angeles.” Times Leader. October 3, 2025. https://www.timesleaderonline.com/news/national-news/2025/10/flames-visible-for-miles-after-a-fire-erupts-at-a-chevron-refinery-outside-los-angeles/
15. Powell, B., D. Krishna Kumar, and N. Risser. “Chevron Says Refinery Fire Near LA Is Extinguished.” Bloomberg via Rigzone. October 3, 2025. https://www.rigzone.com/news/wire/chevron_says_refinery_fire_near_la_is_extinguished-03-oct-2025-181997-article/
16. Chevron El Segundo. “News.” elsegundo.chevron.com. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://elsegundo.chevron.com/news
17. Oil & Gas Journal. “Phillips 66 progresses California refinery shuttering plan, Chevron El Segundo fire adds to state’s refining uncertainty.” ogj.com. October 3, 2025. https://www.ogj.com/refining-processing/refining/operations/news/55321189/phillips-66-progresses-california-refinery-shuttering-plan-chevron-el-segundo-fire-adds-to-states-refining-uncertainty
18. City of El Segundo. “Chevron Refinery Fire Update.” elsegundo.org. October 3, 2025. https://www.elsegundo.org/Home/Components/News/News/3933/268327
19. Rodriguez, Matthew. “Large fire erupts at Los Angeles-area Chevron refinery in El Segundo.” CBS News. October 3, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/losangeles/news/large-fire-erupts-at-los-angeles-county-refinery/
20. Hydrocarbon Processing. “Chevron working to restart units at El Segundo refinery (U.S.) after fire.” hydrocarbonprocessing.com. October 2025. https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2025/10/chevron-working-to-restart-units-at-el-segundo-refinery-us-after-fire/
21. Lazo, Alejandro/CalMatters. “Weakening of US Chemical Safety Board makes it unclear who’s investigating California refinery fires.” Seattle Post-Intelligencer. October 9, 2025. https://www.seattlepi.com/business/article/weakening-of-us-chemical-safety-board-makes-it-21093031.php
22. California Globe. “Potential Impact of Retail Gas Prices of the Chevron El Segundo Fire.” californiaglobe.com. October 2025. https://californiaglobe.com/fl/potential-impact-of-retail-gas-prices-of-the-chevron-el-segundo-fire/
23. Chrise, Kyle and Erin Stone. “What The Chevron Refinery Fire Means For Your Air Quality And Gas Prices.” LAist. October 3, 2025. https://laist.com/news/climate-environment/chevron-plant-el-segundo-fire-impact-air-quality
24. Waters, Maxine. “Congresswoman Waters’ Statement on the Explosion and Fire at the Chevron Refinery in El Segundo.” waters.house.gov. October 8, 2025. https://waters.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congresswoman-waters-statement-on-the-explosion-and-fire-at-the-chevron-refinery-in-el-segundo
25. Lazo, Alejandro/CalMatters. “Weakening of US Chemical Safety Board makes it unclear who’s investigating California refinery fires.” SFGate. October 9, 2025. https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/weakening-of-us-chemical-safety-board-makes-it-21093031.php
26. Briscoe, Tony and Connor Sheets. “Chevron’s El Segundo refinery has a history of safety and environmental violations.” Yahoo News via Los Angeles Times. October 4, 2025. https://ca.news.yahoo.com/chevrons-el-segundo-refinery-history-215442733.html
27. Stone, Erin and Kyle Chrise. “Some Good News About the El Segundo Chevron Explosion.” Legal Planet. October 7, 2025. https://legal-planet.org/2025/10/07/some-good-news-about-the-el-segundo-chevron-explosion/
28. Discovery Alert. “Understanding the El Segundo Refinery Fire: Impact on California’s Fuel Supply.” discoveryalert.com.au. October 2025. https://discoveryalert.com.au/news/el-segundo-refinery-fire-impact-california-fuel-2025/
29. Simply Wall St. “The Bull Case For Chevron (CVX) Could Change Following Major El Segundo Refinery Fire and Lawsuit.” simplywall.st. October 8, 2025. https://simplywall.st/stocks/us/energy/nyse-cvx/chevron/news/the-bull-case-for-chevron-cvx-could-change-following-major-e
