Ukraine’s Drone Crucible: Assessing a Wartime Industrial Revolution

This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Ukraine’s domestic drone production capabilities, a critical component of its asymmetric warfare strategy against the Russian Federation. The analysis deconstructs official statements and production data to distinguish between industrial capacity, actual output, and battlefield consumption. While Ukraine has achieved a revolutionary scale-up of its domestic drone industry, this success is built upon a critical strategic vulnerability: a profound dependence on Chinese-sourced components that threatens the long-term viability of its asymmetric advantage.

Section 1: Executive Summary

This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Ukraine’s domestic drone production capabilities. These capabilities are a critical component of its asymmetric warfare strategy against the Russian Federation.

The analysis deconstructs official statements, production data, and think tank reports. It aims to distinguish between industrial capacity, actual output, and battlefield consumption.

The data reveals a revolutionary scale-up of Ukraine’s domestic industry. First-Person-View (FPV) drone production has grown exponentially. It increased from 50,000 units in December 2023 to an average of over 183,000 per month by the end of 2024.¹˒² An agile and decentralized ecosystem of over 500 private manufacturers enabled this growth.³˒⁴

However, a critical strategic vulnerability underpins the entire ecosystem. This vulnerability is a profound dependence on Chinese-sourced components. A Ukrainian defense think tank found that **nearly 97 percent of Ukrainian drone producers identify China as a primary source for imported components.**⁵ This gives Beijing immense geopolitical leverage that could be wielded to disrupt Kyiv’s war effort.

Furthermore, severe constraints limit this growth. The primary factor is a significant “aspirational gap.” This gap exists between the industrial capacity to produce millions of drones and the available funding to do so.⁶˒⁷˒⁸

Finally, the report places these figures in the stark context of battlefield attrition. The estimated monthly requirement is 270,000 drones of all types. This consumption rate outstrips even the most optimistic supply figures, highlighting that the conflict is a war of industrial attrition.⁹

Ukraine’s ability to maintain its asymmetric advantage will therefore hinge on three pillars:

• Securing consistent international funding.
• Mitigating its supply chain vulnerabilities.
• Maintaining a rapid pace of innovation to stay ahead of Russian countermeasures.

Section 2: An Audit of Ukraine’s Drone Production

To accurately gauge Ukraine’s drone manufacturing capabilities, this section provides a meticulous audit of various figures. We examine numbers presented by government officials, military leaders, and independent analysts. These figures, often used for strategic messaging, are carefully categorized. We distinguish between actual production, industrial capacity, procurement targets, and total supply, which includes international aid.

2.1 The Trajectory of FPV Drone Production: A Chronological Analysis

Verified data on FPV drone production reveals an exponential growth curve. This growth is a testament to a historic industrial mobilization. A chronological analysis of official statements provides a clear timeline of this ramp-up.

A crucial baseline was established at the end of 2023. On December 20, 2023, Oleksandr Kamyshin, then Minister for Strategic Industries, reported a key figure. He stated that Ukraine’s defense industry had produced over 50,000 FPV drones in that month alone. Kamyshin made this statement in the context of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s promise to produce one million drones in the coming year, clarifying this target referred specifically to FPV drones.¹

This production rate doubled within two months. On February 29, 2024, Deputy Minister for Strategic Industries Hanna Hvozdiar announced that Ukraine had produced approximately 200,000 FPV drones in the first two months of 2024. This averages to 100,000 per month.¹⁰˒¹¹ This rapid increase demonstrated the scalability of Ukraine’s decentralized production model.

Data for the full year confirmed this trajectory. During a forum in early 2025, President Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine had produced a total of 2.2 million FPV drones in 2024.² This figure averages out to over 183,000 FPV drones per month for the year. It is consistent with the accelerating rate observed in the early months.

Looking ahead, Ukraine’s ambitions continue to grow. These are now framed as procurement targets contingent on funding. The Ministry of Defense has announced plans to purchase 4.5 million FPV drones in 2025.³˒⁸˒¹²˒¹³ This represents a clear demand signal to both domestic industry and international partners. However, it should be understood as a goal rather than a guaranteed production figure.

