Price, Packers, and Power Politics: The Strategic Case for Expanding U.S. Access to Argentine Beef

Executive Summary

The American beef market faces a period of unprecedented and sustained price pressure. This creates a significant economic burden for consumers. This report analyzes the structural factors driving the crisis. It also evaluates a current proposal from the Trump administration to expand the tariff-rate quota (TRQ) for Argentine beef.

The central argument is that high U.S. beef prices result from two primary market failures. First, a historically small domestic cattle herd has created a fundamental supply shortage. Second, the market power of an oligopolistic packer industry amplifies price volatility. This industry captures a disproportionate share of the food dollar. A policy of inaction is not a viable option, as it would ask consumers to endure record prices for the years required for domestic herd rebuilding.

The administration’s proposal is not a sweeping free-trade measure. It is a targeted, surgical intervention. It is designed to act as a pressure-relief valve on the domestic market. The policy expands the volume of beef that can be imported from Argentina under a lower tariff. This aims to introduce marginal supply and cool retail prices in the near term.

This report documents the severe price inflation and analyzes the supply-side constraints, which are rooted in multi-year droughts and high input costs. It also provides a detailed profile of the four dominant beef packers: Tyson Foods, JBS USA, Cargill Meat Solutions, and National Beef Packing Company. Their market concentration forms a critical bottleneck in the supply chain.

Beyond immediate domestic economic benefits, this policy offers a significant geopolitical dividend. The policy is a crucial pillar of a broader U.S. strategy. It supports the pro-American, reformist government of President Javier Milei in Argentina. This occurs during a time of escalating strategic competition. Bolstering a key hemispheric ally serves as a direct check on China’s expanding influence in the South Atlantic.

This report concludes that expanding Argentine beef access is a coherent and pragmatic strategy. It simultaneously addresses a domestic economic crisis, challenges a concentrated market structure, and advances critical U.S. national security interests.

Section 1: The U.S. Beef Price Crisis: A Market Under Structural Strain

A significant policy intervention requires a clear and persistent market failure. In the U.S. beef industry, the evidence of such a failure is unambiguous. American families feel its effects daily.

For several years, retail beef prices have climbed to historic highs, straining household budgets. This price crisis is not a transient fluctuation. It is the result of a deep structural imbalance between supply and demand. This imbalance is rooted in the most severe contraction of the nation’s cattle herd in over seventy years. This section quantifies the scale of the price inflation and analyzes its fundamental cause.

1.1 Quantifying the Burden on the American Consumer

The most direct measure of the beef market’s dysfunction is the price consumers pay at the grocery store. Data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS) shows a steep and unrelenting upward price trajectory.

As of August 2025, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for beef and veal was 13.9% higher than in August 2024. This marked the eighth consecutive month of increases.¹ This sustained inflation far outpaces the general rate of inflation, indicating a problem specific to the beef sector.

ERS data reveals the severity of the price levels. These figures represent a significant affordability challenge, placing a staple of the American diet out of reach for many households.

• Choice Beef Retail Value: Reached an unprecedented $9.85 per pound in August 2025.²
• All-Fresh Beef Retail Value: Climbed to $9.18 per pound in the same month.²
• Ground Beef: Surged to $6.32 per pound in August 2025, a substantial increase from earlier in the year.²

This is a kitchen-table economic crisis. It forces consumers to trade down to cheaper proteins or reduce their meat consumption altogether. The persistence of these record-high prices establishes a clear and compelling need for policy action aimed at providing near-term relief.

Retail Beef Price Indicator	August 2025 Level	Year-Over-Year Change (vs. Aug 2024)
CPI for Beef & Veal	N/A	+13.9%
Choice Beef Retail Value	$9.85 / lb	N/A
All-Fresh Beef Retail Value	$9.18 / lb	N/A
Ground Beef Retail Value	$6.32 / lb	N/A

1.2 The Root Cause: A Historically Depleted National Cattle Herd

A fundamental shortage of supply is the primary driver of the current price crisis. The U.S. national cattle herd has contracted to its smallest size in generations. This scarcity inevitably translates to higher prices.

