Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Launch Assessment: ISRO LVM3-M5 (CMS-03)

Report Date: November 2, 2025

Analyst: OSINT Space Analyst

Subject: Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Launch LVM3-M5

Payload: CMS-03 (GSAT-7R)

Significance: This launch represents a major upgrade to India’s military space capabilities, specifically for its Navy.1 It enhances India’s network-centric warfare capabilities 4 and maritime domain awareness across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The IOR is a critical theater for international trade and naval operations.4

The satellite’s advanced, multi-band nature also presents a potential dual-use capability for Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Electronic Warfare (EW). This development aligns with India’s broader, post-2019 shift. That shift has moved India toward a more security-oriented space posture and the development of dedicated military and intelligence satellites.

A. Executive Summary

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is scheduled to launch the 4,410 kg CMS-03 (also known as GSAT-7R) satellite. The launch will occur on November 2, 2025, from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre.⁵

The primary mission, assessed with high confidence, is the deployment of a next-generation military communication satellite (MILSATCOM) for the Indian Navy. This satellite is intended to provide secure, encrypted, multi-band (UHF, C, Ku, Ka) communications across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It will serve as a replacement for the aging GSAT-7 satellite.⁸

While the satellite’s primary mission focuses on India’s regional security, its advanced, sensitive multi-band receivers present a plausible dual-use capability. This low-confidence potential is for geostationary Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Electronic Warfare (EW). Such capabilities could be used against U.S. and allied assets operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) areas of responsibility.¹⁰

India is a key U.S. partner in many domains. However, its development of advanced, dual-use space capabilities reflects a policy of “strategic autonomy.”¹² This policy contributes to the complex, multi-polar competition in the space domain. It particularly serves as a regional counterweight to China’s own space-based assets.

B. Verified Launch Facts

The following table and list summarize all verified, open-source facts regarding this launch.

Table 1: CMS-03 (GSAT-7R) Launch Fact Sheet

Parameter	Detail	Citation(s)
Launch Country	India	[8, 13]
Launch Provider	Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO)	5
Launch Vehicle	LVM-3 (Launch Vehicle Mark-3) (Mission LVM3-M5)	[5, 6, 7, 13, 14]
Payload	CMS-03 (also known as GSAT-7R)	[8, 9, 13, 15, 1]
Operator	Indian Navy (Funded by Ministry of Defence)	[8, 9, 16, 2, 3]
Launch Date (UTC)	November 2, 2025 at 11:56 UTC	[6, 17]
Launch Date (Local)	November 2, 2025 at 17:26 India Standard Time (IST)	[7, 14, 17, 18]
Launch Site	Second Launch Pad (SLP), Satish Dhawan Space Centre (SDSC), Sriharikota	6
Declared Mass	4,410 kg	[6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 20]
Declared Orbit	Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO)	[5, 6, 15, 20, 21]
Declared Azimuth	$107^{\circ}$	6