2.2 Beyond FPV: Quantifying Strategic and Specialized Systems

FPV drones form the bulk of Ukraine’s production volume due to their low cost and attritable nature. However, the country’s industrial strategy is multifaceted. It includes a growing focus on higher-value, strategic systems designed for deep strikes and specialized missions.

• Medium-Range Drones: In late 2023, Oleksandr Kamyshin projected a 2024 capacity to produce more than 10,000 medium-range unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UAVs). These are defined as having a range of hundreds of kilometers.¹
• Long-Range Drones: For long-range systems capable of striking targets over 1,000 kilometers away, Kamyshin initially projected a 2024 capacity of over 1,000 units.¹ This ambition was dramatically increased for the following year. President Zelenskyy ordered the production of at least 30,000 long-range drones in 2025.⁸˒¹⁴˒¹⁵ These systems are crucial for targeting Russian logistics, airbases, and industrial facilities deep within its territory.
• Bomber Drones: In January 2025, Minister of Strategic Industries Herman Smetanin announced a significant delivery. Over 30,000 bomber drones had been delivered to the Defense Forces throughout 2024.¹⁴˒¹⁵ These platforms are distinct from kamikaze FPVs and are designed to drop munitions before returning to base.
• Naval Drones (USVs): Specific production numbers for Unmanned Surface Vessels like the “Sea Baby” are not publicly available. However, their technological evolution is a powerful indicator of Ukraine’s growing industrial sophistication. These systems have progressed from simple, single-use explosive craft to reusable, multi-purpose platforms. The latest variants feature AI-assisted targeting, the ability to launch their own aerial attack drones, and defensive armaments including multiple-rocket launchers and stabilized machine-gun turrets.¹⁶˒¹⁷ This rapid innovation cycle demonstrates a mature design, engineering, and manufacturing capability.

2.3 Industrial Capacity vs. Funded Output: The Aspirational Gap

A critical distinction exists between Ukraine’s theoretical maximum production capacity and its actual, funded output. Ukrainian officials consistently promote ambitious capacity figures. These figures serve as a strategic signal to international partners about the potential for investment.

In October 2024, President Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine had developed the capacity to produce up to 4 million drones per year.⁷˒¹⁴˒¹⁵ Defense Minister Rustem Umerov reiterated this figure in June 2025. He added that of this total, 1.5 million drones had already been delivered to the army by the end of June.⁷ Presidential advisor Alexander Kamyshin offered an even higher figure specifically for FPVs, claiming a national capacity to produce over 5 million FPV units per year.⁸

The most ambitious claim came from Deputy Minister of Defence Oleksandr Kozenko. At a security forum in Singapore, he stated that the Ukrainian defense industry has the capability to produce 10 million different drones annually.⁶˒¹⁸˒¹⁹

These large figures are not near-term production forecasts. They are an explicit appeal for funding. Officials like Kamyshin have been clear that a lack of financial resources is the primary constraint preventing production at these levels.⁸˒¹⁵

Communicating these capacity numbers demonstrates to Western allies that Ukraine’s defense sector is “shovel-ready.” It signals that direct financial support for procurement from Ukrainian manufacturers—the “Danish model”—is a highly efficient form of aid. The industrial infrastructure is already in place and capable of scaling rapidly.²⁰ The Atlantic Council estimates that realizing the 10 million drone-per-year goal would require an additional investment of approximately €10 billion over two years.²⁰

The battlefield implications of this funding gap are severe. Drones have become essential for Ukraine to compensate for its disadvantages in manpower and conventional artillery.²¹˒²²˒²³ With troop numbers stretched thin, drones hold defensive lines, plug gaps created by Russian advances, and substitute for soldiers where the frontline is fragmented.²⁴

“The only thing keeping Ukrainian lines in the shape they are right now is drones… without them, it would be very bad.”