According to the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) cattle inventory report from July 2025, the total number of cattle and calves in the United States stood at 94.2 million head. This figure represents a 1% decline from the 95.4 million head recorded in July 2023, continuing a multi-year downward trend.³

The number of beef cows has fallen to the lowest level since the early 1950s, a historical benchmark that underscores the gravity of the supply situation.⁴ This decline is the result of several years of adverse conditions for ranchers, including:

• Widespread and severe droughts that diminished pasture and water resources.
• Sharply elevated input costs for feed, fuel, and fertilizer.

These pressures forced many producers into herd liquidation. They sent an abnormally high number of breeding-age females to slaughter, shrinking the nation’s capacity to produce new calves.

U.S. Cattle Inventory (Total Head)	Change from 2019 Peak
January 1, 2019 (Peak)	94.7 Million
January 1, 2025	86.7 Million⁵
July 1, 2025	94.2 Million³

Critically, the data also indicates that a rapid, organic recovery of the herd is not imminent. The number of heifers retained for beef cow replacement was down 3% from two years prior.³ This figure is a crucial leading indicator. The biological lifecycle of cattle imposes an inescapable lag on any effort to expand the herd. The process is inherently slow, taking over two years from retaining a heifer to bringing a calf to market weight.

The reduction in retained replacement heifers signals that the domestic supply shortage will persist for at least the next two to three years. This biological reality makes any strategy that relies solely on domestic herd rebuilding an inadequate response to the immediate price crisis. It strengthens the case for using imports as a necessary stopgap measure to stabilize prices while American ranchers regenerate the national herd.

This supply shortage, however, is only one part of the equation. Its effects on consumers are magnified by the structure of the industry that stands between the rancher and the retailer.

Section 2: The Packer Bottleneck: How Market Concentration Amplifies Scarcity

The depleted national cattle herd is the foundational cause of the beef price crisis, but it is not the sole factor. The structure of the U.S. meatpacking industry acts as a critical bottleneck in the supply chain. This industry is a highly concentrated oligopoly dominated by four colossal firms.

This structure creates an environment where scarcity’s effects are amplified and price signals are distorted. A disproportionate share of the final consumer dollar is captured by a small number of corporate intermediaries. This section analyzes the anatomy of this oligopoly and its effect on the gap between rancher pay and consumer prices.

2.1 Anatomy of an Oligopoly: The “Big Four” and Market Dominance

The U.S. beef packing sector is one of the most concentrated industries in the American economy. This high concentration grants a few companies immense power to influence prices, creating a bottleneck that can disadvantage both cattle producers and consumers.

Four companies control the vast majority of the market:

• Tyson Foods (Tyson Fresh Meats division)
• JBS USA (the U.S. arm of the Brazilian meat giant)
• Cargill Meat Solutions (a division of the global commodity behemoth)
• National Beef Packing Company

According to a 2019 USDA report, these four firms alone account for the slaughter of 85% of all steers and heifers in the United States.⁶ This extreme concentration creates a formidable “choke point” between the nation’s independent cattle ranchers and its millions of beef consumers.

In many regions, ranchers have only one or two of these major packers as viable buyers. This lack of competition gives the Big Four immense leverage in setting the prices they pay for live cattle. Simultaneously, their control over the processed beef supply gives them significant power in negotiating wholesale prices with grocery chains and distributors.

Four-Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4) in U.S. Steer & Heifer Slaughter
1980
1990
2019

2.2 The Widening Price Spread: Tracking Value from Farm to Retail

A key metric for understanding the impact of packer concentration is the “meat price spread.” The USDA’s Economic Research Service tracks this data series.⁸ The spread measures the difference between the value of beef at various stages of the supply chain: farm value, wholesale value, and retail value. It essentially tracks how the consumer’s dollar is divided among the rancher, the packer, and the retailer.⁹

During periods of supply tightness, these spreads often suggest the exercise of market power. The gap between the farm value and the wholesale/retail value can remain wide or even expand when retail prices are high.⁹ This indicates that the financial benefits of high consumer prices are not being fully passed back to the primary producers.

Instead, a significant portion of that value is captured within the processing and distribution stages, where the Big Four operate. This dynamic supports the frustration of both ranchers and consumers. The persistent width of these price spreads points to a systemic inefficiency and a potential imbalance of power within the supply chain.

2.3 Strategic and Operational Profile of the “Big Four” U.S. Beef Packers

To fully comprehend the packer bottleneck, it is essential to examine the companies that constitute it. Tyson Foods, JBS USA, Cargill Meat Solutions, and National Beef are sophisticated, politically active, and globally integrated corporations. The following table consolidates key data points for each of the Big Four.

