OSINT ANALYSIS: Long March 7A (Wenchang) Launch November 3, 2025 – Payload and Threat Assessment

Executive Summary

This report assesses a high-confidence threat from an upcoming Chinese space launch. The Long March 7A (CZ-7A) rocket, launching from Wenchang on November 3, 2025 ¹, will likely deploy a high-value military payload.

The inferred destination is a Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO).¹ This inference is supported by the vehicle’s 7,000 kg GTO lift capacity and the launch site’s equatorial advantage.⁴

The official “Unknown Payload” designation is a known obfuscation tactic. China uses this cover for its sensitive military programs, such as the Tongxin Jishu Shiyan (TJS) or Shijian (SJ) series.⁶ These programs are operated by the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF).⁸

We therefore infer two primary mission profiles. The payload is likely intended for either space-based Electronic Warfare (EW) ⁹ or co-orbital Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO).¹¹ This RPO capability may be masked as a benign, dual-use “debris removal” mission to hide offensive anti-satellite capabilities.¹²

Verified Launch Facts

• Launch Vehicle: Long March 7A (CZ-7A / LM-7A).¹ This is the 60.13-meter, 3-stage variant of the Long March 7 family.
• Launch Provider: China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC).¹ CASC is the state-owned main contractor for the Chinese space program.¹⁴
• Launch Site: Wenchang Space Launch Site (WSLS), Hainan, China.²
• Launch Complex: LC-201, which is associated with the Long March 7 and 8 rocket series.
• Scheduled Launch Time: Monday, November 3, 2025, at 03:45 UTC.¹
• Payload Designation: “Unknown Payload”.¹ This is a common designation China uses to obfuscate sensitive military or intelligence satellites, such as the TJS or Shijian series.⁶

Orbit & Mission Inference

1. Primary Orbit Inference: Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO)

• Confidence: HIGH
• Rationale: This inference is based on a strong convergence of technical evidence from the launch vehicle, launch site, and the vehicle’s operational history.
  • Vehicle Analysis:
    • The Long March 7A (CZ-7A) is a three-stage rocket. This design distinguishes it from the two-stage CZ-7, which is used for Low Earth Orbit (LEO) cargo flights.³
    • The third stage is specifically added to provide the high-energy orbital insertion required for GTO.
    • Multiple sources confirm its design specification: placing payloads up to 7,000 kg (7 metric tons) into GTO.¹
    • This capacity is optimized for a large, single GEO-bound satellite.
  • Launch Site Analysis:
    • The Wenchang Space Launch Site (19°N latitude) is China’s southernmost spaceport.
    • It was selected for its proximity to the equator.⁴
    • Launching from this low latitude provides a “slingshot” effect from Earth’s rotation. This effect maximizes payload mass to equatorial orbits (like GTO/GEO) and minimizes the propellant needed for a plane change.
  • Historical Precedent: The CZ-7A’s launch history is dominated by GTO/GEO missions. As shown in the table below, many of these carried secretive payloads with vague “experiment” or “communication” designations.

Date	Payload	Payload Cover Description	Inferred/Actual Orbit	Citation(s)
2020-03-16	XJY 6	“Experiment”	GTO (Launch Failure)	[17, 21]
2021-03-11	XJY-6 02	“Experiment”	GTO
2021-12-23	Shiyan 12-01 & 02	“Experiment”	GTO
2022-09-13	ChinaSat 1E	Communications	GTO
2023-01-08	Shijian 23	“Scientific Experiment”	GTO
2023-11-03	TJS-10	“Communication Technology”	GTO	[22, 23]
2025-10-23	TJS-20	“Communication Technology”	GTO	[24, 25]