— Military Analyst Konrad Muzyka²⁴

Therefore, the inability to fund production at full capacity directly hampers the delivery of urgently needed systems. Rapid replacement of attrited drones is critical to repelling enemy attacks and preventing Russian breakthroughs.²⁴˒²⁵

Date of Statement/Report	Official/Source	Stated Figure	Drone Type Specified	Timeframe	Metric	Context/Notes	Source ID
Dec 20, 2023	Oleksandr Kamyshin	>50,000	FPV Drones	Per Month	Actual Production	End-of-year 2023 baseline figure for FPV production.	1
Dec 20, 2023	Oleksandr Kamyshin	>10,000	Medium-Range (hundreds of km)	Per Year (2024)	Production Capacity	Projection for 2024 production of larger strike drones.	1
Dec 20, 2023	Oleksandr Kamyshin	>1,000	Long-Range (>1,000 km)	Per Year (2024)	Production Capacity	Projection for 2024 production of “Shahed-analogue” drones.	1
Feb 29, 2024	Hanna Hvozdiar	~200,000	FPV Drones	Jan-Feb 2024 (total)	Actual Production	Demonstrated a doubling of the monthly production rate from Dec 2023.	2
Oct 2024	Volodymyr Zelenskyy	4 million	All Drones	Per Year	Production Capacity	Statement made at the Second International Defense Industries Forum.	4
Jan 2025	Herman Smetanin	>30,000	Bomber Drones	Full Year 2024	Actual Delivery	Total number of bomber-type drones delivered in 2024.	4
Early 2025	Volodymyr Zelenskyy	2.2 million	FPV Drones	Full Year 2024	Actual Production	Total FPV production for 2024, averaging >183,000/month.	6
Early 2025	Ministry of Defense	4.5 million	FPV Drones	Per Year (2025)	Procurement Target	Official government plan for purchasing FPV drones in 2025.	7
Nov 2024	Volodymyr Zelenskyy	>30,000	Long-Range Drones	Per Year (2025)	Production Target	Ambitious goal for deep-strike drone production in 2025.	9
June 2025	Rustem Umerov	4 million	All Drones	Per Year	Production Capacity	Reiteration of the 4 million annual capacity figure.	10
N/A	Oleksandr Kozenko	10 million	All Drones	Per Year	Production Capacity	Most ambitious stated capacity, presented at an international forum.	11

Section 3: The Industrial Engine: Anatomy of Ukraine’s Drone Ecosystem

The exponential growth in Ukraine’s drone output results from a fundamental transformation of its defense-industrial base. This section analyzes the unique ecosystem of agile procurement, decentralized manufacturing, and rapid innovation that has enabled this industrial revolution.

3.1 From Cottage Industry to Coordinated Ecosystem

At the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, a fragmented network of volunteers and small workshops drove Ukraine’s drone capabilities. They often modified commercial drones for military use.²⁰˒²⁶ By 2025, this cottage industry had evolved into a robust and coordinated industrial ecosystem. The number of drone manufacturers has surged, with estimates placing the total at over 500 distinct companies.³˒²⁵

This rapid expansion was the result of a deliberate state policy. The government pivoted away from relying solely on traditional, state-owned defense conglomerates. Ukrainian leaders correctly concluded that major contractors like Ukroboronprom lacked the agile culture and commercial know-how needed to scale production of low-cost drones at the required speed and volume.²⁷

Instead, the government adopted the role of an enabler. It created the regulatory and financial conditions for a vibrant private sector to flourish. This strategic shift has been remarkably successful. Domestically produced systems now account for over 95% of the drones used by Ukrainian forces on the front line.³˒⁷

3.2 The “Army of Drones”: An Agile Acquisition Model

The cornerstone of Ukraine’s success has been the radical overhaul of its acquisition process for unmanned systems. Traditional defense procurement cycles can take years, which is untenable in a high-intensity conflict. Ukraine has aligned its processes with the speed of the commercial technology development lifecycle.²⁷ This agile model is built on several key innovations.