Metric	Tyson Foods	JBS USA	Cargill Meat Solutions	National Beef
DEI Program	Yes, explicit commitments, 8 Business Resource Groups (BRGs).¹⁰	Yes, formal global DEI policy and regional case studies.¹¹	Yes, company-wide DEI goals, 9 BRGs, commitment to gender parity by 2030.¹²	No branded “DEI program” on public site; focuses on “Valuing Our Employees.” Parent company Marfrig has inclusion policies.¹³
Key Beef Plant Locations & State Political Control (2025)	Amarillo, TX (R); Holcomb, KS (Split); Dakota City, NE (R); Lexington, NE (R); Pasco, WA (D).¹⁴	Cactus, TX (R); Grand Island, NE (R); Greeley, CO (D); Green Bay, WI (Split); Hyrum, UT (R); Tolleson, AZ (Split); Plainwell, MI (Split); Souderton, PA (Split).¹⁵	Dodge City, KS (Split); Schuyler, NE (R); Friona, TX (R); Fort Morgan, CO (D).¹⁶	Dodge City, KS (Split); Liberal, KS (Split); Tama, IA (R); Kansas City, KS (Split); Moultrie, GA (R); Hummels Wharf, PA (Split); North Baltimore, OH (R).¹⁷
Federal Lobbying (2023-2024 Cycle)	~$1.67M in 2024.²⁶	Data aggregated under agribusiness sector spending.²⁷	~$1.4M in 2024.²⁸	Minimal federal lobbying footprint compared to others.²⁹
Federal PAC Contributions & Partisan Split (2023-2024 Cycle)	$316,500 (74% R / 26% D).³⁰	$88,000 (64% R / 39% D).³¹	$198,000 (55% R / 45% D).³²	Very small federal PAC presence; $9,570 reported.³³
Significant FSIS Beef Recalls (Post-2020)	Nov 2022: ~94,000 lbs ground beef (foreign matter).³⁴	May 2025: Ground beef (foreign matter). Note: Major 2018 Salmonella recall is pre-scope but indicates history at Tolleson, AZ plant.³⁵	May 2024: ~16,000 lbs ground beef (E. coli O157:H7).³⁶	No FSIS beef recalls found for 2021-2025 period.³⁷

A deeper analysis reveals a powerful system that insulates these firms from political and market pressures. Their large-scale slaughter plants are heavily concentrated in states with predominantly Republican-controlled governments, such as Texas, Kansas, and Nebraska.¹⁸, ¹⁹, ²⁰, ²¹, ²², ²³, ²⁴, ²⁵

This geographic reality is reinforced by their political spending. The Political Action Committees (PACs) for Tyson, JBS, and Cargill all direct a majority of their federal contributions to Republican candidates.³⁰, ³¹, ³² This alignment of geography and political financing creates a formidable “political moat,” making it difficult to advance policies that would foster greater competition.

However, this politically insulated structure masks a significant operational vulnerability. The centralization that gives these companies their market power also makes them single points of failure. Recent recalls demonstrate this fragility. In November 2022, a Tyson facility recalled nearly 94,000 pounds of ground beef.³⁴ In May 2024, a Cargill plant recalled over 16,000 pounds due to potential E. coli contamination.³⁶ A JBS plant incident in May 2025 also prompted a recall.³⁵ Each event removes a significant volume of product from the market, causing supply chain disruptions.

This combination of political insulation and operational fragility creates a systemic risk. The industry is structured to resist competitive pressures while being susceptible to large-scale disruptions. While the proposed TRQ expansion does not resolve this long-term structural problem, it highlights the need for a broader policy approach. Potential long-term solutions include:

• More robust antitrust enforcement.³⁸
• Strengthening the USDA’s oversight powers under the Packers and Stockyards Act.³⁸
• Creating federal programs to support smaller, independent processors.³⁸

This dual vulnerability provides a powerful rationale for diversifying the nation’s beef supply through temporary measures like expanded imports.

Section 3: A Targeted Intervention: The Case for Expanding Argentine Beef Imports

Given the dual crises of record-high consumer prices and a fragile, concentrated processing sector, a policy of inaction is untenable. The Trump administration’s current proposal to increase beef imports from Argentina represents a pragmatic and carefully calibrated intervention.

