The Convergence: An Analysis of Government-Directed Narrative Management in the American Information Ecosystem

Executive Summary

A convergence of federally funded research, strategic shifts within key civil society organizations, and overlapping personnel affiliations indicates a coordinated effort. This effort aims to centralize the control of online narratives.

This trend is exemplified by two key developments:

• The National Science Foundation’s (NSF) “Convergence Accelerator Track F” program.
• The 2022 agenda pivot of the DEF CON Voting Machine Hacking Village (VMHV).

These developments are not coincidental. They are thematically and temporally aligned with the strategic priorities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas. This alignment suggests a significant degree of government influence.

This convergence blurs the critical line between independent research and state-directed information management. Ultimately, it poses a significant challenge to free speech and the impartiality of the cybersecurity community.

Section I: The Architecture of Narrative Control: The Rise of the Federal Disinformation Apparatus

To understand this trend, one must first examine the strategic context. The U.S. government formalized “disinformation” as a homeland security threat. This doctrinal shift created the bureaucratic foundation for the activities and collaborations that followed.

The Disinformation Governance Board (DGB)

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Disinformation Governance Board (DGB) in 2022.¹ This was the most prominent manifestation of its new doctrine. According to its official charter, the DGB’s purpose was to “guide and support the Department’s efforts to address mis-, dis-, and mal-information that threatens homeland security (‘MDM’)”.²

The board was publicly framed as focusing on foreign threats, such as Russian disinformation and narratives from human smugglers.¹ However, its intended scope was demonstrably broader. Internal documents revealed plans to target “inaccurate information” on a wide range of politically charged domestic topics.³ These topics included:

• The origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines.
• Racial justice.
• U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
• The nature of U.S. support to Ukraine.³

This expansion shows a clear intent. The government sought to apply a national security framework to domestic political speech and dissent. This framework is traditionally reserved for foreign adversaries.

A Model for Indirect Influence

The DGB’s operational model was not direct state censorship, which would face First Amendment challenges. Instead, its charter detailed a plan for coordination with “the private sector”.² The strategy was to empower partners by providing “information to technology companies enabling them to remove content at their discretion and consistent with their terms of service”.⁴

This approach reveals a mechanism for laundering government censorship priorities through private entities. It is a core component of what has been termed the “Censorship-Industrial Complex”.⁵ The government created a system of plausible deniability by establishing a formal structure to intervene in online speech. In this system, non-state actors carry out censorship while operating in alignment with federal agencies.

CISA’s Expanding Role

A key operational arm of this apparatus is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). CISA is a DHS agency and was a standing member of the DGB.² During this period, CISA’s mission expanded beyond its traditional focus on physical and cyber infrastructure. It came to include “a burgeoning MDM effort” that involved “directly engaging with social media companies to flag MDM”.³

A House Judiciary Committee report further illuminates this role. The report found that CISA was instrumental in creating the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP). The EIP, a consortium of academic institutions, was created in 2020 “at the request” of CISA.⁶ It provided a way for the federal government to “launder its censorship activities in hopes of bypassing both the First Amendment and public scrutiny”.⁶ This partnership model, where government agencies work through academic and private-sector cutouts, establishes the blueprint for a “whole-of-society” approach to managing online discourse.

Section II: The Science of Censorship: Weaponizing Taxpayer Funds Through the National Science Foundation

A federally funded research effort ran parallel to the establishment of a bureaucratic apparatus within DHS. This effort aimed to build the technological tools for implementing narrative control. The National Science Foundation’s (NSF) “Convergence Accelerator Track F” program serves as the R&D wing for the government’s ambitions. It funds the creation of AI-powered tools for at-scale censorship and propaganda, all under the guise of neutral academic inquiry.

Public Goals vs. Operational Capabilities

Publicly, the NSF describes Track F, titled “Trust & Authenticity in Communication Systems,” as a program to develop tools to “prevent, mitigate and adapt to critical threats to communication systems”.⁷ The program’s official language emphasizes “use-inspired convergence research.”⁸ It brings together academia, industry, and government to solve “national-scale societal challenges.”⁸ This framing presents the work as a benign, collaborative scientific endeavor.

