A Fragile Arsenal: An Investigation into Systemic Risk in the U.S. Munitions Industrial Base

Executive Summary

This report analyzes critical risks within the U.S. munitions industrial base. The analysis stems from specific allegations from a senior industry insider.

The investigation reveals a pattern of concentrated risk at Accurate Energetic Systems (AES). The company has shifted its business model to a multi-tenant “explosives manufacturing hub.” This model appears to violate fundamental Department of War (DoW) safety principles for explosive separation distances.¹ Further allegations point to hazardous material handling processes and questionable supply chain practices that heighten this risk.

A latent catastrophic hazard also exists at Aerojet’s Camden facility. There is a potential for a Deflagration-to-Detonation Transition (DDT). A DDT is a rapid combustion event that escalates into a supersonic explosion.² The facility’s buildings are allegedly not designed to withstand such an event.

Credible allegations of systemic incompetence and ethical lapses within the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) compound these site-specific issues. This suggests a critical failure in the oversight mechanisms designed to prevent such risks.

This confluence of factors points to a fragile ecosystem. Production pressures, supply chain vulnerabilities, and compromised oversight create interconnected and amplified risks. These risks threaten personnel, mission assurance, and national security.

Table 1: Summary of Key Allegations and Corroborating Evidence

Allegation	Corroborating Evidence	Contradictory Evidence / Context
AES “Explosives Hub” Violates Safety Rules: AES operates as a multi-tenant hub, violating DoW safety distance requirements (Inhabited Building Distance).	* AES leases buildings to other companies (e.g., Rio Ammunition in 2014).³ * DoW Manual 4145.26-M mandates specific, large separation distances between non-associated explosives operations.⁴, ⁵	AES publicly advertises its facilities and claims compliance with DoW 4145.26-M.⁶ However, it does not publicly detail its multi-tenant safety plan.

| Hazardous RDX/HMX Drying Process: AES uses a primitive, manual process for drying wet RDX/HMX, creating a severe electrostatic discharge (ESD) risk. | * A 2019 TOSHA complaint confirms prior safety issues with hazardous materials handling.⁷

* The description of a “steam heated plywood building” and unreliable “leg stats” is inconsistent with modern ESD safety protocols. | Historical documents on Holston AAP, the source of the material, detail highly industrialized processes. The alleged manual method at AES would be a significant regression in safety.⁸, ⁹ No public documentation confirms the specific drying process.

Questionable TNT Sourcing: AES sources TNT from questionable foreign suppliers and relabels it as new, AES-manufactured material. * The U.S. has a documented strategic TNT shortage and no domestic production.¹⁰, ¹¹

* AES openly advertises its “Global Sourcing” capabilities for explosives.¹² Public import records are inconclusive regarding AES’s specific TNT consignments.¹³ The practice, while raising quality control concerns, may be a necessary workaround to meet urgent DoW demand.

Aerojet Latent Detonation Risk: Aerojet’s Camden facility has a latent risk of a DDT in buildings not designed for a detonation event. | * Scientific literature confirms DDT is a known risk in solid propellants, especially if imperfections are present.¹⁴, ¹⁵

* A “willful” OSHA violation at Aerojet’s Orlando plant for improper explosives handling suggests potential systemic process safety issues.¹⁶, ¹⁷ | Aerojet’s Camden facility has received public safety awards for achieving one million work-hours without a lost-time injury.¹⁸ However, such awards do not necessarily reflect robust process safety management for high-consequence events. |

| DCMA Oversight Failures: DCMA’s Contract Safety Group is compromised by incompetence, ethical lapses, and whistleblower retaliation. | * Named individuals (Lupone, Tluchowski) held the leadership positions described.¹⁹, ²⁰

* Provided contact information for the Contract Safety Group matches official DCMA directories.²⁰ | DCMA’s official mission is to be the “independent eyes and ears of DoW”.²¹ The allegations come from a single source and coincide with a major, agency-wide reorganization (“Vision 2026”) that may have created internal friction.²² |

Section 1: Accurate Energetic Systems (AES) – A Case Study in Concentrated Industrial Base Risk

This section examines the operational model and safety culture at Accurate Energetic Systems. Based on insider testimony, it analyzes how the company’s ambition to become an “explosives manufacturing hub” may directly contravene foundational DoW safety regulations. By re-evaluating past incidents and analyzing specific high-hazard processes, this section builds a case that commercial incentives are creating concentrated and unmitigated risks.