It is not a radical move toward unfettered free trade. It is a surgical expansion of an existing trade mechanism—the tariff-rate quota (TRQ). The policy intends to provide immediate relief to consumers while serving as a temporary bridge during the multi-year process of domestic herd rebuilding.

3.1 The Policy Mechanism: A Surgical Expansion of the Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ)

The United States currently manages beef imports from Argentina through a TRQ system.

A Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) allows a specific quantity of product—20,000 metric tons per year—to enter the U.S. market at a low tariff rate. Any imports exceeding that quota face a much higher tariff of 26.4%.³⁹

This mechanism is a standard tool of managed trade. It allows some foreign competition while protecting the domestic industry from being overwhelmed.

The administration’s proposal is to quadruple this quota to 80,000 metric tons of Argentine beef that can be imported at the lower duty rate.⁴⁰ This is a significant but measured increase. Argentina currently supplies only about two percent of total U.S. beef imports.³⁹ Quadrupling the quota would increase Argentina’s market share but would still represent a marginal addition to the total U.S. beef supply.

The economic logic is straightforward. By increasing the available supply of beef, the policy introduces downward pressure on wholesale and retail prices. It functions as a “pressure-relief valve” for a market under extreme strain.⁴¹ The targeted nature of the TRQ expansion allows policymakers to inject a specific, controlled volume of product into the system. It is a tool for stabilization, not replacement.

3.2 Answering the Rancher Pushback: A Temporary Bridge, Not a Permanent Replacement

The proposal has drawn sharp criticism from U.S. cattle ranching organizations.

The National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA) has labeled the plan a “misguided effort to manipulate markets” that risks “damaging the livelihoods of American cattlemen and women”.⁴¹

Similarly, the producer group Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America (R-CALF USA) called the plan a “betrayal of the American rancher,” arguing that “excessive imports have displaced domestic production”.³⁹

These concerns, rooted in the economic interests of domestic producers, must be addressed. The primary counterargument is one of economic and political reality. With the domestic cattle herd at a 70-year low and retail beef prices at all-time highs, asking American consumers to “wait it out” for the years required for herd recovery is not a credible position.

The limited TRQ expansion serves as a temporary bridge. It is a policy designed to protect consumers from the worst effects of the supply crisis while the domestic industry undertakes the necessary work of rebuilding.

3.3 Acknowledging Potential Risks and Counterarguments

A comprehensive analysis requires acknowledging potential risks and counterarguments beyond the direct impact on cattle ranchers.

1. Foreign Animal Disease: A key concern is the potential introduction of diseases like Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD).⁴¹ This risk is managed through stringent federal oversight. All beef imports are subject to rigorous sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards enforced by the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). These established protocols are designed to prevent the entry of such diseases and would not be weakened by this policy.
2. Impact on Other Agricultural Sectors: Some farm groups argue that the broader U.S. aid package to Argentina has already harmed other American producers.³⁹ They note that a tariff pause by the Milei government spurred a surge in Argentine soybean exports to China when China has banned purchases of U.S. soy.³⁹ This highlights the complex trade-offs in foreign policy but does not negate the need to address the domestic beef price crisis.
3. Packer Profits vs. Consumer Savings: Critics contend that dominant meatpackers may capture any financial benefits from increased imports rather than passing them on to consumers.³⁹ This is a valid concern rooted in market concentration. However, the policy’s primary mechanism for consumer relief is the increase in aggregate supply. An influx of product, even if handled by major players, increases the total volume that must be sold, creating downward pressure on prices to clear the market.

This highlights that while a TRQ expansion is a valuable short-term tool, it does not resolve the underlying, long-term challenge of packer concentration, which requires separate policy attention.

Beyond these immediate domestic benefits, this policy also serves a critical role in the United States’ broader geopolitical strategy.

Section 4: The Geopolitical Dividend: Aligning Economic Relief with National Security

The proposal to expand Argentine beef imports is a key component of a much broader geopolitical strategy. The policy is designed not only to lower grocery bills but also to generate a substantial foreign policy dividend.

By providing timely and tangible economic support to a crucial, pro-American ally, the administration is actively working to secure a strategic partnership, stabilize a friendly government, and erect a bulwark against the rising influence of the People’s Republic of China in a region of vital national interest.