30. Stillwater Associates. “Chevron El Segundo Fire Ignites West Coast Fuel Jitters.” stillwaterassociates.com. October 2025. https://stillwaterassociates.com/chevron-el-segundo-fire-ignites-west-coast-fuel-jitters/
31. Lazo, Alejandro/CalMatters. “Weakening of US Chemical Safety Board makes it unclear who’s investigating California refinery fires.” SFGate. October 9, 2025. https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/weakening-of-us-chemical-safety-board-makes-it-21093031.php
32. MB News Staff. “Bland messages about Chevron fire offer little reassurance.” The Manhattan Beach News. October 3, 2025. https://www.thembnews.com/2025/10/03/548675/bland-messages-about-chevron-fire-offer-little-reassurance
33. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. “News.” csb.gov. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://www.csb.gov/news/?folder=board_members&page=board&member=Visscher&F_All=y
34. Rodriguez, Matthew. “Large fire erupts at Los Angeles-area Chevron refinery in El Segundo.” CBS News. October 3, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/losangeles/news/large-fire-erupts-at-los-angeles-county-refinery/
35. Chevron. “fire at chevron el segundo refinery is now out.” chevron.com. October 3, 2025. https://www.chevron.com/newsroom/2025/q4/fire-at-chevron-el-segundo-refinery-is-now-out
36. Contra Costa Health. “Martinez Refining Company Oversight.” cchealth.org. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://www.cchealth.org/Home/Components/News/News/886/972
37. El Segundo Fire Department. “News.” elsegundofd.org. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://www.elsegundofd.org/fire-prevention/fire-advanced-components/news/-arch-1/-npage-7
38. Discovery Alert. “Understanding the El Segundo Refinery Fire: Impact on California’s Fuel Supply.” discoveryalert.com.au. October 2025. https://discoveryalert.com.au/news/el-segundo-refinery-fire-impact-california-fuel-2025/
39. Stillwater Associates. “Chevron El Segundo Fire Ignites West Coast Fuel Jitters.” stillwaterassociates.com. October 2025. https://stillwaterassociates.com/chevron-el-segundo-fire-ignites-west-coast-fuel-jitters/
40. Mitchell, Holly J. “Supervisor Mitchell’s Statement on the Chevron Refinery Fire in El Segundo.” LA Post. October 3, 2025. https://lapost.us/?p=75904
41. El Segundo Fire Department. “Home.” elsegundofd.org. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://www.elsegundofd.org/
42. City of El Segundo. “Chevron Refinery Fire Update.” elsegundo.org. October 3, 2025. https://www.elsegundo.org/Home/Components/News/News/3933/268327
43. Guardian staff and agencies. “Fire still burning at California Chevron refinery following explosion.” The Guardian. October 3, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/oct/03/large-fire-breaks-out-at-el-segundo-refinery-in-los-angeles
44. Bloom Injury Law. “What Are the Hazards of Living Near an Oil Refinery?” bloominjurylaw.com. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://bloominjurylaw.com/news/what-are-the-hazards-of-living-near-an-oil-refinery/
45. Hydrocarbon Processing. “Chevron working to restart units at El Segundo refinery (U.S.) after fire.” hydrocarbonprocessing.com. October 2025. https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2025/10/chevron-working-to-restart-units-at-el-segundo-refinery-us-after-fire/
46. Waters, Maxine. “Congresswoman Waters’ Statement on the Explosion and Fire at the Chevron Refinery in El Segundo.” waters.house.gov. October 8, 2025. https://waters.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congresswoman-waters-statement-on-the-explosion-and-fire-at-the-chevron-refinery-in-el-segundo
47. National Wildfire Coordinating Group. “Effects of Smoke Exposure.” nwcg.gov. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://www.nwcg.gov/6mfs/firefighter-health-and-first-aid/effects-of-smoke-exposure