However, an examination of specific grant awards reveals far more operational goals. One project funded under Track F, for instance, aimed to develop a three-step method to “identify, test, and correct” misinformation.⁹ The “correction” phase explicitly detailed plans to deploy “scalable intervention techniques available through the platforms sponsored content systems.” This included using “ad-purchasing, automated bots, and online influencers” to disseminate “evidence-based corrections”.⁹

This dual-language approach obscures the true nature of the work. Publicly, the program uses academic terminology. Privately, it pursues operational capabilities. This allows for the development of politically sensitive tools under a veneer of scientific research.

The House Judiciary Committee Investigation

An interim staff report from the House Judiciary Committee strongly supports this interpretation. The report labels the NSF’s program as an effort to fund “the development of automated tools to censor online speech ‘at scale’”.¹⁰ The committee alleges the NSF is using taxpayer dollars to create “AI-powered censorship and propaganda tools” for use by government and Big Tech.¹⁰

The investigation uncovered non-public documents. One was a pitch for the University of Michigan’s “WiseDex” tool. This document explicitly stated its purpose:

“…to help social media platforms ‘push responsibility for difficult judgments to someone outside the company… by externalizing the difficult responsibility of censorship.’” ¹

The committee alleges this is a direct admission that the tools are designed to facilitate censorship while providing platforms with plausible deniability.

A Strategic Investment in Automated Control

The scale of this investment is significant. The NSF allocated a total of $39 million to Track F teams.¹¹ A combined $13 million went to four key recipients:

• The University of Michigan (WiseDex)
• Meedan (Co-Insights)
• The University of Wisconsin-Madison (CourseCorrect)
• MIT (Search Lit) ¹

These tools are not merely analytical; they are designed for active intervention. They solve the key logistical problem of scalability that human-centric censorship efforts faced.¹¹ Previous efforts required large teams of human analysts to manually flag content. In contrast, the NSF is funding AI-powered systems that can monitor, identify, and act on disfavored speech “at a scale that would far outmatch” any human team.¹¹

Track F, therefore, represents a strategic investment. It is building the technological infrastructure required to implement a widespread, automated, and largely invisible system for managing online content.

Section III: Capturing the Commons: The Transformation of the DEF CON Voting Machine Hacking Village

As the federal government formalized its disinformation doctrine and funded censorship technologies, a prominent civil society organization underwent a notable transformation. The DEF CON Voting Machine Hacking Village (VMHV), once a bastion of technical vulnerability research, pivoted its agenda in 2022. It shifted its focus to narrative management. This change, aligning perfectly in timing and theme with DHS priorities, suggests the co-opting of a critical community to serve government objectives.

A Shift from Hardware to Narratives

The VMHV was co-founded in 2017.¹² Its creation was a direct response to intelligence reports of Russian interference in the 2016 election. Its original mission was clear: provide a venue for researchers to discover and expose technical vulnerabilities in U.S. election equipment.¹³ Consequently, early reports from the village focused squarely on tangible hardware and software flaws.¹³

In August 2022, however, the VMHV’s mission fundamentally changed. Co-founder Harri Hursti announced a new, expanded mission. The village would now “fight against conspiracy theories, misinformation, claims of hacks that didn’t happen, claims of weirdness that didn’t happen”.¹⁴ This statement marked a definitive pivot from examining objective machine vulnerabilities to policing subjective narratives about elections.

A New Agenda Reflecting Government Priorities

The 2022 VMHV agenda directly reflected this new mission. The schedule was no longer dominated by technical deep dives into voting machine firmware. Instead, it featured presentations from officials from Maricopa County, Arizona, explaining how their elections work—a direct rebuttal to narratives surrounding the 2020 election.¹⁵ Another session featured a former National Security Council staffer discussing how disinformation targets minority communities.¹⁵

This content is inherently political and narrative-based. It is a stark departure from the village’s traditional focus on verifiable code and hardware. This pivot represents a move away from analyzing objective, falsifiable threats. Instead, the VMHV began adjudicating subjective, politically charged claims. What one group deems “misinformation,” another may see as legitimate inquiry. This placed the VMHV in the role of political arbiter rather than impartial technical auditor.

This programmatic shift serves as a powerful case study. It shows how an ostensibly independent organization can be repurposed to advance government objectives. In 2021 and 2022, a primary goal of DHS was to counter “misinformation” related to the 2020 election.¹⁶ In August 2022, the VMHV voluntarily adopted this exact goal as its core mission.¹⁴ This creates a powerful amplifying effect, where a trusted “independent” entity validates and disseminates a government-prioritized narrative.