1.1 The Explosive Manufacturing Hub: A Violation of Foundational Safety Principles

New information suggests Accurate Energetic Systems (AES) is transforming its campus in McEwen, Tennessee, into a multi-tenant “explosives manufacturing hub.”²³, ²⁴ This business model involves renting buildings to various contractors for both DoW and commercial production. This practice creates a complex and concentrated risk environment.

Specific examples of this co-location include:

A former break house repurposed for a DoW contractor’s detonation cord repackaging operation.
A new building to support a Dynetics program assembling the GBU-69/B Small Glide Munition (SGM).²⁵, ²⁶

This arrangement appears to directly conflict with foundational safety principles mandated by the Department of War.

The core of explosives safety is the principle of Quantity-Distance (QD). QD standards dictate the minimum separation distances between an explosives site and its surroundings.²⁷ These rules are designed to prevent sympathetic detonation and protect personnel.

A key component of QD is the Inhabited Building Distance (IBD). IBD is the separation required to protect people in non-associated buildings from hazardous blast overpressure and fragments.⁵, ²⁸

These requirements are codified in DoW 4145.26-M, the DoW Contractor’s Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives. This document is contractually binding on all DoW contractors, and AES publicly claims adherence to it.⁶, ²⁹

Under this regulation, a building leased to a separate, independent contractor is considered an “inhabited building.”³⁰ This requires the application of the much more stringent IBD. It prohibits using the smaller Intraline Distance (ILD) meant for operations under a single, unified safety program.

The allegation that the AES campus is “not large enough to provide the protections required” is technically sound. For example, the IBD for just 100 pounds of Hazard Division 1.1 explosives is 1,250 feet.⁵ Required distances can expand to a mile or more as quantities increase. It is highly improbable that a 1,300-acre site could safely accommodate multiple, independent energetic operations while maintaining the required IBD between them.

Visualizing the “Explosives Hub” Risk

The diagram below illustrates the potential safety violation. Under DoW rules, the distance between two independent contractors (Tenant A and Tenant B) on the same site should be the much larger Inhabited Building Distance (IBD), not the smaller Intraline Distance (ILD) used within a single company’s operations.
|---------------------| |---------------------|
| AES Building 1 | | AES Building 2 |
| (Operated by AES) | <-----> | (Operated by AES) |
|---------------------| ILD |---------------------|

        ^
|
|
IBD - Potentially Violated
|
|
        v

|---------------------| |---------------------|
| Tenant Building A | <-----> | Tenant Building B |
| (e.g., Det-Cord Op) | IBD | (e.g., Dynetics SGM)|
|---------------------| |---------------------|

This business model represents a fundamental conflict between commercial incentives and military safety imperatives. By treating adjacent, independent contractors as if they were part of a single operation, the company may be structurally violating DoW safety regulations. This suggests either a profound misunderstanding of the rules or a deliberate disregard for them, enabled by a failure of government oversight.

The direct implication is the creation of a single point of failure for multiple, unrelated DoW programs. An accident in a commercial demolition charge line could trigger a cascading disaster. Such an event could halt production or destroy the assembly line for a critical precision-guided munition like the Dynetics SGM.

Table 2: DoW 4145.26-M IBD Requirements vs. Alleged AES Campus Configuration

Operation	Hazard Division / Net Explosive Weight (NEW)	Required IBD (Barricaded)	Analysis
Det-cord Repackaging	HD 1.1 (e.g., 500 lbs NEW)	1,250 ft	Co-locating multiple independent explosives operations on a 1,300-acre campus makes adherence to IBD requirements between each tenant highly challenging. The required separation distances for even moderate amounts of explosives can quickly consume the available real estate. This suggests the alleged “hub” model is inherently non-compliant and creates a significant risk of a cascading, multi-facility event.
SGM (GBU-69/B) Assembly	HD 1.2.1 (e.g., 100 units x 36 lbs = 3,600 lbs NEW)	1,200 ft

Note: Hazard Divisions and NEW are illustrative estimates. IBD values are derived from tables in DoW 4145.26-M.⁵ The SGM warhead is 36 lbs.²⁵

1.2 A Pattern of Incidents: Re-evaluating the 2014 and 2019 Safety Lapses

The operational model at AES must be viewed in the context of its safety history.