• Launch Country, Provider, and Vehicle: The launch originates from India. It is conducted by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).⁵ The launch vehicle is the LVM-3 (Launch Vehicle Mark-3), with this mission designated LVM3-M5. This is its fifth operational flight.⁵
• Launch Date and Time: The launch is scheduled for November 2, 2025, at 11:56 UTC.¹⁷ This corresponds to 17:26 India Standard Time (IST) at the launch pad ⁷, which is in the UTC+05:30 time zone.¹⁸
• Launch Site: The launch will be from the Second Launch Pad (SLP). The pad is located at the Satish Dhawan Space Centre (SDSC) in Sriharikota, Andhra Pradesh.⁶
• Declared Payload and Operator: The payload is identified as CMS-03, also designated GSAT-7R.⁸ It is explicitly a military communication satellite.¹ It is operated by the Indian Navy ⁸ and funded by the Indian Ministry of Defence.²
• Official Mission Description: ISRO’s official mission brochure states CMS-03 is a “multi-band communication satellite” ⁵ with a mass of 4,410 kg.⁶ Its stated purpose is to “provide services over a wide oceanic region including the Indian landmass”.⁵ It is confirmed to be a replacement for the aging GSAT-7 (“Rukmini”) satellite.⁸
• Declared Payload Capabilities: The payload is described as “next-gen” and “upgraded”.⁸ It operates across multiple frequencies: UHF, S, C, Ku, and Ka bands.⁸ Reports indicate it features advanced military-grade capabilities. These include anti-jamming, frequency hopping, and encrypted data links.⁴
• Hazard Areas and Azimuth: A Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) (A3188/25) was issued for a launch window beginning October 31, 2025. The notice originated from pad coordinates 13°43’12″N 080°13’48″E.¹⁹ ISRO’s official mission brochure explicitly states a launch azimuth of $107^{\circ}$.⁶
• Declared Target Orbit: ISRO has officially declared the target as a Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO).⁵ The specific, declared orbital parameters are:
  • Perigee: 170 km (± 3.5 km) ⁶
  • Apogee: 29,970 km (± 3700 km) ⁶
  • Inclination: $21.4^{\circ}$ (± $0.1^{\circ}$) ⁶
• Independent Reporting: Numerous independent news and space-focused media outlets corroborate the launch’s key details. These include the launch provider, vehicle, payload, military operator (Indian Navy), and GTO insertion profile.⁷

C. Orbit and Mission Inference

• Inclination Band (Confidence: HIGH)
  • Inference: The launch will directly insert the payload into an inclination band of approximately $21.4^{\circ}$ to $21.8^{\circ}$.
  • Rationale: Confidence is High. We confirmed this inference by cross-validating ISRO’s official, pre-launch declared parameters. The launch site (SDSC) latitude (lat) is approximately $13.72^{\circ}$ North.¹⁸ ISRO has also declared a launch azimuth (az) of $107^{\circ}$.⁶
  • Using the standard spherical trigonometry formula, $\cos(i) = \cos(lat) \times \sin(az)$ ²⁹, the calculation is: $\cos(i) = \cos(13.72^{\circ}) \times \sin(107^{\circ})$. This yields an inclination ($i$) of approximately $21.75^{\circ}$.
  • This independently calculated value is a near-perfect match for ISRO’s declared target inclination of $21.4^{\circ}$.⁶ This confirms the launch is a standard, direct-injection GTO insertion. It does not involve complex or non-standard “dogleg” maneuvers.
• Orbit Regime (Confidence: HIGH)
  • Inference: The satellite will be inserted into the declared Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO). It will then use its own onboard propulsion system to perform multiple apogee burns. These burns will circularize its orbit to a Geostationary (GSO) orbit at an altitude of approximately 35,786 km.
  • Rationale: Confidence is High. The LVM-3 is ISRO’s heavy-lift vehicle. It is specifically designed to place payloads of the ~4,000 kg class into GTO.⁷ The payload’s declared mass of 4,410 kg ⁶ is at the upper end of the LVM-3’s GTO capacity.²¹ The declared mission is also explicitly for geostationary communications.⁹ This combination of launch vehicle, payload mass, and declared mission is fully consistent with a standard GTO-to-GSO deployment profile.
• Primary Mission (Confidence: HIGH)
  • Inference: The primary mission is secure, next-generation Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) for the Indian Navy. The satellite will function as an encrypted, secure, and anti-jam communications relay. Its purpose is to provide “network-centric warfare capabilities” ⁸ by linking deployed warships, submarines, aircraft, and shore-based command centers.⁸
  • Inferred Location (Confidence: HIGH): The satellite will almost certainly be deployed to or near the $74^{\circ}$ East geostationary longitude slot. This is the current location of the GSAT-7 “Rukmini” satellite ³², which CMS-03 is designated to replace.⁸ Deploying to this slot ensures continuity of service for the Indian Navy’s existing ground, air, and maritime terminals.
  • Rationale: Confidence is High. The mission is explicitly stated by numerous official and independent sources.⁸ The operator (Indian Navy) ⁹, payload (anti-jam, multi-band) ⁴, and replacement target (GSAT-7) ⁸ are all unambiguous.
• Secondary Mission Potential (Confidence: LOW)
  • Inference: The payload’s advanced, multi-band hardware is plausibly dual-use. This would enable a non-declared secondary mission of geostationary Signals Intelligence (SIGINT / ELINT).
  • Rationale: Confidence is Low. This confidence level is based on political and operational factors, not on a lack of technical feasibility. There is no historical precedent or public evidence of India using its MILSATCOM assets for offensive, non-allied intelligence gathering.
  • Furthermore, such a secondary mission would face significant operational constraints. It would be forced to compete for power, transponder time, and ground-processing resources against its high-priority, declared MILSATCOM mission.
  • The payload does possess highly sensitive receivers across a wide Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum: UHF, S, C, Ku, and Ka bands.⁸ Its declared military capabilities, such as “anti-jamming” and “frequency hopping” ⁴, require a sophisticated RF front-end. This front-end must be capable of rapidly scanning, characterizing, and processing a wide spectrum of signals.
  • This hardware is inherently dual-use. It is ideal for a passive “listener” mission to collect and analyze foreign signals, such as Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) from radar and Communications Intelligence (COMINT) from communications.¹⁰
  • Geostationary orbit is a proven “high ground” for SIGINT. The U.S. pioneered this with programs like RHYOLITE ³⁵, and China currently uses it (e.g., Qianshao-3) to monitor the Indian Ocean.¹¹ This strategy of using geostationary orbit for persistent signals intelligence is a proven, high-value tactic employed by major space powers. This includes the U.S. (with past programs like RHYOLITE ³⁵ and MAGNUM ³⁶) and China (with its Qianshao-3 constellation).¹¹
  • A powerful strategic incentive exists for India to field a reciprocal SIGINT capability. This is particularly true given that China, India’s primary strategic competitor, is known to conduct such surveillance in this satellite’s exact operational area.
  • However, this low-confidence assessment must be tempered by significant operational challenges. The satellite’s primary MILSATCOM mission will compete for power and transponder time. This competition limits the resources available for a persistent, wide-area SIGINT collection mission. Furthermore, differentiating hostile or non-allied signals from the vast sea of commercial and civilian RF noise in its footprint is a massive data-processing challenge. This task requires a dedicated, sophisticated ground-processing infrastructure.