48. Associated Press. “Massive fire erupts at Chevron refinery just outside of Los Angeles.” Pipeline Online. October 5, 2025. https://pipelineonline.ca/massive-fire-erupts-at-chevron-refinery-just-outside-of-los-angeles/
49. Reddit user “PromoCodePro” et al. “Chevron Plant on Fire in El Segundo.” Reddit. October 2025. https://www.reddit.com/r/SouthBayLA/comments/1nwpwwl/chevron_plant_on_fire_in_el_segundo/
50. Chevron. “fire at chevron el segundo refinery is now out.” chevron.com. October 3, 2025. https://www.chevron.com/newsroom/2025/q4/fire-at-chevron-el-segundo-refinery-is-now-out
51. Chevron El Segundo. “commitment to safety.” elsegundo.chevron.com. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://elsegundo.chevron.com/sustainability/environment/safety-and-health
52. DeSaulnier, Mark. “Congressman DeSaulnier Statement on El Segundo Refinery Fire.” Contra Costa News. October 10, 2025. https://contracosta.news/2025/10/10/congressman-desaulnier-statement-on-el-segundo-refinery-fire/
53. Bay Area News Group. “Refinery fire smoke went unmeasured.” Contra Costa County. August 12, 2012. https://www.contracosta.ca.gov/Archive.aspx?ADID=2455
54. Chevron El Segundo. “Home.” elsegundo.chevron.com. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://elsegundo.chevron.com/
55. Oil & Gas 360. “Fire at Chevron’s El Segundo Refinery threatens California fuel supply.” oilandgas360.com. October 8, 2025. https://www.oilandgas360.com/fire-at-chevrons-el-segundo-refinery-threatens-california-fuel-supply/
56. Wilson, Alex. “El Segundo Chevron continues to meet fuel demand, despite fire.” Easy Reader News. October 9, 2025. https://easyreadernews.com/el-segundo-chevron-continues-to-meet-fuel-demand-despite-fire/
57. Stone, Erin and Kyle Chrise. “Some Good News About the El Segundo Chevron Explosion.” Legal Planet. October 7, 2025. https://legal-planet.org/2025/10/07/some-good-news-about-the-el-segundo-chevron-explosion/
58. Chevron El Segundo. “air quality.” elsegundo.chevron.com. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://elsegundo.chevron.com/sustainability/environment/air-quality
59. Hydrocarbon Processing. “Chevron working to restart units at El Segundo refinery (U.S.) after fire.” hydrocarbonprocessing.com. October 2025. https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2025/10/chevron-working-to-restart-units-at-el-segundo-refinery-us-after-fire/
60. Kherkher Garcia. “Chevron Refinery Fire Highlights Dangers of Refinery Explosions.” kherkhergarcia.com. October 2025. https://www.kherkhergarcia.com/chevron-refinery-fire-dangers-refinery-explosions/
61. Sowards, Hunter. “How the Chevron refinery fire in El Segundo could affect California gas prices.” CBS News. October 3, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/losangeles/news/how-the-chevron-refinery-fire-in-el-segundo-could-affect-california-gas-prices/
62. Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment. “Indoor air quality after a fire.” cdphe.colorado.gov. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://cdphe.colorado.gov/iaq-fires
63. El Segundo Fire Department. “News.” elsegundofd.org. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://www.elsegundofd.org/fire-prevention/fire-advanced-components/news/-arch-1/-npage-6
64. Oil & Gas 360. “Fire at Chevron’s El Segundo Refinery threatens California fuel supply.” oilandgas360.com. October 8, 2025. https://www.oilandgas360.com/fire-at-chevrons-el-segundo-refinery-threatens-california-fuel-supply/
65. Görgülü, Osman, et al. “Acute Inhalational Injury.” Pulmonary Medicine. 2014. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4261306/
66. Harris, M., et al. “Contra Costa County, California, 2012 Chevron Refinery Fire: Emergency Department Census and Diagnoses.” American Journal of Public Health. May 2019. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6524223/
67. MB News Staff. “Bland messages about Chevron fire offer little reassurance.” The Manhattan Beach News. October 3, 2025. https://www.thembnews.com/2025/10/03/548675/bland-messages-about-chevron-fire-offer-little-reassurance