In April 2014, an explosion occurred in a building on the AES complex leased to Rio Ammunition. The incident resulted in one fatality and three injuries.³¹, ³² The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) ruled the event an accidental industrial explosion.³³ New information provides a more specific cause. A worker performing maintenance allegedly used a power drill on a powder feed line, igniting smokeless powder. This detail reframes the incident from a generic accident to a specific failure of maintenance safety procedures. The clarification that AES owned the building but had no oversight of Rio’s equipment underscores the risks of the multi-tenant model.³

More recently, in 2019, the Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration (TOSHA) cited AES for “serious” health violations.⁷ The violations related to exposing employees to hazardous chemicals, including the high explosive RDX.³⁴ The new information connects this citation to a “former break house.” This same building was subsequently repurposed into a detonation cord repackaging operation for a DoW contract. This suggests a pattern of converting facilities with documented safety deficiencies into new, high-hazard production areas.

1.3 High-Hazard Processes: The RDX/HMX Drying Operation

Following the 2019 TOSHA complaint, AES reportedly constructed a new drying facility. The facility was for wet RDX and HMX sourced from the Holston Army Ammunition Plant.³⁵, ³⁶ The description of this process raises profound safety concerns, particularly the risk of a catastrophic electrostatic discharge (ESD) event.

The process is described as entirely manual. It involves workers scooping wet explosive material onto a screen, placing it on bakery racks, and wheeling it into a steam-heated plywood building. This procedure deviates sharply from modern explosives safety standards. Manual handling of sensitive high explosives is a significant generator of static electricity.

The described method for personnel grounding—the use of “leg stats”—is notoriously unreliable and inadequate for this level of hazard. The stated lack of readily available conductive, waterproof boots is a critical failure in providing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE).

Most alarmingly, the use of a “plywood building” for this operation is fundamentally unsafe. Wood is a non-conductive, static-generating material. Standard industry practice mandates purpose-built facilities with grounded conductive flooring, strict humidity controls, and comprehensive ESD mitigation systems.⁸ The described operation is more reminiscent of WWII-era production methods than a modern, compliant facility.⁸, ³⁷

The 2019 TOSHA fine was for chemical exposure. The company’s response appears to have “solved” that hazard by introducing a far more acute ignition hazard. This suggests a reactive and dangerously superficial safety culture. Specific citations are addressed without a comprehensive understanding of process safety, leading to the substitution of one risk for another.

Section 2: AES Supply Chain Integrity and Corporate Governance

This section investigates the corporate practices of AES. It focuses on allegations of questionable supply chain activities and the nature of its leadership. The analysis explores the plausibility of claims that AES re-brands foreign-sourced explosives, a practice made more likely by the current global TNT shortage. It also examines the influence of AES leadership within the broader explosives industry, highlighting potential conflicts of interest.

2.1 Strategic Material Provenance and the Global TNT Shortage

A significant allegation concerns AES’s business specialty. The company allegedly sources bulk explosives like TNT from global manufacturers, performs minor processing, and then relabels the material as “new” on Ammunition Data Cards.³⁸ The insider specifically questions the provenance of AES’s TNT, speculating it is sourced from developing nations and reboxed to obscure its origin.

This claim is highly plausible in the current geopolitical and industrial context. The United States has not produced TNT domestically for decades and is entirely dependent on foreign sources.¹¹, ³⁹ The conflict in Ukraine has dramatically tightened the global supply. The Pentagon’s primary supplier, a Nammo-Talley plant in Poland, is now at capacity and prioritizing deliveries to Ukraine.¹⁰ This disruption has created a severe supply-demand imbalance, causing prices to increase fourfold.¹⁰

This market environment creates a powerful incentive for a company specializing in “Global Sourcing” to procure materials from non-traditional suppliers. AES’s own website advertises its logistics capabilities, stating, “We can assist with sourcing explosives or hazardous goods from international manufacturers”.¹² The practice of re-characterizing foreign-made material as “new” and of U.S. origin is a serious charge. It could mask critical variations in purity and stability, introducing unquantified risks into the U.S. military’s munitions stockpile.