D. Worst-Case Uses Against U.S. Interests

The inferred GSO-based MILSATCOM/SIGINT platform has plausible (though not necessarily intended) applications. These could be directed against U.S. national security assets in the region.

1. Space-based Electronic Warfare: Uplink/Downlink Jamming

• What: The CMS-03 could repurpose its powerful, next-generation, steerable transponders (operating in C, Ku, and Ka bands) ⁴ for offensive Electronic Attack (EA) against U.S. or allied satellites.¹⁰
• How this orbit/payload enables it: From its highly probable $74^{\circ}$E geostationary slot, the satellite has a fixed, persistent, 24/7 line-of-sight. This view covers all other GEO satellites in its view and a wide-area ground footprint. That footprint includes the entire U.S. CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) and significant portions of INDOPACOM.⁴ Its high-power, high-bandwidth transponders could be directed to transmit noise instead of relaying data. This would “brute-force” jam the sensitive uplink receivers of a target U.S. satellite or the downlink receivers of U.S. ground terminals in-theater.¹⁰
• What U.S. system(s) could be affected: U.S. military communication satellites (e.g., WGS, MUOS). More plausibly, it could affect commercial satellites (e.g., Inmarsat, Viasat) leased by the U.S. Department of Defense for CENTCOM operations. This includes command and control (C2) of Unm unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), naval communications, and ground-force datalinks.
• Potential Mitigations: U.S. and allied assets can mitigate this threat through resilient architectures. One example is proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) constellations, which are less vulnerable to a single-point GEO jammer. Other measures include advanced signal processing (e.g., spread-spectrum, frequency hopping), on-board radiation hardening ³⁸, and the ability to rapidly geolocate the source of the jamming.
• Citation(s): The dual-use nature of high-power MILSATCOM transponders for electronic attack is a foundational element of modern Electronic Warfare (EW) doctrine.³⁷ Other nations, notably China, are also assessed to be developing GEO-based jamming capabilities, establishing this as a credible modern threat vector.³⁹