2. Secondary Orbit Inference: Medium Earth Orbit (MEO)

• Confidence: LOW-TO-MEDIUM
• Rationale:GTO is the CZ-7A’s primary role, but it is not its only demonstrated capability.On September 9, 2025, a CZ-7A launched the Yaogan 45 satellite.⁴ Open-source analysis indicated its orbit circularized at approximately 7,500 km ²⁶, placing it in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO). A MEO insertion, while less common, remains a distinct possibility.Confidence in this MEO inference would increase post-launch if initial Two-Line Elements (TLEs) show parameters well below GTO. It would also increase if the payload is identified as part of a MEO-based constellation (like Yaogan).Conversely, confidence remains low because the vast majority of secretive CZ-7A launches (TJS, Shiyan) have targeted GTO.¹

3. Primary Mission Inference: Military GEO Counterspace / Intelligence Payload

• Confidence: HIGH
• Rationale: This inference is based on analysis of the “Unknown” payload designation ¹, a known cover for China’s most sensitive military space programs.
  • Analysis of “TJS” Cover:
    • China typically uses “Unknown” as a placeholder. It later assigns vague, benign names to these payloads after a successful launch.
    • The most common cover for secretive GEO-bound military satellites is Tongxin Jishu Shiyan (TJS), or “Communication Technology Experiment”.⁶
    • This tactic of providing vague descriptions and no technical specifications allows China to maintain ambiguity about the payload’s true military mission and capabilities.
    • China publicly states TJS satellites are for “multi-band and high-speed communication technology experiments”.²² However, the secrecy surrounding them (no images or specifications) is inconsistent with a civil program.
    • Authoritative analysis consistently identifies the TJS program as a cover for multiple, distinct military programs operating in GEO.⁶
    • Crucially, public satellite catalogs identify the operator for TJS satellites as the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF).⁸ This is the branch of the Chinese military responsible for space, cyber, and electronic warfare.
  • TJS Mission Sets: The TJS program is believed to cover at least three distinct mission sets:
    1. SIGINT (Signals Intelligence): The Qianshao-3 series, featuring large-aperture antennas for SIGINT collection from GEO.⁶
    2. Missile Early Warning (MW): The Huoyan-1 (“Fire Eyes”) series, China’s first-generation GEO early warning system, analogous to the U.S. Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS).⁶
    3. Rendezvous / Inspection: TJS satellites have demonstrated RPO. TJS-3 (launched 2018) released an undeclared subsatellite and was later observed actively maneuvering to inspect U.S. military GEO satellites (USA 233 and USA 298).

4. Secondary Mission Inference: Dual-Use On-Orbit Servicing (OSAM) / RPO

• Confidence: MEDIUM
• Rationale:The launch profile is also consistent with China’s Shijian (SJ) “Practice” series. This program focuses on developing and operationalizing On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (OSAM) and RPO technologies.31These OSAM capabilities are inherently dual-use.China publicly states satellites like Shijian-21 (SJ-21) are for “space debris mitigation technologies”.³³ This provides a plausible, peaceful justification for developing close-proximity RPO, grappling, and towing capabilities. However, the same technology used to “mitigate” debris can be used to “mitigate” an active, non-cooperative satellite belonging to an adversary.This capability is operational. In 2021-2022, SJ-21 (launched to GTO) maneuvered to a defunct Beidou satellite, grappled it, and towed it to a high super-sync graveyard orbit.¹² This event demonstrated a “space tug” capability. Its precursor, Shijian-17, was also noted by the U.S. DoD to possess a robotic arm.Therefore, this “Unknown Payload” could be the next-generation SJ-class “space tug.” It may use a benign “debris removal” mission cover to deploy a potent co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon.

Worst-Case Uses Against the U.S.