2.2 Leadership, Ownership, and Industry Influence

John Sonday is the central figure at AES, with public records confirming his role as President.²³, ⁴⁰, ⁴¹ His leadership is linked to the firm’s specialty in global sourcing.¹², ⁴² The company is a privately held, SBA-certified Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB), a designation that provides preferential access to government contracts.⁴³

Available information does not detail the corporate board of AES, LLC. However, it shows that AES leadership is deeply integrated into the governance of the Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME), the primary industry trade and safety association.⁴⁴

AES CEO Wendell Stinson sits on the IME’s main board.⁴⁵
Other AES managers serve on its safety and compliance committees.⁴⁶

This indicates AES is a key influencer in the industry body that helps shape safety standards.

This combination of factors creates a complex dynamic. A company potentially engaged in high-risk supply chain practices also holds a position of influence over the standards that govern those practices. This presents a potential conflict of interest. It provides a veneer of legitimacy and creates a mechanism through which deviations from safety and quality norms could be institutionalized.

Section 3: Latent Catastrophic Risk at Aerojet’s Camden Facility

This section shifts focus to Aerojet Rocketdyne. It analyzes a highly specific technical risk at its Camden, Arkansas facility. The section explains the science behind a potential Deflagration-to-Detonation Transition (DDT) during solid rocket motor manufacturing. It also assesses the credibility of the claim that the facility is not designed to withstand such an event. This technical analysis is contextualized by examining Aerojet’s broader corporate safety culture, weighing public accolades against a record of serious regulatory violations.

3.1 The Deflagration-to-Detonation Transition (DDT) Threat in Solid Rocket Motor Casting

Serious concerns have been raised about process safety at the Aerojet Rocketdyne facility in Camden, Arkansas. An insider alleges a “distinct possibility” that an accidental ignition during the casting of solid rocket motor propellant could undergo a Deflagration-to-Detonation Transition (DDT). The production buildings are allegedly not designed for such an event. This claim points to a latent catastrophic hazard.

What is DDT?

A deflagration is a subsonic combustion event—a very rapid fire.

A detonation is a supersonic explosion driven by a shock wave, releasing energy almost instantaneously with far greater destructive power.⁴⁷

DDT is the hazardous phenomenon where a deflagration, under specific conditions, accelerates and violently transforms into a detonation.²

Scientific literature confirms that a perfectly cast, void-free solid propellant is highly unlikely to undergo DDT from burning alone. However, the risk increases dramatically if the propellant is porous, damaged, or fragmented.¹⁵ This casting process—where a viscous propellant mixture is poured into a motor case to cure—is a critical phase where voids or cracks can be introduced.⁴⁸ An accidental ignition during this phase could cause the material to behave more like a porous charge, significantly elevating the risk of a DDT event.¹⁵

The allegation that the buildings are designed only for deflagrations is the crux of the issue.

A facility designed for a deflagration hazard typically has features like blowout panels to safely vent pressure.⁴⁹
A facility rated for a detonation hazard requires immense structural reinforcement and must be sited with a much larger quantity-distance separation arc.⁴⁹

If a DDT event were to occur in a building designed only for deflagration, it would catastrophically exceed the facility’s design limits. This would lead to total destruction and a high probability of fatalities.