2. Geostationary Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Optimized for Maritime Domain Awareness

• What: The satellite could use its sensitive, multi-band receivers (especially in the UHF, S, and Ku bands) ⁸ for a persistent, wide-area SIGINT collection mission against U.S. naval and air assets.
• How this orbit/payload enables it: The geostationary orbit provides a 24/7 “stare” capability over the entire Indian Ocean.⁴ This area includes the critical U.S. naval and air base at Diego Garcia. Its receivers are specifically designed to pick up low-power naval signals (UHF) ⁸ and high-bandwidth datalinks (Ku/Ka).⁴ These capabilities are ideal for mapping the U.S. electronic order of battle (EOB) by intercepting radar emissions (ELINT) and communications (COMINT).⁴⁰
• What U.S. system(s) could be affected: U.S. Navy surface combatants and submarines operating from the 5th Fleet (CENTCOM) or 7th Fleet (INDOPACOM). It could also affect P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft and strategic bombers operating from Diego Garcia.
• Potential Mitigations: Counter-measures include strict emissions control (EMCON) protocols for naval and air assets in the satellite’s footprint. The most effective mitigation is the use of non-RF, line-of-sight communication methods, such as encrypted laser communications (LASERCOM). These methods are not vulnerable to RF interception.
• Citation(s): This is a classic intelligence mission. The U.S. pioneered GEO-based SIGINT with programs like RHYOLITE.³⁵ More significantly, China is currently deploying its own GEO SIGINT assets (e.g., Qianshao-3) to monitor this exact region ¹¹, confirming the strategic value and technical feasibility of this threat.

3. Dual-use “Debris Removal/OSAM” Tech Repurposable for Offensive Co-orbital Capability

• What: CMS-03 is not a Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) satellite. However, the launch provider (ISRO) is actively developing dual-use RPO and On-Orbit Servicing (OSAM) technologies. When paired with this rocket, these technologies create a future co-orbital “tug” or “inspector” threat.
• How this specific launch enables it: This launch is a capability demonstration. It proves ISRO’s LVM-3 rocket can reliably deliver a very heavy (4,410 kg) ⁶, complex military satellite directly to GTO for insertion into a precise GEO slot. This exact launch profile could be used in the future to deploy an Indian “servicer” satellite. That satellite could be equipped with patented “capturing mechanisms” and “robotic arms” ⁴² into a co-orbital position with a high-value U.S. asset.
• What U.S. system(s) could be affected: High-value, non-maneuverable, or single-point-of-failure U.S. national security assets in GEO. This includes missile warning (e.g., SBIRS) or signals intelligence (e.g., MENTOR/ORION) satellites. These assets could be inspected, jammed at close proximity, or physically relocated.⁴³
• Potential Mitigations: Mitigation relies heavily on enhanced Space Domain Awareness (SDA) to detect, track, and characterize any co-orbital object.⁴⁴ High-value U.S. assets could be assigned “keep-out” zones. These zones could be defended by on-board maneuver capability or protected by “bodyguard” satellites.
• Citation(s): India’s development of these technologies is confirmed. ISRO demonstrated RPO-related maneuvers in January 2025 ⁴⁵ and has announced plans for “catching satellites” with robotic arms.⁴² The dual-use nature of OSAM/RPO for offensive counterspace is a primary concern in authoritative international threat assessments.⁴⁶