• Outsourced R&D: Ukraine has effectively outsourced early-stage research and development (R&D) to the commercial sector. Ukrainian drone manufacturers typically use their own capital to develop technologies up to the prototype phase. They often reach a minimum viable product (MVP) before the military becomes formally involved.²⁷ This approach frees the Ministry of Defence from the risk and administrative burden of managing early-stage development. It allows the military to focus its resources on testing and scaling already-proven technologies.
• Institutionalized Feedback Loops: Battlefield requirements can change in weeks as new threats and countermeasures emerge. To address this, Ukraine created direct communication channels between soldiers using the drones and the engineers designing them. This allows for rapid product iteration based on real-world combat experience. New drone variants and software updates are developed and fielded in weeks rather than months or years.⁴˒²⁰
• Innovative Procurement Platforms: These principles have been codified in platforms like the DOT-Chain Defence marketplace. Launched in June 2025, this digital platform functions as an internal “Amazon” for the armed forces. Military brigades can see a catalogue of approved drones and place direct orders for the specific systems they need. The state’s Defense Procurement Agency then pays for the order, significantly reducing bureaucracy and delivery times. Defense Minister Rustem Umerov states this system gets necessary equipment to the front “ten times faster” than the previous model.⁴˒⁷

3.3 The Drive for Localization

A key strategic objective for Ukraine’s defense industry is to increase the localization of its production. This reduces its dependence on foreign supply chains. Significant progress has been made in final assembly. Official reports from late 2024 and early 2025 indicate that over 95-96% of the drones used by Ukrainian forces are now considered domestically produced.³˒⁷˒¹⁴˒¹⁵

However, the term “domestically produced” can be misleading. Assembly, airframe manufacturing, and software development largely occur in Ukraine. But the industry remains heavily reliant on imported sub-components.

This reality is a dual-edged sword. The initial success of Ukraine’s drone industry was built on leveraging cheap, readily available commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. This was particularly true for components from the global electronics market dominated by China.⁵˒²⁰ This COTS-based model is the foundation of the agile, fast-iterating ecosystem that has given Ukraine its technological edge.

Yet, this same foundation constitutes the system’s greatest strategic weakness. The reliance on foreign components creates a critical vulnerability that could be exploited by geopolitical adversaries.

In response, there is a concerted effort to onshore the component supply chain. Some reports claim that up to 70% of the components for FPV drones can now be produced domestically.³ Furthermore, officials have noted the emergence of at least one company producing UAVs with 100% domestically sourced components, a significant milestone.¹⁹

The long-term sustainability of Ukraine’s drone advantage is therefore contingent on winning the industrial race to secure a resilient, domestic component base before external political pressures can sever its vital supply lines.

Section 4: The Battlefield Calculus: Production vs. Attrition

The impressive production figures of Ukraine’s drone industry must be evaluated against the brutal realities of wartime consumption. This section examines the battlefield calculus. It compares production volumes to the staggering attrition rates on the front line and assesses the cost-effectiveness of these systems.

4.1 The Insatiable Demand of the Front Line

The demand for drones from Ukrainian military units is immense. It appears to consistently outpace even the ramped-up supply. In early 2024, a Ukrainian commander estimated that the Defense Forces required over 120,000 drones each month. This number was needed to effectively counter Russian offensives and weaken their numerical superiority.¹²˒²⁸ This figure alone, representing a need for approximately 4,000 drones per day, sets a formidable benchmark.

More recent data reveals an even higher rate of consumption. In October 2025, Ivan Pavlenko, chief of the electronic warfare directorate of Ukraine’s armed forces, disclosed a “staggering” figure. He stated that Ukrainian forces were deploying approximately 9,000 drones of all types per day.⁹ This number includes FPV, bomber, intelligence, and logistics drones. It paints a vivid picture of a battlefield saturated with unmanned systems and underscores their central role in all aspects of combat.

4.2 The Production-Consumption Gap

A direct comparison of supply and consumption figures reveals a significant gap. The daily deployment rate of 9,000 drones translates into a monthly consumption of approximately 270,000 drones.⁹

This number stands in stark contrast to the most optimistic supply figure. First Deputy Minister of Defense Ivan Havryliuk stated that the total monthly influx of all unmanned systems (from both domestic production and international aid) was around 200,000 units in early 2025.¹⁴˒¹⁵

This suggests a monthly operational deficit of approximately 70,000 drones. While this gap may be partially filled by existing stockpiles or surges in aid, its existence highlights the immense pressure on Ukraine’s logistics and industrial base. The conflict is a war of industrial attrition. Victory depends on the ability to consistently out-produce and out-supply the enemy. The gap between production and consumption is the most critical variable, indicating that Ukraine is likely operating at the very edge of its logistical capacity.