3.2 Assessing Aerojet’s Corporate Safety Culture

The allegation that “Aerojet loves to skate the rules” contrasts with the company’s public safety record. The Camden facility, for example, received the National Safety Council’s “Million Work-Hours Award” in 2010.¹⁸, ⁵⁰

However, a history of high-consequence incidents challenges this positive image. In 2008, a worker was killed in a rocket motor explosion at the Camden plant.⁵¹, ⁵² More recently, in 2024, OSHA fined Aerojet’s Orlando facility $262,451 for one “willful” and six “serious” violations after a fire severely burned multiple employees.¹⁶, ¹⁷

The “willful” violation is particularly significant. This classification indicates the employer either knowingly failed to comply with a legal requirement or acted with plain indifference to employee safety. This incident lends substantial weight to the insider’s claim of a culture that “skates the rules.” It suggests that positive metrics based on occupational safety (like slips and falls) may be masking deep-seated failures in process safety (preventing catastrophic explosions).

This points to a potentially bifurcated safety culture. The company may succeed in managing high-frequency, low-consequence incidents. However, it may be failing to invest the necessary rigor to prevent low-probability, high-consequence events. This can create a dangerous illusion of safety, where management can point to awards while critical, latent failures remain unaddressed.

Section 4: An Inquiry into Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Oversight

This section scrutinizes the government body responsible for ensuring contractor safety: the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). It examines specific allegations of incompetence and unprofessional conduct within the agency’s Contract Safety Group. By analyzing these claims, this section questions whether the primary oversight mechanism for the munitions industrial base is fundamentally compromised, thereby enabling the risks identified at contractor facilities to persist.

4.1 Competence and Conduct within the Contract Safety Group

Effective contractor safety programs depend on rigorous and independent government oversight. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is tasked with this responsibility, serving as the “independent eyes and ears” for contract administration and safety compliance.²¹, ⁵³ However, severe allegations have been made regarding the competence and conduct of this group.

An insider has characterized DCMA’s technical directorate as a “dumping ground for clueless ex-military.” The source singled out two leaders for criticism:

Matthew Lupone, who served as DCMA’s Technical Director from June 2020 to July 2022, is identified as a “problem”.¹⁹, ⁵⁴
Mike “T-9” Tluchowski, identified as the Director of the Contract Safety Group, is described as “worse.” Contact information provided for Tluchowski aligns with official DCMA directories, confirming his office.²⁰

Beyond incompetence, the source describes a culture of unprofessionalism and ethical lapses. The insider claims to have been “forced into retirement” after complaining about a “lack of documentation of technical direction after sitting through one of their late night drinking parties.” This points to a breakdown of professional conduct at the leadership level. It suggests that critical oversight decisions may be made in an ad-hoc, undocumented manner.

Table 3: DCMA Personnel Named in Allegations

Name	Title/Role	Tenure in Role	Summary of Allegation(s)
Matthew Lupone	DCMA Technical Director	June 2020 – July 2022 ¹⁹, ⁵⁵	Identified as a “problem” within a directorate described as a “dumping ground for clueless ex-military.”
Mike “T-9” Tluchowski	Director, Contract Safety Group ²⁰	Ongoing (presumed)	Described as “worse” than Lupone. Associated with a culture of unprofessionalism and a lack of formal documentation for technical direction. Allegedly involved in the forced retirement of the source.

4.2 Systemic Barriers to Accountability and Whistleblower Protection

The source’s claim of being “forced into retirement” for demanding proper documentation suggests potential whistleblower retaliation. An effective safety organization must have protected channels for experts to raise concerns without fear of reprisal. A culture where a senior expert is pushed out for insisting on a formal, auditable record is fundamentally broken.

Such a culture directly undermines DCMA’s mission. If technical direction is not documented and expert opinions are suppressed, the agency loses its ability to enforce safety requirements like DoW 4145.26-M. Oversight becomes a “rubber stamp” exercise. This creates a direct causal link between the alleged failures at DCMA and the unmitigated risks at facilities like AES and Aerojet.

This pattern is suggestive of “regulatory capture.” This phenomenon occurs when an oversight body becomes subservient to the interests of the industry it regulates. The preference for undocumented, informal agreements over formal, auditable direction serves both the contractor and the DCMA official by reducing conflict and administrative burden. The result is an oversight agency that is no longer an independent auditor but a complicit partner.

Section 5: Synthesis of Findings

This final section synthesizes the report’s findings into a holistic view of the munitions industrial base as a fragile ecosystem. It demonstrates how production pressures, supply chain weaknesses, and oversight failures are not isolated issues but interconnected risks that amplify one another.