E. Red Flags Checklist

• Secretive or mislabeled payload family with history of RPO/EW/ELINT?
  • [✗] Note: No. The GSAT/CMS family is India’s well-established, primary line of communication satellites.³² The payload’s military MILSATCOM mission is explicitly and publicly declared.¹
• Undeclared subsat/companion objects?
  • [✗] Note: No. All open-source reporting indicates the LVM-3 is dedicated to this single, heavy payload. This payload utilizes the rocket’s full GTO capacity.⁶
• GEO drift or plane suggesting proximity ops?
  • [✗] Note: Not applicable pre-launch. The satellite is expected to drift to the $74^{\circ}$E slot to replace its predecessor, GSAT-7.⁸ This is standard replacement procedure, not hostile proximity operations.
• LEO inclination & LTDN consistent with ISR over CONUS/test ranges?
  • [✗] Note: Not applicable. This is a GTO-to-GEO launch, not a LEO (Low Earth Orbit) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission.⁶ (LTDN: Local Time of Descending Node; CONUS: Continental United States)
• Defense org as operator or co-developer?
  • [✓] Note: Yes. This is a key indicator. The operator is explicitly the Indian Navy ⁸, and the project was funded directly by the Indian Ministry of Defence.²
• Collision-avoidance-like maneuvers shortly after deployment?
  • [✗] Note: Not applicable pre-launch. Standard GTO-to-GSO circularization burns are the only maneuvers expected.³¹ Any non-standard maneuvers (beyond the expected Two-Line Element set (TLEs) values) would be a major post-launch indicator.

F. Gaps and Next OSINT Monitoring (Next 72 Hours)

Key Information Gaps:

1. TLEs: No post-launch Two-Line Element sets (TLEs) or state vectors are available yet. These are needed to confirm orbital insertion accuracy.
2. Final Slot: The $74^{\circ}$E orbital slot is inferred based on its predecessor.³² It is not confirmed by ISRO for this specific mission.
3. Signal Structure: No pre-launch Radio Frequency (RF) signal plan or International Telecommunication Union (ITU) filings are available in the open source to baseline against.

OSINT Monitoring Plan (Next 0-72 hours):

• 1. TLE / State Vector Monitoring:
  • Action: Continuously monitor the U.S. Space Force’s public catalog via Space-Track.org ⁵⁰ and its distributor CelesTrak.⁵² The goal is to find the first TLEs for the payload (CMS-03) and the LVM-3 rocket body (upper stage).
  • Purpose: To independently verify that the GTO insertion parameters (perigee, apogee, inclination) match ISRO’s declared 170 km x 29,970 km x $21.4^{\circ}$ orbit.⁶ Any significant deviation would be a major anomaly.
• 2. Optical Sighting and GEO Drift Monitoring:
  • Action: Monitor the amateur and professional optical tracking community (e.g., SeeSat) for ground-based sightings.
  • Purpose: To confirm the satellite is stable (not tumbling). This tracking will also follow its subsequent apogee-raising burns. Observers will calculate its “drift rate” to predict its final geostationary longitude. This will confirm or deny the $74^{\circ}$E inference.⁵⁴
• 3. RF Signal Monitoring:
  • Action: Monitor the amateur radio (ham) and satellite-tracking communities. Look for detection of the satellite’s initial “beacon of health” and subsequent telemetry/communications transmissions.⁵⁶
  • Purpose: To confirm the payload is alive (“aliveness check”). This also begins a baseline characterization of its signal structure in the declared C, Ku, and Ka bands.⁴

G. Analyst Recommendations

Based on this assessment, we provide the following recommendations for U.S. and allied stakeholders:

1. Enhance Bilateral Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Cooperation: The U.S. should prioritize and expand joint U.S.-India SSA initiatives. Examples include the INDUS-X space situational awareness challenge ⁴⁴ and participation in exercises like Global Sentinel. This approach builds trust. It also provides a cooperative framework for monitoring a crowded domain, including the geostationary belt.
2. Utilize Diplomatic Channels for Norms and Transparency: Leverage existing dialogues. These include the U.S.-India Advanced Domains Defense Dialogue and the 2+2 Ministerial. Use these channels to promote norms of responsible behavior for dual-use technologies. Encourage India to participate in transparency measures. This will mitigate the risk of miscalculation regarding its “strategic autonomy” posture.¹²
3. Harden and Diversify U.S. Assets: U.S. Space Command should assume that the RF environment in the CENTCOM and INDOPACOM AORs is persistently monitored. U.S. and allied military/commercial assets in the region should be assessed for vulnerabilities. This includes vulnerabilities to the specific C, Ku, and Ka-band jamming/SIGINT capabilities of this platform. Resilience should be enhanced through proliferation (e.g., pLEO) and hardening.³⁸
4. Deepen Commercial and Civil Engagement: Continue to foster commercial and civil space partnerships. These are outlined in the 2023 Joint Statement and India’s Space Policy. Joint civil missions (like the upcoming NISAR launch ¹²) and commercial industry collaboration create interdependence. They also provide valuable, non-confrontational channels for engagement, strengthening the U.S.-India strategic partnership.