Section IV: The Human Element: Interlocking Directorates and Government Affiliations

The alignment between DHS priorities and the VMHV’s 2022 agenda is not abstract. It is underpinned by a concrete network of individuals with overlapping professional histories. This network, centered on a key VMHV co-founder, provides a direct mechanism for transmitting government policy into the operational agenda of a supposedly independent organization.

The Central Node: A Senior DHS Advisor

The career of VMHV co-founder Jake Braun represents the most direct evidence of this link. Braun has a long history in government service, including as the White House Liaison to DHS from 2009 to 2011.¹² Most critically, the Biden administration appointed him to serve as a Senior Advisor to the DHS Management Directorate in February 2021. He subsequently served as Senior Counselor to the Secretary of Homeland Security from June 2021 to May 2023.¹²

This timeline is paramount. Jake Braun was serving in a senior advisory capacity directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security during the entire planning cycle for the August 2022 DEF CON. This was the event where the VMHV executed its pivot to combating “misinformation.” As a Senior Counselor, he would have been intimately aware of the department’s strategic priorities. His concurrent leadership role as a VMHV co-founder created a direct channel for DHS’s agenda to be adopted by the village. His dual-hatted status personifies the convergence of government and civil society. It provides a de facto steering mechanism without a formal directive.

A Broader Network of Influence

While Braun is the central node, the broader network of VMHV organizers and speakers reinforces its enmeshment with the federal policy apparatus.

• Matt Blaze, a co-organizer and professor at Georgetown University, has frequently testified before Congress as an expert witness on voting machine security.¹⁷
• Harri Hursti, a co-founder, has engaged with state-level government entities for election audits and participated in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) working groups.¹⁸
• Nicole Tisdale, a former National Security Council staffer, was a speaker at the 2022 event, cementing the village’s alignment with the national security establishment’s perspective on disinformation.¹⁵

This network of affiliations calls the independence of the election security community into question. The VMHV’s credibility derives from its perception as a grassroots, hacker-led initiative.¹³ However, with its leadership so deeply integrated into the federal security apparatus, a feedback loop is created. The government can help shape the research agenda of the very “experts” it later relies upon for “independent” validation.

Individual	Role in VMHV	Government/Policy Affiliation(s)	Timeline of Overlap & Significance
Jake Braun	Co-Founder	– Senior Counselor to the DHS Secretary (June 2021 – May 2023) – Senior Advisor, DHS Management Directorate (Feb 2021) – White House Liaison to DHS (2009-2011)	Direct Overlap: Held a senior advisory role at DHS during the entire planning period for the 2022 VMHV agenda pivot. Represents a direct, high-level structural link between DHS leadership and VMHV leadership.
Matt Blaze	Co-Organizer	– Professor, Georgetown University (Computer Science & Law) – Frequent expert witness/testifier before U.S. Congress on cybersecurity	Indirect Influence: A key figure in shaping the policy discourse around election security that government agencies consume and act upon. His participation lends policy credibility to the VMHV’s agenda.
Harri Hursti	Co-Founder	– Participant in NIST working groups – Engaged by state governments for election audits	Indirect Influence: Operates as a trusted technical expert for government bodies, bridging the gap between the hacker community and state election officials.
Nicole Tisdale	2022 Speaker (Disinfo)	– Former National Security Council (NSC) Staffer	Thematic Alignment: Her presence as a speaker directly brings the national security establishment’s narrative on disinformation into the VMHV, reinforcing the agenda’s alignment with government priorities.

Section V: Synthesis and Assessment: A Coordinated Effort to Centralize Narrative Control

The evidence points toward a deliberate, multi-pronged effort to establish a system of centralized narrative control. The parallel activities at DHS, the NSF, and the VMHV are not isolated events. They are interconnected components of a single, overarching strategy to manage the American information ecosystem.

A Three-Part Strategy

First, the federal government, through DHS, established a new doctrine. It reframed domestic “disinformation” on politically contentious topics as a threat to homeland security.¹,² This created the justification for government intervention in online speech.