5.1 A Fragile Ecosystem: Interconnected Risks in the Munitions Industrial Base

The deficiencies at AES, Aerojet, and DCMA are not isolated problems. They are interconnected symptoms of a systemic fragility within the U.S. munitions industrial base. Production pressures, supply chain vulnerabilities, and oversight failures create a cascade of escalating risk.

The strategic shortage of TNT, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, creates immense production pressure.¹⁰, ¹¹ This pressure drives behaviors like AES’s alleged high-risk global sourcing and its use of hazardous drying processes. Simultaneously, AES’s “explosives hub” model concentrates risk by co-locating multiple critical DoW and commercial programs, like the Dynetics Small Glide Bomb, in a configuration that appears to violate the safety principle of dispersal.²⁶ This creates a single point of failure where an accident in one production line could have a cascading effect on unrelated national security programs.

The oversight of DCMA is supposed to buttress this entire fragile structure. However, the allegations of incompetence, ethical lapses, and whistleblower retaliation suggest this critical backstop has failed. A functional oversight body would have immediately identified and halted the IBD violations at AES and the hazardous RDX drying process. A vigilant DCMA would scrutinize Aerojet’s process safety management. The alleged failure of this oversight mechanism allows all other risks to fester and grow.

Glossary of Key Terms

Deflagration-to-Detonation Transition (DDT): A hazardous phenomenon where a subsonic combustion event (a rapid fire) accelerates and violently transforms into a supersonic explosion (a detonation) driven by a shock wave.²
Electrostatic Discharge (ESD): A sudden flow of electricity between two objects, often seen as a spark. It is a critical ignition hazard in environments with explosive materials.
Inhabited Building Distance (IBD): A key component of Quantity-Distance rules, it is the minimum required separation between an explosives site and a non-associated occupied building to protect personnel from blast and fragment hazards.²⁷
Quantity-Distance (QD): A foundational set of safety principles that uses the amount (quantity) of explosives to calculate the safe separation distances required to prevent propagation of an explosion.²⁸
Willful Violation (OSHA): A violation classification used by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration when an employer either knowingly failed to comply with a legal requirement or acted with plain indifference to employee safety.¹⁶