H. Conclusion

The 2 November 2025 launch of CMS-03 (GSAT-7R) is a high-confidence, unambiguous step forward in India’s military space program. It provides a state-of-the-art MILSATCOM capability for the Indian Navy.⁸

While its primary mission is regional maritime security, its advanced, multi-band RF-payload hardware is emblematic of a global trend. This trend shows high-power communication satellites are inherently dual-use. They possess a latent capability for Signals Intelligence or Electronic Warfare.¹⁰

We must view this launch alongside India’s separate development of RPO and OSAM technologies.⁴² This combination underscores the nation’s rising status as a major space power.

For U.S. and allied interests, this launch highlights the complex nature of the U.S.-India strategic partnership. India is simultaneously a key partner in the Indo-Pacific and a technologically sophisticated, independent actor. It is an actor pursuing strategic autonomy in the space domain.¹²

I. Glossary of Key Terms

• AOR: Area of Responsibility
• ASAT: Anti-Satellite (weapon)
• C2: Command and Control
• CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command
• COMINT: Communications Intelligence
• CONUS: Continental United States
• ELINT: Electronic Intelligence
• EOB: Electronic Order of Battle
• EW: Electronic Warfare
• GSO: Geostationary Orbit
• GTO: Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit
• INDOPACOM: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
• IOR: Indian Ocean Region
• ISRO: Indian Space Research Organisation
• ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
• IST: India Standard Time
• ITU: International Telecommunication Union
• LEO: Low Earth Orbit
• LTDN: Local Time of Descending Node
• LVM-3: Launch Vehicle Mark-3
• MILSATCOM: Military Satellite Communications
• NOTAM: Notice to Airmen
• OSAM: On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing
• OSINT: Open Source Intelligence
• pLEO: proliferated Low Earth Orbit
• RF: Radio Frequency
• RPO: Rendezvous and Proximity Operations
• SDSC: Satish Dhawan Space Centre
• SIGINT: Signals Intelligence
• SLP: Second Launch Pad
• SSA: Space Situational Awareness
• TLEs: Two-Line Element sets
• UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
• UTC: Coordinated Universal Time

J. Long-Term Outlook and Strategic Implications

Beyond the immediate 72-hour monitoring window, the launch of CMS-03 fits into a broader, long-term strategic trend. India’s space program is in a new era. It is shifting from its historic focus on civil applications and regional services. It is now becoming a key pillar of its national security and “strategic autonomy”. This launch confirms India’s reliable heavy-lift capability. This capability is a prerequisite for a robust, independent geostationary and deep-space program.⁷

The more significant long-term implication is a convergence. This launch capability is converging with India’s separate, public development of dual-use On-Orbit Servicing (OSAM) and Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) technologies.⁴²

This specific satellite is a passive communications platform. However, the ability to launch heavy, complex payloads to GEO is the same capability needed for a different purpose. It could be used to deploy a future “inspector” or “servicer” satellite. Such a satellite could have offensive counterspace applications.⁴³

This trajectory solidifies a multi-polar space environment. For the United States, India is neither a full ally nor an adversary in space. It is a selective, pragmatic partner.

India collaborates deeply in areas of mutual interest (e.g., the Quad, civil science missions, commercial industry). Simultaneously, it develops independent capabilities (like Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons ¹²) and diverges on key international norms (like ASAT testing bans and UN rules).¹²

The long-term challenge for the U.S. will be managing this “frenemy” dynamic. This will require continuing to leverage cooperation for mutual benefit. At the same time, the U.S. must hedge against India’s independent and potentially disruptive strategic capabilities.

Works Cited

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