4.3 The Asymmetric Advantage: Cost-Effectiveness

Despite the high attrition rate, the strategic and economic calculus of drone warfare remains overwhelmingly in Ukraine’s favor. Drones provide a powerful asymmetric advantage. They allow Ukraine to inflict disproportionate losses on a conventionally superior adversary. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) has estimated that drone attacks are responsible for approximately 70% of confirmed Russian equipment losses.¹⁸˒²⁰

The cost-exchange ratio is exceptionally favorable. Low-cost FPV drones, with unit prices from $400 to $2,000, can destroy or disable high-value Russian military assets.¹³˒¹⁸ These assets, such as tanks and artillery systems, cost millions of dollars. This economic efficiency allows Ukraine to sustain its defense with a smaller overall defense budget.

A dramatic illustration of this impact was “Operation Spiderweb.” In this operation, Ukrainian forces reportedly used 117 FPV drones, with a total cost likely under $250,000. The attack is claimed to have damaged or destroyed over 40 strategic aircraft, including Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 long-range bombers. This represents an estimated asset loss of $7 billion for Russia.²⁹˒³⁰

Section 5: Critical Dependencies and Strategic Vulnerabilities

While Ukraine’s drone program is a landmark success, its long-term viability is threatened by critical dependencies. This section explores the strategic vulnerabilities that could undermine its asymmetric advantage, including supply chain reliance, funding needs, and the technological arms race with Russia.

5.1 The Chinese Supply Chain: The Achilles’ Heel

The single greatest strategic vulnerability is the industry’s profound dependence on components sourced from China. This dependency is a direct consequence of the COTS-based model that enabled its rapid growth. A report from the Snake Island Institute, a Ukrainian defense think tank, found that nearly 97% of Ukrainian drone producers identify China as a primary source for imported components.⁵

This reliance is not just a legacy issue. Data from the first half of 2024 shows that nearly 89% of Ukraine’s UAS-related imports by value still originated from China, despite Beijing enacting some export controls.⁵ Critical sub-systems—including batteries, flight controllers, and sensors—are overwhelmingly sourced from Chinese manufacturers due to the lack of affordable or available alternatives from Western suppliers.⁵

This situation places Ukraine in a precarious position. It gives Beijing immense geopolitical leverage, which could be wielded to support its strategic partner, Russia. A further tightening of Chinese export controls could severely disrupt or even cripple Ukraine’s drone production.

5.1.1 Pathways to a Resilient Supply Chain

Mitigating this dependency requires a multi-pronged strategy. It must focus on leveraging Western industrial capacity and fostering domestic production. While a complete shift is a long-term endeavor, several concrete pathways exist:

• Leveraging Western Component Manufacturers: A growing ecosystem of American and European companies can provide viable alternatives. For instance, US-based firms like ModalAI manufacture American-made flight controllers. Drone producers like Inspired Flight have already successfully integrated these to create a secure supply chain.³¹ Other companies in the US and Europe, such as AeroVironment, Skydio, Parrot (France), and Orqa (Croatia), offer a range of hardware that can reduce reliance on Chinese sources.³²˒³³ European firms like Refitech specialize in key structural components like carbon fiber frames.³⁴
• Government-Led Initiatives: Western governments are creating policy frameworks to address this vulnerability. In the US, initiatives like the “Unleashing American Drone Dominance” Executive Order are designed to prioritize and fund US-made drone technology.³⁵ In Europe, think tanks have proposed a “protect-promote-align” framework to ban Chinese drones in sensitive sectors and promote domestic manufacturing.³⁵
• Joint Production and Investment: A more direct strategy involves establishing joint production hubs in Europe and North America. These hubs could manufacture critical components and sell them to Ukraine at subsidized prices.³⁵ This approach not only secures Ukraine’s supply but also strengthens the broader Western defense industrial base. Direct financial and material support from partners is essential to bolster Ukraine’s own efforts to onshore component production.³⁶
• Acknowledging Timelines and Challenges: The transition will not be immediate. Experts estimate that even with a full commitment, it could take over a year before reshoring production can scale to meet demand.³⁷ Ukrainian efforts to onshore production are underway but are described as a “long process” that will require sustained European support.²²