Works Cited

U.S. Department of War. “DoW 4145.26-M DoW Contractor’s Safety Manual For Ammunition and Explosives, with Change 2.” WBDG – Whole Building Design Guide. March 13, 2008. https://www.wbdg.org/dod/dod-manuals/dod-414526-m
Wikipedia. “Deflagration to detonation transition.” Accessed October 15, 2025.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deflagration_to_detonation_transition)
Wikipedia. “2025 Tennessee manufacturing plant explosion.” Accessed October 15, 2025.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Tennessee_manufacturing_plant_explosion)
U.S. Department of War. “DoW Manual 4145.26-M, Change 2.” WBDG – Whole Building Design Guide. August 31, 2018.(https://www.wbdg.org/FFC/DOD/DODMAN/414526m_c2.pdf)
U.S. Department of War. “Table AP2.T1. HD 1.1 IBD and PTRD.” DoW Manual 4145.26-M, Change 2. August 31, 2018.(https://www.wbdg.org/FFC/DOD/DODMAN/414526m_c2.pdf)
Accurate Energetic Systems, LLC. “Home Page.” 2025. https://www.aesys.biz/
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. “Inspection: 1395197.015 – Accurate Energetic Systems, Llc.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=1395197.015
Hess, Jeffrey A. “Holston Army Ammunition Plant, RDX-and-Composition-B Manufacturing Line 9.” Historic American Engineering Record, National Park Service. April 1986. https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/master/pnp/habshaer/tn/tn0200/tn0249/data/tn0249data.pdf
New South Associates. “The World War II Ordnance Department’s Government-Owned Contractor-Operated (GOCO) Industrial Facilities: Holston Ordnance Works.” Defense Technical Information Center. October 1995.(https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315291.pdf)
Global Ordnance. “Shell Game: The Worldwide TNT Shortage.” The War Zone. September 1, 2025. https://www.twz.com/land/shell-game-the-worldwide-tnt-shortage
Voennoe Delo. “US Faces TNT Shortage, Plans New Explosives Plant by 2028.” September 1, 2025. https://voennoedelo.com/en/posts/id735-us-faces-tnt-shortage-plans-new-explosives-plant-by-2028
Accurate Energetic Systems, LLC. “Logistics.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.aesys.biz/logistics
Volza. “Trinitrotoluene Import Data.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.volza.com/p/trinitrotoluene/import/
Bernecker, R.R. “The Deflagration-to-Detonation Transition Process for High-Energy Propellants—A Review.” AIAA. 1991. https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/pdf/10.2514/3.9226
Butler, P.B. et al. “Analysis of Deflagration to Shock to Detonation Transition in High-Energy Propellants.” Defense Technical Information Center. July 1984.(https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA144469.pdf)
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. “US Department of Labor cites Orlando aerospace facility for safety, health failures after fire injures workers.” July 8, 2025. https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/atlanta/20250708
Plant Services. “Industrial safety roundup: OSHA fines Aerojet Rocketdyne, Keystone Food, and Brazilian Stone Design.” July 21, 2025. https://www.plantservices.com/industry-news/news/55303700/industrial-safety-roundup-osha-fines-aerojet-rocketdyne-keystone-food-and-brazilian-stone-design
Manufacturing.net. “Aerojet’s Camden Facility Earns National Safety Council’s ‘Million Work-Hours Award’.” August 3, 2010. https://www.manufacturing.net/home/news/13079631/aerojets-camden-facility-earns-national-safety-councils-million-workhours-award
DCMA Public Affairs. “Technical Director leaves legacy.” Defense Contract Management Agency. July 21, 2022. https://www.dcma.mil/News/Article-View/Article/3115447/total-force-delivers-comprehensive-leadership-development-resource/
Defense Contract Management Agency. “Contact Us.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.dcma.mil/About/Contact-Us/
Defense Contract Management Agency. “About DCMA.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.dcma.mil/About-Us/
Tremblay, Patrick. “Vision 2026, ‘structure by choice’.” Defense Contract Management Agency. October 13, 2023. https://www.dcma.mil/News/Article-View/Article/3539476/vision-2026-structure-by-choice/
Association of the United States Army. “Accurate Energetic Systems, LLC.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.ausa.org/sponsors/accurate-energetic-systems-llc
Accurate Energetic Systems, LLC. “Markets.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.aesys.biz/markets
Designation-Systems.net. “Dynetics GBU-69/B SGM.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app5/sgm.html
Air & Space Forces Magazine. “GBU-69 Small Glide Munition.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/weapons-platforms/gbu-69-small-glide-munition/
California Code of Regulations. “Title 8, Section 5252. Quantity and Distances Table for the Storage of Explosives.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.dir.ca.gov/title8/5252.html
NASA. “Safety Standard for Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics.” NASA Technical Standards System. April 2019.(https://standards.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/standards/NASA/A/2/nasa-std-871912a_with_change_2.pdf)
