Tag: homeland security

  • Mamdani’s 2018 Naturalization: Who Was Responsible? A FOIA Strategy to Expose the Decision

    Zohran Mamdani’s naturalization in 2018 occurred during the Trump administration. The agency responsible for approving citizenship applications is the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While the specific officer who stamped his approval is protected by privacy, the ultimate responsibility lies with the leadership in place at that time. A best estimate of the top officials most responsible would be:

    1. Lee Francis Cissna: The Director of USCIS from October 2017 to June 2019. He was the head of the entire agency and directly responsible for its policies and adjudications during the period Mamdani was naturalized.
    2. Kirstjen Nielsen: The Secretary of Homeland Security from December 2017 to April 2019. As the cabinet-level head of DHS, she had ultimate authority over USCIS.
    3. Stephen Miller: As Senior Advisor to the President for Policy, Miller was the architect of the Trump administration’s immigration agenda. While he had no direct line authority over USCIS adjudications, he exerted immense influence on the agency’s policy direction and leadership.
    4. The USCIS New York City Field Office Director (2018): This individual (whose name is not readily available in public searches) was in charge of the office that likely processed and adjudicated Mamdani’s application. They were responsible for the day-to-day operations and quality control of their officers.
    5. USCIS Chief Counsel (2018): This legal office would have been responsible for interpreting complex legal questions, such as whether specific rhetoric or affiliations would make an applicant ineligible for citizenship.

    A FOIA Strategy to Expose the Decision

    A targeted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) strategy could uncover the political environment and policies that allowed Mamdani’s naturalization. Since requesting his personal A-File is not possible without his consent, the strategy should focus on the system itself:

    • Request Target: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
    • Request 1: Policy and Guidance Memos. Submit a request for “All policy memoranda, field guidance, training materials, and internal communications issued by the USCIS Director’s Office and the Office of Chief Counsel between January 1, 2018, and December 31, 2018, pertaining to the adjudication of N-400 applications involving applicants with known or suspected affiliations with socialist, communist, or anti-Zionist organizations.”
    • Request 2: The ‘Holy Land Five’ Connection. Submit a request for “Any and all internal communications, policy guidance, or legal opinions within USCIS from 2017-2019 that reference the ‘Holy Land Foundation’ or the ‘Holy Land Five’ in the context of determining good moral character for naturalization applicants.”
    • Request 3: Communications with Political Leadership. Submit a request for “All non-personal email communications and meeting minutes between the USCIS Director’s Office and the office of the DHS Secretary and/or the White House Domestic Policy Council (specifically mentioning Stephen Miller) regarding naturalization adjudication priorities for fiscal year 2018.”
  • The “Big Beautiful” Bonus for Our Border Agents: A $5.25 Billion State Accountability Plan

    A new proposal outlines a plan to deliver a $50,000 bonus to every agent, soldier, and officer on the front lines of the border crisis, paid out over three years. By holding specific states financially accountable, the plan aims to create a powerful incentive for cooperation in federal immigration enforcement and ensure reimbursement for the costs incurred by the nation as a whole.

    The total cost, estimated at $5.25 billion, would be funded entirely by the ten states with the largest populations of unauthorized immigrants: California, Texas, Florida, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, North Carolina, Georgia, Washington, and Arizona. The other 40 states would be explicitly exempt from this financial obligation.

    This plan recognizes the immense contributions of approximately 105,000 individuals across the key agencies that have shouldered the burden of the crisis.

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  • Immediately repeal the federal Real ID Act, replace with StatePass or Nothing

    Immediately repeal the federal Real ID Act. Its core danger lies not just in bureaucratic failure, but in its fundamental threat to personal liberty and privacy. Real ID creates the infrastructure for a national tracking system, linking state databases and enabling unprecedented government surveillance of citizens’ movements—precisely the kind of invasive system that evokes deep-seated fears among many Americans, including concerns resembling a “mark of the beast” scenario where government monitors and controls individuals through mandatory identification. This potential for pervasive tracking violates the spirit of the 4th Amendment and must be dismantled.

    Replace Real ID with StatePass, a new system of state-controlled secure IDs for domestic travel originating within their borders. Leveraging lessons from Real ID’s troubled history, states will implement StatePass quickly and efficiently. The absolute priority of StatePass is preventing federal surveillance; standards must prohibit centralized databases or features allowing easy federal tracking, focusing instead on secure credentials verifiable locally, not federal data collection. This state-centric approach, where states design, issue, and manage their own StatePass IDs and verification, directly counters the “mark of the beast” concerns tied to federal overreach.

    State accountability will be ensured through robust mechanisms. The State Security Assurance Fund (SSAF) is a mandatory pool of state contributions, essentially security deposits, used to levy substantial financial penalties against any state whose faulty StatePass system causes a major security breach originating there. The Interstate Travel Security Commission (ITSC), composed of representatives from participating states, manages the SSAF, investigates security failures to determine penalties, and facilitates voluntary collaboration on StatePass best practices.

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