68. The Economic Times. “US News: El Segundo Chevron refinery fire engulfs California sky in orange, Los Angeles residents say ‘thought we got nuked’.” m.economictimes.com. October 4, 2025. https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/global-trends/us-news-el-segundo-chevron-refinery-fire-engulfs-california-sky-in-orange-los-angeles-residents-say-thought-we-got-nuked/articleshow/124287930.cms
69. Democracy Now!. “Massive Fire Erupts at Chevron Oil Refinery in California.” democracynow.org. October 3, 2025. https://www.democracynow.org/2025/10/3/headlines/massive_fire_erupts_at_chevron_oil_refinery_in_california
70. DeSaulnier, Mark. “Congressman DeSaulnier Statement on El Segundo Refinery Fire.” desaulnier.house.gov. October 9, 2025. https://desaulnier.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congressman-desaulnier-statement-el-segundo-refinery-fire
71. California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment. “Analysis of Refinery Chemical Emissions and Health Effects.” oehha.ca.gov. March 2019. https://oehha.ca.gov/sites/default/files/media/downloads/faqs/refinerychemicalsreport032019.pdf
72. Yahoo News. “Chevron’s El Segundo refinery has a history of safety and environmental violations.” ca.news.yahoo.com. October 4, 2025. https://httpshttps//ca.news.yahoo.com/chevrons-el-segundo-refinery-history-215442733.html
73. Associated Press. “Flames visible for miles after a fire erupts at a Chevron refinery outside Los Angeles.” Times Leader. October 3, 2025. https://www.timesleaderonline.com/news/national-news/2025/10/flames-visible-for-miles-after-a-fire-erupts-at-a-chevron-refinery-outside-los-angeles/
74. California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment. “Petroleum Products: Environmental Exposure from Refineries.” p65warnings.ca.gov. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://www.p65warnings.ca.gov/fact-sheets/petroleum-products-environmental-exposure-refineries
75. California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment. “Analysis of Refinery Chemical Emissions and Health Effects.” oehha.ca.gov. March 2019. https://oehha.ca.gov/sites/default/files/media/downloads/faqs/refinerychemicalsreport032019.pdf
76. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. “Health effects of exposure to oil well fires.” publichealth.va.gov. Accessed October 11, 2025. https://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/gulfwar/sources/oil-well-fires.asp
77. Associated Press. “Fire erupts at Chevron oil refinery in California.” YouTube. October 3, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPQptMWOeeY
78. Chrise, Kyle and Erin Stone. “What The Chevron Refinery Fire Means For Your Air Quality And Gas Prices.” LAist. October 3, 2025. https://laist.com/news/climate-environment/chevron-plant-el-segundo-fire-impact-air-quality
79. NBC Los Angeles. “Chevron refinery fire could affect gas prices, expert says.” YouTube. October 3, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UtTDwqAOHIs
80. Potter Handy LLP. “Neighbors to Chevron El Segundo Refinery Fire File Suit with Potter Handy LLP.” Business Wire. October 6, 2025. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20251006794200/en/Neighbors-to-Chevron-El-Segundo-Refinery-Fire-File-Suit-with-Potter-Handy-LLP
81. University of Michigan Alumni Association. “Refinery Fires, Other Chemical Disasters May No Longer Get Safety Investigations.” alumni.umich.edu. October 2025. https://alumni.umich.edu/lifelong-learning/gateway/refinery-fires-other-chemical-disasters-may-no-longer-get-safety-investigations/
82. KEYT NewsChannel 3. “Chevron refinery fire could affect gas prices.” YouTube. October 4, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zMKdxQBh9FQ
83. KTLA 5. “Massive blaze erupts at Chevron’s refinery in El Segundo.” YouTube. October 2, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DmvdNsHZXl0