5.2 The Financial Backstop: The Role of International Partners

As established previously, the scale-up of Ukraine’s drone production is contingent on external financial support. The gap between the industry’s potential capacity (up to 10 million drones annually) and its actual output is primarily a function of funding.⁶˒⁸ Ukraine’s domestic budget is insufficient to finance production at the levels required to meet battlefield consumption rates.¹⁵˒³⁸

Consequently, the program relies heavily on the consistent flow of international aid. Multilateral initiatives like the “Drone Coalition,” co-chaired by Latvia and the United Kingdom, are vital. This coalition, comprising 20 nations, has pledged €2.75 billion to supply an additional one million drones in 2025.²⁰˒³⁹

Bilateral partnerships are also critical. These include the United Kingdom’s “Project OCTOPUS” for co-developing advanced interceptor drones, and direct funding for Ukrainian procurement from countries like Denmark and the Netherlands.⁹˒⁴⁰ Any wavering or delay in this international financial support would have a direct and immediate impact on the number of drones reaching the front line.

5.3 The Technological Arms Race: The EW Challenge

Ukraine’s drone innovation does not occur in a vacuum. Russia is a dynamic adversary actively working to counter Ukraine’s technological edge. This has created a perpetual, high-speed technological arms race, particularly in electronic warfare (EW).

Russia is rapidly expanding its own production of Shahed-type one-way attack drones. According to Ukrainian military intelligence, Russia aims to reach a daily production rate of 190 Shahed-type drones by the end of 2025. This scale would allow for massive, overwhelming saturation attacks.²⁶

More immediately, Russia has deployed sophisticated and widespread EW systems. These systems are designed to jam the command links and GPS signals of Ukrainian drones. This has had a significant impact on effectiveness. It is estimated that 60-80% of FPV drone strikes currently fail to destroy their intended targets.²⁵ This failure rate is largely attributed to a combination of Russian countermeasures, including not only widespread EW jamming but also physical defenses like enhanced armor, nets, and metal cages.¹˒²⁵

This dynamic forces a constant cycle of innovation. As Russia deploys new EW systems, Ukraine must develop and field countermeasures. This has led to the development of drones with AI-enabled terminal guidance that can lock onto a target and complete their attack run autonomously, even if the operator’s connection is jammed.⁴¹

In another adaptation, both sides have begun using drones tethered by long fiber-optic cables, a method impervious to radio-frequency jamming.⁴¹˒⁴² However, Russia has also started deploying its own fiber-optic drones, eroding Ukraine’s advantage.⁴² This perpetual cycle of measure and countermeasure means the drone war is a relentless competition in innovation speed.

Section 6: Conclusion and Strategic Outlook

The analysis of Ukraine’s drone industry reveals the strategic path forward. This concluding section summarizes the key findings, outlines the pillars required to sustain Ukraine’s asymmetric edge, offers actionable recommendations for partners, and provides a long-term outlook on the industry’s future.

6.1 Final Verdict on Production and Vulnerabilities

Ukraine has successfully scaled its domestic FPV drone manufacturing to revolutionary levels, achieving an average monthly rate approaching 200,000 by the end of 2024. The total supply of all unmanned systems, including international aid, reached a similar monthly figure in early 2025.

This remarkable industrial achievement is central to Ukraine’s defense. Nevertheless, it is defined by two critical challenges. First, a significant gap persists between the supply rate and the estimated battlefield consumption of 270,000 drones per month. Second, and more strategically urgent, the entire production ecosystem is critically dependent on Chinese components, creating an acute vulnerability.