Simultaneously, the government began funding the development of technological tools for at-scale narrative management. It used the academic cover of the NSF’s Track F program to build what critics have called a “science of censorship.”¹⁰ The NSF program focused on creating AI-powered systems to identify, analyze, and “correct” disfavored narratives.⁹

At the precise moment this government apparatus was coming online, the VMHV pivoted its mission. It shifted from objective technical research to the subjective work of combating “misinformation.”¹⁴ This pivot was overseen by Jake Braun, who was concurrently serving as a senior advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security.¹² This convergence is too precise to be coincidental. The NSF builds the “weapons,” DHS provides the doctrine, and the VMHV offers a credible, non-governmental platform for deploying the associated narratives.

Structural Influence vs. A “Smoking Gun”

A “smoking gun” communication showing DHS explicitly dictating the VMHV’s agenda has not been made public. However, demanding such an artifact sets an unrealistic standard for proof and ignores the power of structural influence. The presence of a senior DHS counselor in a leadership capacity at the VMHV constitutes a form of de facto steering. The alignment in timing, theme, and personnel is too perfect to be dismissed as mere convergence.

Furthermore, VMHV organizers have not provided a public, compelling rationale for such a fundamental change in their mission. A transparent organization would typically publicize its reasoning. The silence on this matter suggests the true rationale is politically inconvenient—namely, the influence of its government-affiliated leadership.

Conclusion and Implications

In conclusion, the evidence overwhelmingly points to a coordinated strategy to centralize the control of online narratives in the United States. This convergence of government power, academic research, and civil society is not accidental. It represents a deliberate effort to manage public discourse.

The implications are profound and alarming:

• An erosion of First Amendment principles through proxy censorship.
• The capture of the independent cybersecurity community by the national security state.
• The establishment of a powerful, opaque infrastructure for shaping political dissent.

This trend poses a fundamental threat to the open exchange of ideas that underpins a democratic society. To fully substantiate these conclusions, further investigation is necessary. The following appendix provides a roadmap for such an inquiry.

Appendix: A Roadmap for Further Investigation

The following table outlines key pieces of missing evidence that would be decisive in confirming the extent of coordination between the U.S. government and the Voting Machine Hacking Village. This serves as a roadmap for further journalistic, congressional, or legal inquiry.

Evidence Sought	Description & Significance	Likely Custodian(s)	Link to Thesis	Method of Acquisition
Internal VMHV Communications (2020-2022)	Emails, Slack logs, meeting minutes discussing the rationale for the 2022 agenda shift from hardware to disinformation.	Jake Braun, Matt Blaze, Harri Hursti, VMHV Review Committee	Mechanism of Agenda Capture: Would provide a decisive test of whether the shift was internally motivated or externally influenced by DHS priorities.	Whistleblower, subpoena, discovery in litigation.
Full 2022 VMHV “Disinformation” Talk Media	Unedited video and full transcripts of all talks related to disinformation, misinformation, and narrative control.	DEF CON Media Archives, individual attendees’ recordings	Messaging Sync: Allows for a precise, word-for-word comparison between the narratives promoted at VMHV and official DHS/CISA messaging on the same topics.	Public request to DEF CON, crowdsourcing from attendees.
VMHV CFP Records (2022)	Complete records of Call for Papers submissions, including both accepted and, crucially, rejected proposals.	VMHV Review Committee	Process Bias/Topic Gating: Would reveal if technically-focused hardware vulnerability talks were systematically rejected in favor of narrative-focused talks, proving an intentional gating process.	Whistleblower, subpoena.
VMHV Financial & Sponsorship Records	All financial records, sponsorship agreements, and in-kind support arrangements between VMHV/DEF CON and DHS, CISA, or related government contractors/foundations.	VMHV Organizers, DEF CON organizers	Money Trail/Sponsor Steerage: Would establish any financial leverage the government or its proxies may have had over the event’s agenda.	FOIA to agencies, subpoena to organizers.
DHS/CISA/DGB Communications with VMHV	All communications (emails, memos, calendar invites) between DHS/CISA officials (incl. Mayorkas, Jankowicz) and VMHV organizers (incl. Braun) from 2021-2022.	DHS, CISA, VMHV Organizers	Direct Affiliation/Coordination: This is the most probative missing artifact. It would provide definitive proof of direct coordination or steering.	FOIA requests to DHS/CISA, subpoena to organizers.

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Works Cited

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