1. GEO Co-orbital RPO / Inspection and Harassment
   • What: The payload is a TJS-3 or Shijian-17 class inspector satellite deployed to GEO to conduct close-up surveillance and Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) against high-value U.S. national security satellites.¹¹
   • How this orbit/payload enables it: A GTO insertion allows the payload to use its own propulsion to phase its orbit and match the plane and position of any U.S. satellite in the GEO belt, enabling close-flyby inspection or robotic arm manipulation.
   • What U.S. system(s) could be affected: U.S. Space Force missile warning satellites (e.g., SBIRS), protected MILSATCOM (e.g., AEHF, WGS), or U.S. inspector satellites (e.g., GSSAP).¹¹
   • Citation: China has already demonstrated this capability; TJS-3 was maneuvered to closely inspect U.S. military satellites USA 233 and USA 298 in 2022 and 2023. The 2025 Secure World Foundation report details these RPOs as a key area of Chinese counterspace development.⁹
2. Dual-use “Debris Removal” Repurposed for Offensive Co-orbital Relocation
   • What: The payload is a Shijian-21 class “space tug” with grappling capabilities, nominally for “debris removal,” but tasked with rendezvousing with, capturing, and forcibly moving a U.S. satellite to a useless orbit.³¹
   • How this orbit/payload enables it: The 7,000 kg GTO capacity of the CZ-7A is sufficient to launch a large, heavily-fueled “tug” that has the propellant reserves to maneuver to a target, grapple it, and then conduct a major orbital change, such as pushing the U.S. asset into a graveyard orbit.
   • What U.S. system(s) could be affected: Any U.S. GEO satellite, particularly critical Command and Control (C2) or ISR assets that would be “mission killed” if moved from their designated orbital slot.
   • Citation: China “has demonstrated satellite-to-satellite RPO activities in… GEO” and Shijian-21 “apparently grabbed a defunct Beidou satellite and raised it to an unusually high super-sync graveyard orbit,” proving the grappling and towing capability is operational.
3. Space-based Electronic Warfare (EW) from GEO
   • What: The payload is a TJS-class satellite designed to test or operationally deploy high-powered jammers from a geostationary orbit to conduct uplink or downlink interference against U.S. systems.⁹
   • How this orbit/payload enables it: By parking in a GEO slot, the satellite has a fixed, persistent view of a massive geographic area (e.g., the entire INDOPACOM theater), allowing it to conduct 24/7 jamming of satellite communications or navigation signals within that footprint.
   • What U.S. system(s) could be affected: U.S. military satellite communications (MILSATCOM), commercial SATCOM used by the DoD, and GPS P(Y) code receivers within the satellite’s broadcast cone.
   • Citation: The PLA “regularly incorporate jammers against space-based communications, radars, and navigation systems like GPS”. The 2025 Secure World Foundation report explicitly notes “internal People’s Liberation Army reports suggesting that China has deployed a satellite in geosynchronous orbit to test jamming capabilities in that orbital regime”.⁹
4. Early-Warning Payload for Missile Cueing (Huoyan-1)
   • What: The payload is a Huoyan-1 class military satellite, launched under the TJS cover, equipped with infrared sensors to provide strategic missile launch warnings to the PLA.⁶
   • How this orbit/payload enables it: A GEO orbit provides a persistent, “staring” view of a large portion of the Earth (e.g., CONUS or the Pacific), allowing for the near-instantaneous detection of heat blooms from ballistic missile launches.⁶
   • What U.S. system(s) could be affected: This is an enabling, not a direct-attack, capability. It improves PLA kill-chain effectiveness against U.S. forces, compresses U.S. decision timelines, and provides cueing data for China’s missile defense systems.
   • Citation: The TJS program is understood by analysts to be the cover for China’s Huoyan-1 GEO-based early-warning satellites, which are analogous to the U.S. SBIRS system.⁶

Red Flags Checklist

This checklist outlines key indicators, based on past hostile and secretive Chinese space missions, to monitor before and after launch.