6.2 Sustaining the Asymmetric Edge

Ukraine’s ability to maintain its drone-driven asymmetric advantage is not guaranteed. It hinges on the successful management of three core strategic pillars:

1. Supply Chain Resilience: The overwhelming dependence on Chinese components is the program’s most acute vulnerability. A concerted, long-term strategy to diversify suppliers and onshore the production of critical sub-systems is a matter of strategic necessity.
2. Consistent Funding: The gap between industrial capacity and actual output is almost entirely a function of financial resources. Securing long-term, predictable, and substantial financial commitments from Western partners is essential.
3. Pace of Innovation: The drone war is a dynamic technological duel. Victory will go to the side that can innovate and adapt the fastest. Maintaining the agility of its R&D and procurement ecosystem is crucial for Ukraine to stay ahead of Russian countermeasures.

6.3 An Actionable Framework for International Partners

The findings of this report lead to several actionable recommendations for allied governments. These steps can be organized into a framework of immediate actions and strategic initiatives.

• Action Item 1: Secure the Component Supply Chain: Partners should treat the security of Ukraine’s drone component supply chain as a strategic priority. This should involve actively supporting efforts to establish non-Chinese sources for critical electronics. Initiatives could include direct investment in Ukrainian component manufacturing, facilitating partnerships between Ukrainian and Western electronics firms, and streamlining export licensing.
• Action Item 2: Adopt and Scale the “Danish Model”: The most efficient way to support Ukraine’s drone capabilities is to shift from donating finished systems to providing direct funding for procurement from Ukrainian industry. This model is more cost-effective and strengthens Ukraine’s long-term defense-industrial base.
• Action Item 3: Foster Technology Co-Development: Partners should engage in deep, collaborative R&D projects, following the example of the UK’s Project OCTOPUS.⁴⁰ Joint ventures can accelerate the development of next-generation capabilities, such as AI-driven drone swarms and advanced counter-EW technologies.

6.3.1 Immediate Next Steps for Policymakers

To translate these strategic goals into action, international partners should consider the following concrete steps:

1. Formally Adopt and Expand the “Danish Model”: The Drone Coalition and other allied groups should formally adopt this as a primary funding mechanism. They should earmark specific aid for direct procurement from pre-vetted Ukrainian manufacturers.⁴³˒⁴⁴
2. Establish a Supply Chain Task Force: A joint NATO-Ukraine task force should be created. It would map Ukraine’s critical component dependencies, identify Western companies as alternative suppliers, and create a streamlined procurement and export process for these components.³¹˒³⁵
3. Launch a Joint Venture Pilot Program: Following recommendations from institutions like the London School of Economics, partners should launch a pilot program for an institutionalized joint venture system.⁴⁵ An initial project could focus on co-developing next-generation counter-EW software or advanced interceptor drones.
4. Develop a Framework for Controlled Exports: As Ukraine considers loosening its arms export embargo, partners should proactively engage with Kyiv. They can help develop a transparent regulatory framework to ensure Ukraine’s domestic military needs are prioritized while creating secure channels for joint production.⁴⁶˒⁴⁷

6.4 Future Outlook: Ukraine as a Global Drone Exporter

The long-term implications of Ukraine’s wartime industrial mobilization extend far beyond the current conflict. Ukraine has become a laboratory for rapid innovation under extreme pressure. It is now poised to transform from an aid recipient into a major global defense exporter, particularly in the unmanned systems sector.²⁰

Supporters of lifting Ukraine’s wartime export restrictions argue that foreign sales could generate vital revenue. This revenue could fuel further industrial growth and reduce reliance on state funding. Ukrainian manufacturers are capable of producing significantly more drones than the state can currently purchase. Controlled exports could allow companies to operate closer to full capacity, achieve economies of scale, and lower unit costs for all customers, including the Ukrainian military.

A move toward joint production and controlled exports could position Ukraine as a “drone hub for Europe”.⁴⁷ By establishing secure manufacturing sites in partner countries and engaging in joint ventures, Ukraine can leverage its battle-hardened designs to strengthen the broader Western defense industrial base.³⁵˒⁴⁷ For European partners, this offers access to proven, cost-effective systems that have been iterated at the speed of war, providing a crucial capability edge.