U.S. Department of War. “DoW 4145.26-M DoW Contractor’s Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives.” Defense Acquisition University. Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.dau.edu/dod-414526-m-dod-contractors-safety-manual-ammunition-and-explosives
DDESB. “Guidance for Required Explosives Safety Submissions.” Defense Explosives Safety Board Technical Paper 26. January 30, 2014. https://www.denix.osd.mil/ddes/ddes-technical-papers/ddes-technical-papers/tp-26-guidance-for-required-explosives-safety-submissions
CBS News. “1 dead after blast, fire in Tenn. ammo, explosives plant.” April 17, 2014. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/1-dead-after-blast-fire-in-tenn-ammo-explosives-plant/
SMS Legal. “1 Killed, 3 Injured In Explosion At Ammunition Plant.” April 17, 2014. https://www.smslegal.com/blog/1-killed-3-injured-in-explosion-at-ammunition-plant/
WBIR Staff. “Investigators rule deadly middle TN factory explosion accidental.” WBIR.com. April 19, 2014. https://www.wbir.com/article/news/investigators-rule-deadly-middle-tn-factory-explosion-accidental/51-312202894
The Washington Post. “Blast at Tennessee military explosives facility leaves 19 missing, some dead.” October 10, 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2025/10/10/tennessee-explosion-accurate-energetic-systems/
U.S. Army. “Holston Army Ammunition Plant (HSAAP) Fact Sheet.” U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command. Accessed October 15, 2025.(https://www.jmc.army.mil/Images/JMC_Photos/Resources/HSAAP_FactSheet.pdf)
Wikipedia. “Holston Army Ammunition Plant.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holston_Army_Ammunition_Plant
Wikipedia. “RDX.” Accessed October 15, 2025.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDX)
Australian Government Department of Defence. “Characterisation of a New Donor for the Large Scale Gap Test.” Defence Science and Technology Organisation. November 2013.(https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DSTO-TN-1172.pdf)
Institute of Makers of Explosives. “High Explosives.” 2025 IME Federal Legislative & Regulatory Priorities. 2025. https://ime.org/aws/IME/asset_manager/get_file/897701?ver=5
Tennessee Department of Environment & Conservation. “Change to Monthly Bacteriological Monitoring.” February 4, 2019.(https://dataviewers.tdec.tn.gov/dataviewers/BGWPC.GET_WPC_DOCUMENTS?p_file=713872928404313507)
Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development. “Governor Lee, Commissioner Rolfe Announce AES to Expand in McEwen.” February 24, 2020. https://www.tn.gov/ecd/news/2020/2/24/governor-lee–commissioner-rolfe-announce-aes-to-expand-in-mcewen.html
Accurate Energetic Systems, LLC. “Services.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://www.aesys.biz/services
Accurate Energetic Systems, LLC. “Accurate Energetic Systems, LLC.” Institute of Makers of Explosives. Accessed October 15, 2025.(https://www.ime.org/aws/IME/pt/sd/news_article/492125/_PARENT/layout_details/false)
Institute of Makers of Explosives. “About IME.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://ime.org/
Institute of Makers of Explosives. “Board of Governors.” Accessed October 15, 2025. https://ime.org/aws/IME/pt/sp/board_of_governors
Institute of Makers of Explosives. “Safety, Health & Environmental Affairs Committee.” Accessed October 15, 2025.(https://ime.org/aws/IME/directory/user_run?group=15449&size=0&submit=Search)
Wikipedia. “Detonation.” Accessed October 15, 2025.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Detonation)
Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality. “Permit #: 0617-AOP-R12.” Accessed October 15, 2025.(https://www.adeq.state.ar.us/downloads/WebDatabases/PermitsOnline/Air/0617-AOP-R12.pdf)
Defense Technical Information Center. “Hazards of Chemical Rockets and Propellants Handbook Volume II.” CPIA Publication No. 194. May 1970.(https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD0870258.pdf)
Aerojet Rocketdyne. “EHS Policy.” L3Harris SupplierNet. Accessed October 15, 2025. https://arsuppliernet.l3harris.com/suppliernet/doing-business-ar/contractor-safety-program/frequently-asked-questions-faqs-and
Manufacturing.net. “Plant Worker Killed In Rocket Motor Explosion.” September 18, 2008. https://www.manufacturing.net/operations/news/13064477/plant-worker-killed-in-rocket-motor-explosion
Associated Press. “Plant Worker Killed In Rocket Motor Explosion.” Manufacturing.net. September 18, 2008. https://www.manufacturing.net/operations/news/13064477/plant-worker-killed-in-rocket-motor-explosion
Defense Contract Management Agency. “DCMA Overview Brief.” Defense Acquisition University. January 9, 2024.(https://www.dau.edu/sites/default/files/2024-01/DCMA%20Overview%20Brief_DAU_1.9.24%20Updated%20Final.pdf)
DCMA Public Affairs. “DCMA gains new directorate, SES.” Defense Contract Management Agency. November 25, 2019. https://www.dcma.mil/News/Article-View/Article/2024679/dcma-gains-new-directorate-ses/
DCMA Public Affairs. “Technical Director leaves legacy.” Defense Contract Management Agency. July 21, 2022.(https://www.dcma.mil/News/Tag/167023/lupone/)