• [✓] Secretive or mislabeled payload family with history of RPO/EW/ELINT?
  • Note: YES. The “Unknown Payload” designation is a classic indicator for the TJS and Shijian series. These programs have documented histories of RPO ¹¹, SIGINT, and suspected EW/MW missions.⁷
• [?] Undeclared subsat/companion objects?
  • Note: UNKNOWN PRE-LAUNCH. This requires post-launch analysis of the satellite catalog.
  • The TJS-3 mission (2018), for example, deployed an undeclared subsatellite.¹¹ This is a known tactic for RPO testing.
  • Confirmation of extra objects (e.g., 2025-XXXC, -XXXD) from the 18th Space Defense Squadron would elevate this flag.²⁶
• [?] GEO drift or plane suggesting proximity ops?
  • Note: UNKNOWN PRE-LAUNCH. This is monitored by observing the payload’s TLEs over days or weeks.
  • A standard GEO satellite moves to a specific orbital slot and remains there.
  • In contrast, TJS-3 began “wandering” in 2022 and paused to inspect U.S. assets.²⁰ This is non-standard behavior.
  • Observation of this “drifting” pattern would confirm an RPO mission profile.²⁶
• [✗] LEO inclination & LTDN consistent with ISR over CONUS/test ranges?
  • Note: NO. The launch vehicle (CZ-7A) is a GTO-specialist ¹, making a LEO/SSO mission highly improbable and inefficient.
• [✓] Defense org as operator or co-developer?
  • Note: YES. Satellite catalogs explicitly list the operator for TJS-series satellites as the PLA SSF (People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force).⁸
• [?] Collision-avoidance-like maneuvers shortly after deployment?
  • Note: UNKNOWN PRE-LAUNCH. This behavior is subtle and requires high-fidelity orbital data.
  • Such maneuvers, if not correlated with a known debris object, are often a cover for an initial orbital phasing or RPO test.
  • Amateur and official trackers will monitor for this activity.²⁶

Gaps & Next OSINT (72-Hour Watchlist)

1. Current Intelligence Gaps

A key pre-launch intelligence gap is the absence of public Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) or maritime (NAVAREA/HYDROPAC) warnings.³⁹

These warnings define debris drop zones. They are the most reliable OSINT source for calculating the launch azimuth and, by extension, the intended orbital inclination.

One active HYDROPAC warning (2734/2025) does exist for “hazardous operations, space debris.” Its window (Nov 02-06) includes this launch, but the drop zone is in the South Pacific.

This is a possible upper stage re-entry zone for a GTO launch. However, the link is low-confidence without a corresponding first-stage drop zone warning closer to China.

2. 72-Hour OSINT Collection & Analysis Plan

• Priority 1 (0-12h Post-Launch): Monitor for Initial TLEs.
  • Action: Monitor CelesTrak and the 18th Space Defense Squadron (18 SDS) catalog for the first two-line element (TLE) set (likely 2025-XXXA).
  • Analysis: The TLE’s apogee, perigee, and inclination will provide high-confidence confirmation of either a GTO (~200 x 35,786 km) or MEO (~7,500 km) insertion.
• Priority 2 (12-72h Post-Launch): Monitor Object Catalog Count.
  • Action: Continue to monitor 18 SDS / CelesTrak for additional objects (e.g.,…-XXXB,…-XXXC) cataloged from this launch, beyond the payload (A) and rocket body (B).²⁶
  • Analysis: Cataloging an unannounced third or fourth object is a critical red flag. It is a high-confidence indicator of a subsatellite deployment, as seen with TJS-3.¹¹ This would immediately elevate the mission likelihood to RPO/Inspector.
• Priority 3 (0-72h Post-Launch): Monitor Amateur Satellite Tracker Network.
  • Action: Monitor social media and forums for reports from experienced amateur optical and RF (radio-frequency) trackers.
  • Analysis: Amateur observers will likely be the first to achieve three things:
    1. Optically sight the object(s) in GTO.
    2. Detect any initial orbital burns (perigee/apogee-raising).
    3. Report if the payload “drifts” along the GEO belt. Drifting is a key indicator of a “hunter” or RPO mission, as opposed to parking in a designated slot.
• Priority 4 (0-6h Post-Launch): Analyze CASC/Xinhua Press Release.
  • Action: Scrutinize the official launch-success announcement from CASC or Xinhua.²²
  • Analysis: The vaguer the payload description, the higher the confidence in a military mission. A description like “communication technology test satellite” ²² should be treated as confirmation of a TJS-class military payload.⁶

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