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15. Aviacionline. “Ukraine’s Defense Forces Receive 200,000 Unmanned Systems Per Month in 2025.” February 24, 2025. https://www.aviacionline.com/ukraines-defense-forces-receive-200000-unmanned-systems-per-month-in-2025
16. Euromaidan Press. “The Telegraph: Ukraine’s new $250,000 naval drone carriers strike Russians by sea and air.” January 24, 2025. https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/01/24/the-telegraph-ukraines-new-250000-naval-drone-carriers-strike-russians-by-sea-and-air/
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21. Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Fewer Soldiers, More Drones: What Ukraine’s Military Will Look Like After the War.” https://www.csis.org/analysis/fewer-soldiers-more-drones-what-ukraines-military-will-look-after-war
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26. Modern War Institute at West Point. “From Culture to System: A Roadmap for Turning Ukraine’s Counterdrone Innovation into a Capability.” https://mwi.westpoint.edu/from-culture-to-system-a-roadmap-for-turning-ukraines-counterdrone-innovation-into-a-capability/
27. Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance: What the United States Can Learn from Ukraine.” https://www.csis.org/analysis/unleashing-us-military-drone-dominance-what-united-states-can-learn-ukraine
28. Reddit. “Ukraine needs over 120,000 drones monthly to counter Russia’s offensives.” https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/1kuxpgx/ukraine_needs_over_120000_drones_monthly_to/
29. Center for Strategic and International Studies. “How Ukraine’s ‘Spider Web’ Operation Redefines Asymmetric Warfare.” https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraines-spider-web-operation-redefines-asymmetric-warfare
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31. ModalAI. “Flight Controllers from ModalAI® are the American-Made Brains Inside Inspired Flight Drones.” https://www.modalai.com/pages/flight-controllers-from-modalai-are-the-american-made-brains-inside-inspired-flight-drones
32. Advexure. “Top American UAS Manufacturers in 2025.” https://advexure.com/blogs/news/top-american-uas-manufacturers-your-guide-in-2025
33. The Drone U. “The Top 36 Drone Companies in 2025.” https://www.thedroneu.com/blog/top-drone-companies/
34. Refitech. “Carbon Drone Frame Manufacturer.” https://www.refitech.eu/uav/
35. The Cipher Brief. “To Help Ukraine Win, the West Must Break Its Dependence on Chinese Drones.” https://www.thecipherbrief.com/ukraine-drones-russia-china
36. Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Why China’s UAV Supply Chain Restrictions Weaken Ukraine’s Negotiating Power.” https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-chinas-uav-supply-chain-restrictions-weaken-ukraines-negotiating-power
37. Defense One. “Pentagon pushes US dronemakers to innovate as quickly as Ukraine does.” June 2025. https://www.defenseone.com/business/2025/06/pentagon-pushes-us-dronemakers-innovate-quickly-ukraine-does/405739/
38. El País. “Minister of Strategic Industries of Ukraine: ‘We want to get as many people as we can out of the front lines and put in machines’.” March 15, 2024. https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-03-15/minister-of-strategic-industries-of-ukraine-we-want-to-get-as-many-people-as-we-can-out-of-the-front-lines-and-put-in-machines.html
39. EU Institute for Security Studies. “Minding the drone gap: Drone warfare and the EU.” https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/minding-drone-gap-drone-warfare-and-eu
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41. Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Chapter 9: Technological Evolution on the Battlefield.” September 16, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chapter-9-technological-evolution-battlefield
42. The Lowy Institute. “Fibre-optic drones reshape Ukraine’s technological war.” https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/fibre-optic-drones-reshape-ukraine-s-technological-war
43. Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. “EUR 597 million in investment: How the ‘Danish model’ is strengthening Ukraine’s defense industry.” February 6, 2025. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/eur-597-million-in-investment-how-the-danish-model-is-strengthening-ukraine-s-defense-industry
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