4.1 Bolstering a Pro-U.S. Ally: Economic Support for Milei’s Argentina

The timing of the beef proposal is linked to the political and economic situation in Argentina under President Javier Milei. Since taking office, President Milei has embarked on an ambitious program of free-market reforms. However, his government faces immense challenges, including a collapsing currency and rampant inflation, which threaten its stability ahead of critical midterm elections.⁴²

The Trump administration has identified the success of Milei’s government as a key U.S. interest. The beef import proposal is part of a larger financial and political rescue package. The centerpiece is a $20 billion currency swap agreement between the U.S. and Argentina’s central bank, aimed at promoting economic stability.⁴²

The political nature of this support has been made plain. Following a meeting with President Milei, President Trump explicitly tied continued U.S. financial assistance to the outcome of the Argentine elections.

“If he loses, we are not going to be generous with Argentina.”⁴²

This statement underscores that the economic aid, including favorable trade access for beef, is a tool of statecraft. It is intended to ensure the political survival and success of a valued ally.

4.2 A Strategic Check on Chinese Influence in the South Atlantic

The strategic importance of a stable, pro-U.S. Argentina becomes clear when viewed in the context of great-power competition with China. Over the past two decades, Beijing has dramatically expanded its economic, political, and diplomatic footprint across Latin America.⁴³ China has surpassed the United States as South America’s largest trading partner, with trade exceeding $450 billion by 2021.⁴³

Beijing’s primary vehicles for influence include:

• Its massive global infrastructure program, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which over twenty countries in the region have joined.⁴³
• State-directed lending for energy, infrastructure, and technology sectors.
• “Comprehensive strategic partnerships” with key nations, including Argentina.⁴³

These economic relationships are designed to create dependencies that can be leveraged for political gain. A prime example is the Chinese-funded Chancay megaport in Peru, which will give Beijing significant control over a critical piece of hemispheric logistics.⁴⁴

The administration’s policy toward Argentina is a direct countermove. It recognizes that economic tools are primary instruments of power. The offer of a $20 billion currency swap and expanded access to the lucrative U.S. beef market is a powerful incentive for Buenos Aires to align with Washington. This is a transactional foreign policy that trades market access for strategic alignment. By ensuring the stability of President Milei’s government, the United States is actively working to deny a key strategic foothold in the South Atlantic to its primary global rival.

Section 5: Conclusion: A Coherent Strategy for Price Stability and Strategic Advantage

The Trump administration’s proposal to expand the tariff-rate quota for Argentine beef is a well-reasoned and strategically coherent policy. It addresses multiple pressing national interests simultaneously. It is not a simple trade concession that harms domestic producers. It is a sophisticated, multi-pronged strategy. It provides a necessary response to a domestic economic crisis, applies competitive pressure to a concentrated industry, and executes a timely geopolitical maneuver.

The U.S. beef market is under severe structural strain. A historically depleted cattle herd has created a supply shortage that will take years to correct.³ This scarcity is amplified by the oligopolistic structure of the meatpacking industry, where four dominant firms exert immense control.⁶ This contributes to record-high costs for American consumers.²

Against this backdrop, the administration’s targeted expansion of the Argentine beef TRQ emerges as the most pragmatic near-term solution. It is a measured intervention designed to inject marginal but meaningful supply into the market. This provides a much-needed pressure-relief valve to cool retail prices while the domestic herd recovers.⁴¹

Crucially, this domestic economic imperative is integrated with a vital foreign policy objective. The policy serves as a powerful instrument of American statecraft. It delivers tangible economic support to the pro-U.S. government of President Javier Milei at a critical juncture.⁴² This support is a strategic investment aimed at countering the growing influence of the People’s Republic of China in the South Atlantic.⁴³, ⁴⁴

The success of this strategy can be evaluated against a clear set of measurable outcomes:

• A flattening or decline in the retail CPI for beef over a three- to six-month period.
• A narrowing of the wholesale-to-retail price spread, suggesting greater competition.
• Healthy but not market-swamping fill rates for the expanded TRQ, ensuring imported beef serves as a supplement, not a replacement.

By achieving these balanced objectives, the policy will have successfully navigated the complex intersection of domestic economics and international power politics. It delivers a victory for American consumers, competition, and national security.

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